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ABSTRACT
Using the data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), this thesis studies 
British households’ saving behaviour taking into account the concept of inconsistent 
time preference. The concept of inconsistent time preference suggests that households’ 
time preferences are hyperbolic, and such households appear averse to saving for the 
short term and favour saving for the long term.
This thesis is set out based on two theoretical models: one is the buffer-stock model and 
the other is the quasi-hyperbolic life-cycle consumption model. The buffer-stock model 
under a life-cycle/permanent income hypothesis posits that households make 
precautionary savings to buffer income uncertainty in the next period, and this is known 
as precautionary saving behaviour. Based on the same theoretical specifications, the 
quasi-hyperbolic life-cycle consumption model distinguishes itself from the previous 
model by assuming that households’ time preferences are qualitatively hyperbolic. As a 
consequence, one theoretical anomaly emerges: precautionary saving effect may be 
found missing for a household with a hyperbolic discount function. Econometric 
estimation methods are employed to carry out three empirical studies to examine the 
determinants of households’ short-term saving behaviour and long-term saving 
behaviour respectively. In the empirical framework, the anomaly mentioned previously 
is investigated. Moreover, the theoretical implications of the quasi-hyperbolic 
consumption model are examined.
In general, the empirical findings of this study suggest that British households’ saving 
behaviour can be explained by the quasi-hyperbolic consumption model. First o f all, the 
precautionary saving effect is found to be missing. Secondly, those households who 
possess illiquid wealth tend to save less for unexpected events in the short term and 
prefer to save for the long term, and this is consistent with the pattern that hyperbolic 
households would exhibit. Thirdly, households’ long-term savings-age profiles over the 
life cycle exhibit life-cycle effects, whereas their short-term savings profiles remain 
constant throughout the young and middle age groups.
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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
In modem microeconomics, saving behaviour is about the decisions that households 
make to retain income to finance future consumption as opposed to spending money 
now, for some specific purpose, or for some general unspecified contingency in the 
future; the basis for a theory of consumption is therefore the theory of intertemporal 
choices (Deaton, 1992). Since the 1950s, the Life Cycle Hypothesis1 (LCH)/Permanent 
Income Hypothesis2 (PIH), hereafter the life-cycle model, has become a widely applied 
theoretical framework to explain households’ intertemporal consumption/saving 
allocations over the life span at the individual and household level. In this framework, 
consumers, subject to budget constraint, strive to maintain the smoothest consumption 
path that they can achieve over their life span, in order to maximize the utility of 
consumption. As a consequence, saving is important.
Theoretically, in the standard life-cycle framework where an economic agent is assumed 
to be perfectly foresighted and rational, intertemporal time preference is assumed to be 
constant over time. Time preferences are captured mathematically in a discount function; 
an exponential discount function is generally used in the standard life-cycle model to 
describe the weights placed on utilities received at different points in time.
By contrast, research on the inconsistency of time preference has been growing 
widespread, and to date literature on related investigations has largely come from 
experimental psychologists and experimental economists. The most frequently 
documented texts are characterised by positing the existence of a hyperbolic discount 
function, which argues that the spontaneous preferences of both human and non-human 
subjects take the form of a hyperbolic curve, rather than the conventional ‘exponential’ 
curve that would be produced by consistent choice over time (Ainslie, 1974; Green, Fry, 
and Myerson, 1994; Kirby, 1997). It delivers the reversal of preference: when offered 
the choice between £50 now and £100 a year later, many people will choose the
1 It was developed by the economists Irving Fisher (1867-1947), Roy Harrod (1900-1978), Alberto Ando 
(1929-2001), and Franco Modigliani (1918-2003).
2 It was proposed by Friedman (1957).
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immediate £50. However, given the choice between £50 in five years and £100 in six 
years, almost everyone will choose £100 in six years. A rational economic agent would 
have consistent choice: £100 a year later as well as £100 in six years. David Laibson, in 
the late 1990s, formalised the quality of the hyperbolic discount function in a life-cycle 
consumption model3, namely hereafter the quasi-hyperbolic life-cycle consumption 
model, in order to explain consumers’ consumption/saving behaviour.
Motives for making saving have been integrated in a standard LCH/PIH framework to 
explain consumers’ saving behaviour, such as saving for retirement, saving for the next 
generation, precautionary saving, etc. The formation of the buffer-stock model, in early 
1990s, aimed to explain consumers’ precautionary saving behaviour when they are 
faced with income risk. Since then, the significance of a precautionary saving motive in 
consumers’ saving behaviour has caught a lot of research attention, and many related 
empirical investigations have been undertaken as a consequence. However, the quasi- 
hyperbolic life-cycle consumption model, which introduces the hyperbolic discount 
function to a buffer-stock model, has obtained an anomalous insight regarding 
precautionary saving behaviour.
The quasi-hyperbolic consumption model suggests that hyperbolic consumers take up 
external commitment mechanisms to preserve savings for the long-term future by 
holding them in illiquid forms. In addition, addressing the problem of inconsistent time 
preference, a behavioural life-cycle model (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981; Shefrin and 
Thaler, 1988) brings in the concept of mental accounting as an internal commitment 
mechanism. The main insight of mental accounting suggests that distinguishing the 
purposes for saving or the time in which the money will be used, has significant impacts 
on saving behaviour. The assumption that the asset is fungible does not hold in this 
model. In general, the operations of both hyperbolic discount function and mental 
accounting takes place in the process of making a saving decision, and are at work in 
consumers’ minds: this is often called the ‘black box’. To illustrate this, Wameryd 
(1999) summarised in a diagram4 how these psychological factors perform in an 
economic consumption/saving model.
3 More precisely, Laibson incorporated the feature of hyperbolic discount function with the buffer-stock 
model.
4 Note that this does not stand out as a theoretical model.
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Section 1.2 addresses the development of time preference which is assumed to be 
exogenous in a standard LCH/PIH model, and this is followed by a discussion on saving 
motives in such a model. Section 1.3 presents some of the contributions of psychology 
to economics, namely, inconsistent time preference, mental accounting, and 
psychological perceptions. Section 1.4 sets out the main contributions, objectives, and 
outlines of this study.
1.2 THE STANDARD LIFE-CYCLE/PERMANENT INCOME 
HYPOTHESIS (LCH/PIH)
1.2.1 Development of time preference
As assumed in conventional economics, the concept of time preference states that a 
consumer favours enjoyment nearer in time to distant enjoyment: a consumer with high 
time preference wants to spend money now and possesses a high discount rate on the 
future, whereas a consumer with low time preference has a low discount rate and wants 
to save.
Samuelson (1937) introduced a generalised model of intertemporal choices that was 
applicable to multiple time periods, called the discount-utility (DU) model. In this 
model, a discount rate was generated to play the role of the intertemporal time 
preference, which was viewed as a mixture of the effects of various saving motives that 
are mentioned below. The discussions that culminated in the formation of this model 
originated in the mid-nineteenth century. In his publication The Sociological Theory o f  
Capital in 1834 (1905), John Rae discussed the sociological and psychological 
determinants of intertemporal choices in explaining the differences in national wealth 
levels between nations. In Rae’s view, intertemporal choices, reflecting time preference, 
were the joint product of factors5 (motives) that affected ‘the effective desire of 
accumulation’- a psychological factor that determined a society’s level of saving and
5 Rae introduced four factors: the two factors that promoted the effective desire -  the bequest motive and 
the propensity to exercise self-restraint, and the two factors that limited the effective desire - the 
uncertainty of human life and the excitement produced by immediate consumption and the following 
discomfort of deferring such gratification. (Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue, 2002)
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investment. Drawing upon Rae’s views, Jevons (1888), Jevons (1905), and Senior (1836) 
also contributed to the development of the concept of intertemporal choices. Later, 
Bohm-Bawerk (1889) (1970) began modelling intertemporal choices as decisions about 
allocating resources over different points in time, and this was formalised by Irving 
Fisher (1930). Fisher plotted the intertemporal consumption decision on a two-good 
indifference diagram between two periods. He stated that the pure time preference could 
be interpreted as the marginal rate of substitution between present and future 
consumption, which was equal, in equilibrium, to the relative price of present and future 
consumption (Fisher, 1930). Both Bohm-Bawerk and Fisher considered a list of 
psychological factors that had impacts on a consumer’s time preference.
However, Samuelson (1937) condensed various psychological factors (motives) into a 
single rate of time preference in the DU model, and the discount factor was considered 
to be constant over time. This assumed that a consumer would make identical decisions 
at any point in time. Since then, a standard intertemporal choices model has carried two 
standard assumptions: one is that a consumer’s time preference is positive6 and 
consistent7 over the life span, and the other is that marginal utility is diminishing, which 
motivates a person to spread consumption over time. These are embedded in a standard 
life-cycle model.
1.2.2 Savings motives
As discussed earlier, it has been widely suggested that a person’s intertemporal choices 
involve a variety of determinants, both objective and personal. With his The Theory o f 
Interest, Fisher (1930) based his explanation of a consumer’s personal savings on five 
motives: foresight, self-control, habits, expectation of life, and love for posterity, and all 
these factors had impacts on intertemporal choices.
In a series of articles in the 1950s and 1960s, Franco Modigliani, Richard Brumberg and 
Albert Ando asked why people save, under the life-cycle hypothesis (LCH) (Modigliani 
and Brumberg, 1954). Accordingly, a multiple-period life-cycle model posits that
6 Positive time preference motivates a person to concentrate consumption in the present.
7 Consistent time preference indicates that it should not change with the calendar date from which the 
periods are viewed
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consumers, who are defined as perfectly foresighted and prudent, choose when to spend 
their lifetime resources according to their needs and tastes8, i.e., endeavouring to 
optimize his/her utility according to budget constraints. This indicates that saving 
decisions in this model are considered to be goal-directed, i.e. saving for bequeathing to 
heirs9, saving for holidays, saving for retirement, etc. However, it has been noted that 
the standard life-cycle hypothesis does not deal well with what will happen if incomes 
fluctuate erratically over time, whereas precautionary saving motive - consumers save 
according to their expectation of future uncertainty (risk) - is embedded in the 
permanent income hypothesis (PIH) proposed by Friedman’s (1957). In empirical 
investigations on saving behaviour, it has become a common practice to take into 
account determinants from both the life-cycle hypothesis and the permanent income 
hypothesis, and the two terminologies are usually used interchangeably10, as in both 
hypotheses, consumers are assumed to form intertemporal choices to maximise their 
utility over a smooth path throughout their life span.
Since the late 1980s, Zeldes (1989), Deaton (1991), and Carroll (1997)11, in particular, 
have considered precautionary saving behaviour as playing an important role in 
understanding people’s saving behaviour over the life span at both the micro-unit and 
aggregate levels. The strongest claim in support of the precautionary motive came from 
the work of Carroll (1992, 1997) - the buffer-stock model. With LCH/PIH underlying it, 
an assumption in the buffer-stock model is that consumers are sufficiently impatient in 
the case that, when income is certain, they would like to borrow against future income. 
On the other hand, consumers are also prudent, in Kimball’s (1990) sense that they have 
a precautionary saving motive, in order to accumulate wealth to buffer against income 
uncertainty. This model delivers an insight that consumers with higher income risk in 
the (near-term) future, tend to save more. The existence of a precautionary saving 
motive and its influence has been investigated widely in many countries at the 
microeconomic level.
8 This refers to variables that affect the desirability o f consumption at different points in the life cycle, 
household demographic structure being perhaps the most obvious. (Deaton, 1992)
9 Hurd (1990) is a major modification of the LCH as it added a bequest motive to a standard LCH.
10 This is especially whilst permanent income is defined as the annuity value of current financial and 
human wealth.
11 This work emerged firstly in 1992 as a mimeo and was published as a journal paper in 1997.
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To sum up, a consumption model under a LCH/PIH has mainly paid attention to 
investigating the influence on saving motives for a consumer’s intertemporal saving 
decisions, when the rate of time preference is assumed to be constant and positive over 
time.
1.3 BEYOND THE STANDARD LCH/PIH
1.3.1 Inconsistent time preference
One of the DU model’s anomalies12 suggested by empirical observations is hyperbolic 
discounting: it has been found by experimental psychologists that people’s time 
preference is dynamically time inconsistent and is depicted by hyperbolas. In brief, the 
time discount rate with the future is decreasing as the time point is getting further from 
the present, indicating that discount rates are dynamic over time.
In the domain of Economics, it can be dated back to Strotz (1955) where the idea of 
inconsistent time preference was first proposed. He suggested that, due to the lack of 
self control, a consumer in the future self would not be able to carry out the optimal 
plans which were made by the early self; as a consequence, a consumer would need pre­
commitment mechanisms to make sure that the optimal decisions were carried out. 
Later, the concept of inconsistent time preference and the self-control problem was 
formalised by behavioural economists. The quasi-hyperbolic life-cycle model proposed 
by Laibson (1997, 1998) incorporates hyperbolic discount function with a life-cycle 
model. This model illustrates that whilst making intertemporal choices to optimise 
his/her aggregate consumption utility subject to a budget constraint, consumers are 
assumed to have dynamic inconsistent time preference, and their decisions are 
dependent on the length of time horizon of their perspectives from the current time 
point: a high discount rate on a decision in the short term and a low one regarding a 
long-term decision. Moreover, this model proposes that these consumers would prefer 
saving for the long term to for the short term.
12 Other anomalies include ‘the sign effect’ - Gains are discounted more than losses, ‘the magnitude 
effect’ - Small outcomes are discounted more than large outcomes, ‘the delay-speedup asymmetry’, ‘the 
preference for improving sequences’, and ‘the violations of independence and preference for spread.’ See 
Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002) for a detailed review.
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1.3.2 Nonfungibility of savings
In a standard life-cycle model, money is assumed to be fungible as there is presumably 
a perfect capital market where consumers can lend and borrow freely. Even though 
savings are goals-directed in a conventional life-cycle model, a dollar of money saved 
can serve more than one purpose and therefore savings (accumulated wealth) as a whole 
are treated as an aggregate unit and fungible.
By contrast, Shefrin and Thaler (1988) developed a behavioural life-cycle model and 
employed the concept of mental accounting, as the internal controlling strategies that a 
household applies to cope with its consumption-savings decisions. The idea of mental 
accounting suggests that a consumer has a mindset that assigns resources to various 
accounts, and these accounts have a different marginal propensity to consume. This 
implies nonfungibility. The quasi-hyperbolic life-cycle consumption model (Laibson, 
1997, 1998) also suggests that consumers prefer putting money away for long-term 
purposes in illiquid forms than in liquid ones. This theory also suggests the 
nonfungibility of a consumer’s total savings.
1.3.3 Psychology in a life-cycle model
Both of the aforementioned concepts of inconsistent time preference and mental 
accounting incorporate psychological factors into the conventional economic models. In 
his essay about Behavioural Economics, Katona (1980) proposed that subjective human 
factors loom large in economic activities, such as the motives, attitudes, and 
expectations that influence decisions in economic matters. In The Psychology o f Saving, 
Wameryd (1999) summarised a number of psychological issues regarding saving 
behaviour, and presented a schema (this is NOT a theoretical framework), which is 
shown in Figure 1-1, and explains how one can accommodate psychological variables 
into a life-cycle model. The purposes (motives) of savings addressed in the LCH/PIH 
consumption model can also be seen as being located in ‘future needs’ and ‘control of 
expenditure’ in this diagram. As specified, the concepts of future needs in this schema 
are psychological; that is, the psychological perception relates to the uncertainties of 
household or individual goals, the attainment of which can be threatened in the future, 
for instance, the attainment of the future need of security is affected by a variety of
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sources of risk/uncertainty, corresponding to the precautionary motive. Whilst the four 
goals of future needs may operate together, a time dimension13 can be added to their 
perception of future needs, which simultaneously integrates the influence of time 
preferences. As can be seen, the influences of saving motives and time preferences work 
jointly, leading to a saving act, thus it would be impossible to disentangle the influence 
of a pure time preference from all other influences (Loewenstein, 1987; Benzion, 
Rapoport, and Yagil, 1989). Eventually, it is also suggested that the effect of mental 
accounting can be observed in a saving act as a consumer chooses to put money in a 

















Figure 1-1: A Psychological Schema for the Study of Saving Behaviour (WSrneryd, 1999, p322)
1.4 ABOUT THIS STUDY
1.4.1 Background
One main intuition which underpins this study is from an implication in Behavioural 
Economics, which suggests that a consumer’s time preference is hyperbolic and is
13 The time horizon varies for different persons and may for the same person vary for the different needs. 
(Wameryd, 1999)
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dynamically time-inconsistent. When this is applied to people’s saving behaviour, it is 
suggested that consumers have a higher time preference with giving up £1 now for a 
short-term future, than with giving up £1 for a long-term future. This indicates a higher 
time discount rate on saving for the short term and a lower time discount rate on saving 
for the long term, leading to inconsistent saving behaviour regarding lengths of time 
horizons. For instance, consumers’ intertemporal saving behaviour of a long-term 
planning horizon carries a lower time preference than that of a short-term one, and more 
savings will be made for the long term than for the short term14. Moreover, saving for 
the long term may be preferred than for the short term.
Precautionary saving behaviour has become a prevalent research topic in the past 
decade, and the buffer-stock model is the most well-established theory that addresses 
consumers’ precautionary saving behaviour. It suggests that people, being both 
impatient and prudent, make precautionary savings to buffer income uncertainty in the 
(short-term) future. Whilst the buffer-stock model assumes that a consumer’s time 
discount rate is consistent over time, i.e. exhibiting an exponential discount function, a 
quasi-hyperbolic life-cycle consumption model that integrates the quality o f a 
hyperbolic discount function into a buffer-stock framework, suggests some anomalies. 
One of them is that the precautionary saving effect may be found to be missing for a 
consumer with a hyperbolic discount function, and consumers’ high discount rate (high 
impatience) with saving for the short term is suggested to be the cause.
It thus becomes essential to investigate this anomaly by using empirical analysis, and 
moreover, to explore the determinants of households’ saving behaviour with 
inconsistent time preference being taken into account.
1.4.2 Contributions
The application of time preference into saving motives
Conventional studies of saving behaviour paid more attention to observed wealth 
accumulation and less to consumers’ perceived attitudes or motivations in the decision­
making process, and this is partly because it was difficult to have knowledge about
14 The level of savings made can be considered as an indicator for their time preference: high savings 
made refers to low time preference and vice versa.
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people’s attitudes, unless they were explicitly stated. It has been raised that 
heterogeneity of saving motives needs to be taken into account when one studies saving 
behaviour. As a consequence, this study has the advantage in that it directly looks at 
consumers’ saving motives of a long-term horizon and of a short-term one, as well as 
the amount of savings made in response to such saving motives. Such saving motives 
are considered to reflect households’ subjectively perceived preferences with saving for 
different time in the future, and the amount of savings made regarding such motives 
indicate the degree to which households have managed to give up current consumption 
for the future.
The application of subjective perceived aggregate risk
Uncertainty about future income and uncertainty about subjective life expectancy are 
crucial concepts in discussions of the LCH/PIH; for instance, precautionary saving 
behaviour theory posits that households make savings to buffer against all sorts of 
risk/uncertainty, in particularly that related to future household income15. Related 
empirical literature will be reviewed in chapter two.
The concept of risk should used in situations or outcomes to which probabilities can be 
attached and in principle at least can be insured against, and the concept of uncertainty 
refers to outcomes where there are no probabilities or even any limited interval of 
probabilities (Knight, 1921; Luce and Raiffa, 1990). In the literature of precautionary 
saving behaviour, the concept of risk is more widely applied in that probability 
evaluations of risk/uncertainty are often observed. Nevertheless, these two concepts are 
not always kept strictly apart, in addition, a certain type of consequence may be 
perceived as uncertainty by one person and as risk by another; for instance, mortality 
may be considered as an uncertainty for the young but a risk for the elderly.
In a classic decision making theory, risk/uncertainty is most commonly conceived as 
reflecting variation in the distribution of possible outcomes, their likelihoods and their 
subjective values, and this has always been the main practice in economics. In the 
literature on precautionary saving behaviour, measurement of risk/uncertainty in the 
early stages was largely obtained by a relatively objective evaluation -  taking the means
15 The buffer-stock model specifies the future of a short-term perspective.
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and the variances of the aggregate income/consumption distribution or income 
realisation from panel data. Gradually, subjectively estimated uncertainty/risk has 
become widely applied, subject to the availability of appropriate datasets16: individuals 
were asked about the likelihood of being unemployed in the next year; moreover, 
individuals were asked about their income expectations, about the percentage change if 
the individuals responded to expect a change, about being unemployed, etc. They were 
also asked to give a scale of possibility for scenarios of expectation, which concerned 
their level of certainty of these being fulfilled. However, the accountability of such 
information may be undermined by the possibility that respondents find it a very 
difficult task to manage, or by the situation that respondents may not think 
probabilistically about uncertain events. (Ellsberg, 1961; Zimmer, 1983, 1984; 
Dominitz and Manski, 1997)
There are various sources of risk that individuals perceive themselves to face; however, 
it is very uncommon to find in any survey that information about an individual’s risk of 
different facets of their lives has been comprehensively collected. This makes it more 
difficult to estimate an overall indication of individual’s risk. In accordance with 
Wameryd (1999), the concept of subjectively perceived risk is adopted to indicate 
households’ perception that their future needs/goals would be under threat, which is a 
more psychologically driven approach. Stone and Winter (1987) have defined risk as a 
subjectively-determined expectation o f loss; the more certain one is about the 
expectation, the more risk he/she has. This idea has been widely applied in the field of 
consumer behaviour, and only the recent studies are named here (Lim, 2003; 
Cunningham, Gerlach, Harper, and Young, 2005).
This work applies a household’s general evaluation about its financial situation in the 
next 12 months as an indicator for its aggregate perceived risk. Those who expect 
deterioration in their financial situation are considered to be more certain about a risk, 
than those who expect improvement or those who expect things to remain unchanged. 
This posits that these households make saving decisions based on their subjective
16 For instance, the VSB Panel project at CentER, Tilburg Univeristy. The VSB Panel project is known as 
the Dutch household survey - CentER Panel Survey (CPS), and this survey started in 1993. The 
information in the data set can be divided into seven categories: household characteristics, 
accommodation, labour-market status, pension entitlements, health, income, assets and liabilities, and 
economic and psychological aspects o f financial behaviour.
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evaluations about every facet of their lives, including not only income uncertainty but 
also health and other risks.
The application of effects of habit
Katona (1975) noted that most behaviour is routine behaviour. In psychology, habit 
implies a tendency towards routine and repetitive behaviour; several interpretations can 
be applied on continued habits in saving behaviour. First, in a doer-player behavioural 
model, doers may apply habitual rules to control players’ impulsive actions; for 
example, households join Christmas clubs or apply internal rules of thumb to save 
money regularly (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981; Shefrin and Thaler, 1988). Secondly, it may 
well be that there are habitual restrictions on consumption (Marshall, [1890] 1990; 
Wameryd, 1999), suggesting that if people were brought up to control their means, they 
are most likely to keep to this pattern. Thirdly, people prefer things to stay the same, 
and thus it causes discomfort to break a well-established habit, and this refers to a 
cognitive bias - status quo bias (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1991), e.g. 
endowment effects (Thaler, 1980) and loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; 
Thaler and Benartzi, 2004). In this study, habit effects on households’ saving ratio 
regarding long-term and short-term purposes, will be investigated. Households who 
report to save primarily fo r  no specific reason ’ are considered to practice saving as a 
result of habit (Wameryd, 1999).
Objectives
■ To explore households’ savings behaviour of a long-term planning horizon and those 
of a short-term planning horizon, respectively, by using the data from the British 
Household Panel Survey. The research frameworks in this work aim to investigate 
the determinants of saving motives and savings per se for two time preferences.
■ Precautionary saving behaviour, from a short-term perspective, will be explored 
through the hypothetical relationships between households’ inclination to save for 
the short term and their perceiving higher risk, as well as between households’ short­
term saving ratio and their perceived risk.
■ Moreover, this work examines the extent to which the ownership of housing wealth 
and the enrolment in private pension schemes influence households’ saving 
behaviour with respect to different time preferences. Households’ holding of housing 
wealth indicates that they choose to accumulate wealth in illiquid forms, and their
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paying into a private pension scheme underlines the fact that they have committed 
themselves to an external mechanism, in order to save for retirement. Imposing 
illiquidity on wealth and commitment to making savings characterise some of the 
approaches which hyperbolic consumers would utilise, in order to keep themselves 
from splurging and to manage their saving.
■ The impact of habit effects on saving behaviour (saving ratios), for the two different 
time preferences, will be examined.
■ Age effects on saving behaviour will be explored by analysing households’ long­
term savings-age profile and short-term savings-age profile, over the working life 
cycle.
Outline
Chapter two contains a literature review. Section 2.2 presents the theoretical framework 
and implications of the buffer-stock model. In addition, it includes the theoretical 
framework of the quasi-hyperbolic life-cycle consumption model and its implications 
and related discussions. The theoretical anomaly between these two models will be 
shown. Lastly the theoretical implications of savings-age profile throughout a life cycle 
from these two models are discussed. Section 2.3 reviews the related empirical issues of 
the buffer-stock model and the quasi-hyperbolic consumption model. Section 2.4 
concludes this chapter.
Chapter three discusses issues concerning the data and the sample selection. To begin 
with, the constructions of the dependent variables subject to the content of the survey 
questions, which are saving motives in the first stage, saving ratio in the second stage, 
and savings amount in the third stage, are illustrated in detail. In addition, the 
construction of explanatory variables is also explained and related theoretical and 
empirical justifications are presented. Next, descriptions of samples are provided. A 
whole sample is selected from waves 10-13 of the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS), and the sample is disaggregated into two subgroups - homeowners and private 
pension participants - for the first and the second empirical studies, and into five groups 
in the third empirical study - males, females, homeowners, private pension participants, 
and employees. The separation between males and females considers the influence of 
gender difference. Putting homeowners and private pension participants into 
comparison shows the effects of two distinct external commitment mechanisms to
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saving behaviour -  homeownership and private pension enrolment. The self-employed 
are distinct from employees in that they are more financially vulnerable as their social 
security welfare are less guaranteed. In addition, the self-employed can be considered as 
both private persons and enterprises, and entrepreneurs tend to save, on average, a larger 
proportion of their income than other people with similar incomes and have a unique 
and apparently powerful motive to save (Katona, 1960). Employees are used instead 
because the sample size of the self-employed is too small for empirical estimation being 
undertaken. Finally, based on the valid samples, elementary data analyses will be 
presented.
Chapter four considers the econometric frameworks and estimation methods to be 
applied on three empirical studies, respectively. Firstly, two methods are proposed and 
explained: a random-effect order Probit model and a seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR) model. Because the dependent variable is characterised as qualitatively discrete, 
the random-effect ordered Probit model is applied for panel-data estimation. The SUR 
model considers four cross-sectional estimation equations in a single framework, by 
assuming that correlation exists amongst the equations. Secondly, a random-effect Tobit 
model is employed, mainly because the dependent variable is censored. Thirdly, a 
nonparametric kernel smooth quantile estimation method is employed.
Chapter five covers the first empirical study, which is to explore the changes in 
likelihood of saving motives. First, the results of a panel-data estimation method of the 
whole sample and the two subgroups -  homeowners and private pension participants - 
are discussed. Second, the estimated results of a SUR model are analysed, in addition, 
the time consistency of the coefficients of the independent variables, will be examined.
Chapter six is concerned with the second empirical study, and the determinants of 
saving ratios of a long-term horizon and a short-term horizon will be analysed 
respectively. Moreover, the influence of habit effects on saving ratios will also be 
examined in this chapter. The estimated coefficients and estimated marginal effects of 
the determinants will be reported at the whole sample level and for the two subgroups.
Chapter seven is the third empirical study, and aims to estimate the long-term savings- 
age and short-term savings-age profiles over the working life cycle, namely between
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ages 25 and 65. Analyses are carried out at the whole sample level as well as on five 
subgroups -  males, females, homeowners, private pension participants, and employees. 
A nonparametric cross-sectional kernel smooth quantile estimation method is employed.
Chapter eight concludes the findings and limitations of this study. In addition, possible 
directions for future research are proposed.
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CHAPTER 2 : LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The life cycle model is used to explain the households’ intertemporal 
consumption/savings behaviour. Consumers are assumed to be perfectly able to foresee 
their future income path, and are inclined to smooth out consumption over the life cycle, 
in particular, to keep the consumption at a habitual level. The standard model assumes 
that saving for retirement is the dominant saving motive. However, this is unable to 
explain the observed household savings behaviour.
Under the standard life-cycle hypothesis, the buffer-stock model has been derived with 
the key proposition that consumers possess precautionary saving motives, and hence 
accumulate liquid wealth stock to buffer the shocks of income uncertainty on 
consumption. In the buffer-stock model, it is assumed that the consumers are 
sufficiently impatient, implying that they would borrow against future income without 
income uncertainty, and meanwhile prudent so that they would defer current 
consumption and put money away.
Although allowing for heterogeneity with time preference across individuals/households, 
the standard life-cycle model assumes that consumers’ time preference is consistent 
over time. However, this assumption has been proved inconsistent with human being’s 
observed intertemporal decision-making process. It has been found by experimental 
psychologists that people’s preference is dynamically time inconsistent and is depicted 
by hyperbolas: in brief, the time discount rate with the future is decreasing as the time 
point is getting further from the present. The consumers with hyperbolic discount 
function are willing to put away some money when this task will take place in the 
distant future. However, when the date of action is approaching, the consumers become 
less willing to do it. Hence, the later selves have the self-control problem and are unable 
to accomplish what the early selves have expected them to do.
Strotz (1955) was the first work that analysed intertemporal choices by providing a 
theory of dynamic inconsistent preference of a myopic economic individual. In contrast
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with Strotz’s (1955) investigating the changing (inconsistent) time preference of an 
individual over time, Thaler and Shefrin (1981) developed a model in which an 
individual is assumed to have two sets of preferences that are in conflict in a single 
point in time in which the self-control problem arises. This work was thus the first 
systematic and formal treatment of a two-self man, which considers there being a 
planner and a doer within a single individual. Strotz (1955) and Thaler and Shefrin 
(1981) all suggested that some accessible external pre-commitment schemes or some 
internal mechanism are applied by an individual, to tackle his/her self-control problem. 
Accordingly, the concept of mental accounting was proposed in Shefrin and Thaler 
(1988) as internal controlling strategies. The feature of mental accounting indicates that 
the consumers have a mindset that assigns resources to various accounts, which have a 
different marginal propensity to consume. Correspondingly, the consumers manage to 
save money by assigning money to the accounts with relatively low marginal propensity 
to consume. The idea of mental accounting suggests that assets are nonfungible, and this 
is in contrast to the standard life-cycle model. More recently, David Laibson (1997, 
1998) has developed the quasi-hyperbolic life-cycle consumption model to integrate the 
feature of inconsistent time preference and the asset-allocation strategies into the 
framework of the buffer-stock model. The feature of inconsistent time preference posits 
that the effective discount factor is determined by the weighted interaction between the 
inclination to consume in the near future and the aim to save for the long-term future. 
The asset allocation strategies shed light on the asset allocation between liquid assets 
and illiquid assets of a quasi-hyperbolic consumer: the current individual is inclined to 
put some resources away in illiquid forms in order to impose liquidity constraint on the 
next-period self s budget and to prevent himself/herself from a splurge in the short run. 
Similarly, these asset allocation strategies also suggest the feature of asset-specific 
marginal propensity to consume.
In the quasi-hyperbolic life-cycle consumption model, the precautionary saving effect 
may be found missing (Laibson, 1997) and this is one anomaly between the buffer-stock 
model and the quasi-hyperbolic life-cycle consumption model. The intuition emerges: 
with a short-run perspective, the consumers are too impatient to save and instead are 
tempted to gain instant gratification; meanwhile, being aware of such a self-control
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problem, they tend to accumulate wealth in illiquid forms17, and leave relatively small 
amounts of liquid assets accessible.
The standard life-cycle hypothesis states that the main motivation for saving is to 
accumulate resources for later expenditure, in particular to support consumption at a 
habitual standard during retirement. Consumption smoothing leads to a humped shape - 
inversed ‘U’ - age path of wealth holding (Modigliani, 1986): individual households 
dissave in young age, save in middle age, and dissave again after retirement. Breaking 
down aggregate savings by saving motives has been introduced into empirical studies. 
The buffer-stock model introduces the precautionary saving motive into the life-cycle 
model, implying that saving for uncertainty also determines the savings-age profile. 
Furthermore, the quasi-hyperbolic consumption life-cycle model infers that savings 
made with a short-term perspective may not be consistent with those of a long-term 
perspective.
Section 2.2 illustrates the theoretical implications of the buffer stock model and the 
quasi-hyperbolic life-cycle consumption model; in addition, one theoretical anomaly 
between the two models is explained. Section 2.3 reviews recent relevant literatures and 
discusses related issues in empirical studies based on the two theoretical models. 
Section 2.4 concludes this chapter and explains the role of this study.
2.2 THEORETICAL ISSUES
2.2.1 The buffer-stock model
Evolving from the work of Stephen Zeldes (1989), Angus Deaton (1991), and 
Christopher Carroll, the buffer-stock saving model under the life cycle hypothesis was 
firstly proposed by Carroll (1992, 1997). Buffer-stock saving behaviour can emerge 
from the standard dynamic optimization framework when consumers facing important 
income uncertainty are both impatient and prudent. The consumers are sufficiently 
impatient in the sense that if income were certain, they would like to borrow against 
future income to finance current consumption. On the other hand, they are prudent in
17 The illiquidity may take the forms of external commitment schemes.
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the sense that they have a precautionary saving motive. In Miles Kimball’s (1990) sense, 
the term ‘prudence’ is meant to suggest the propensity to prepare and forearm oneself in 
the face of uncertainty. This contrasts with ‘risk aversion,’ which is how much one 
dislikes uncertainty and would turn away from it if possible.18
The theoretical framework starts with the assumption that the consumers choose 




Et denotes consumers’ expectation at time t . u(C) denotes the utility function of 
consumption ( C ), and takes the form of the standard Constant Relative Risk Aversion
Q \~ P
(CRRA): u(C) = ------  , where p  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion;
i - p
fi  = 1/(1 + 8) denotes the discount factor where 8  is the time-consistent discount rate, 
indicating intertemporally consistent time preference. The dynamic budget constraint is:
W ^= R [W ,+ Y ,-C ,]  (2.2)
where R = (1 + r ) , denoting the constant gross interest rate; W , denotes the current 
stock of non-human net wealth; Yt is current labour income. Labour income changes 
due to transitory and permanent shocks, both assumed to be log-normally distributed:
Y,=P,V,
(2.3)
P,= G P ^N ,
Pt is permanent labour income19; Vt is the white noise transitory shock to income; N t
is a lognormally distributed white noise with mean value 1 and a multiplicative shock to 
permanent income; G = (1 + g) denotes the growth factor for permanent labour income.
18 Arrow-Pratt index measures of absolute and relative risk aversion have been widely used (Arrow 1965; 
Pratt 1964). Denote v (x ) as a utility function and X for the consumption level; index 
— v"(x ) /  v'(x) =  a(x) refers to a measure of absolute risk aversion, and xa(x) refers to the 
coefficient o f relative risk aversion. The index of prudence is thus measured as — Vm( x )  / vn(x) = p (x ) .
19 The log of P  is assumed to follow a random walk with drift: In Pt =  In G +  In Pl_] +  In N t .
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In any period, optimal consumption will depend on labour income of this period and the 
non-human wealth accumulated, namely, the current total cash-on-hand, denoted as X :
(2.4)X,=W, + 7,
and the cash-on-hand of the next period is given by:
X ,^ = R [ X ,-C ,]  + Y,/+! (2.5)
Therefore, the consumer’s problem can be written as:
I T (  i \
K,(X,) = max k(C,) + £ : , £  \ \ p
subject to
i = t + \  j= t+ \ y
X t+i = R[Xt - C t\ + Yt+], and




Consider a consumer solving the finite horizon problem with last period of life T . The 
consumer is assumed to spend total resources he has in the last period ( X T), the Euler 
equation for optimal consumption in the period before last is:
u \C T_x) = RJ3Et_]U'(Ct ) = RpET_ ,u \X T) (2.9a)
Equation (2.9a) refers to marginal utilities between two periods being equal. 
Alternatively, it can be expressed in terms of ratios to permanent income P  , 
X  C
i.e. x , = —- 20, and ct = — . Reconsidering P  in terms of equation (2.3), equation (2.9a)
can be rewritten as:
u'{cT_lPT_x) = RpE j^u'iX jP j) = Rj3ET_^ u '(xT GPT_^ N T )
(2.9b)
2Qjc X ,  R j X ^ - C ^  + Y, R { x , _ x -  c t_x)P,^  + Yt /?(*,_,  -  c , [ Y,
1 P, P, P, GP,_xN, Pt
_ P(Xl-l ~ Ci-1 ) y
GN,
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By dividing equation (2.9b) by Pr_, and substituting for the value xT according to the 
ratio mentioned above, yields
A ct-i) = m Ty { [ R{XT-' Ct- '1 + Vt]PNt ) (2.9c)
(_7iV J*
Therefore, equation (2.9c) defines the optimal value of the consumption ratio cT_i as a 
function ofxr_, , i.e. cT_x (xr_,). A numeral optimal consumption rule is derived by using 
backwards recursion on the period-by-period Euler equations; therefore, between period 
T - 1 and T -  2, a similar Euler equation holds,
u’{CT_2) = RJ3Et_2u\C t _x)
► U (ct_2Pt _2) ~ RpET_2U \cT_j (Xj_j )-^ 7’_i ]
 ► u’(cT_2) = RPEt_2u'{ct_, [ R(Xt' \ ~  Cr-;) + vr_, ]GNr_,}. (2-9d)
(jiV j  j
Similarly, equation 2.9(d) defines cT_2 as a function of xT_2 , i.e. cT_2 {xT_2) .  More 
generally,
u'(c, ) = RJ3E,u'{c,tl {R(X' ~ C' } + VM ]GNm  }
t+1
 ► u \c ,)  = R f i l [ u '{ c M [ ^ ^ -  + VM ]GNM}dF(y)dF(H) (2.10)
As can be seen, the function ct (x,) is defined by equation (2.10). Because there is no
analytical solution for this, numerical methods were used to solve the optimal 
consumption rule. The numerical methods were illustrated in Carroll (1992, 1997)21.
21 It was assumed that in period t + 1 , income would be zero with some possibility, p  , i.e. Vt+] =  0 ;  if
income is not zero, Vt+l and vV/+1 are distributed lognormally with expected value (1 — p )  and 1, 
respectively.
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When income was perfectly certain, consumption growth, denoted as (In Ct+l -  In C ,) or 
A In C/+122 , would be approximately p~x ( r - S ) .  A condition for a sufficiently impatient 
consumer is given as p~l (r -  8) < g : such a consumer would wish to borrow against 
future income if income was certain, the level of consumption must be higher than the 
level of income, indicating that his consumption growth is slower than income growth . 
Under income uncertainty, say, if the change in permanent income is distributed 
lognormally with variance a \nN, the successive consumption rules ct (x,) ,  c,_3 (xM), ..., 
converge24 i f :
p - '{ r - 8 )  + (£)< jlN < g - ^  (2.11)
c2
The lnN on the left-hand side of equation (2.11) reflects the additional consumption 
2
growth induced by the permanent income shocks, and, on the right-hand side, the 
reduction in the mean growth of the log of income necessary to maintain EtN t+l = 1.
Precautionary saving behaviour generated in the buffer-stock model is given by the 
Euler equation for consumption growth. Provided that shocks to consumption are 
lognormally distributed, consumption will grow according to:
A In C(+, « p-'(r-<5) + ( | ) £ ,  var(A In C„,) + (2.12)
22 To derive this formally, note that the Euler equation in equilibrium is: 
u \ C t ) =  Rj3u'(Ct+l) -> (C t )~p =  R /3(C t+])~p -»  ^ ^ -  =  (R /3)]lp . As making the usual
approximation that ln [ i? ]« r  and ln[/?] =  —8  , taking logs of both sides gives the 
ln C ,+] - I n C ,  = p~x( I n + I n /?) « p~l( r - 8 ) .
23 Approximation can also be made on income growth: ln [G ] «  g  .
24 As mentioned above, the numerical method involves solving the optimal consumption rule in the last 
period of life, then that in the second-to-last period, then that o f the third-to-last period, and so on, until 
the difference between successive consumption rules is small enough that the consumption rule can be 
said to have converged.
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The key insight in equation (2.12) is that the expected variance of consumption growth, 
Et var(AlnC/+1), will be negatively related to wealth. Consumers with less wealth have 
less ability to buffer consumption against income uncertainty, thus they have higher 
Et var(A In Ct+]) and faster consumption growth, A In Ct+l. The rate of consumption
growth is high when wealth is small because the level of current consumption is being 
depressed by precautionary saving as a result of prudence.
The theoretical implications on precautionary saving behaviour emerge. Firstly, 
consumers are assumed to be sufficiently impatient that they would borrow (dissave) 
whilst income were certain, and are prudent in the sense that they would accumulate 
(precautionary) wealth to buffer income shocks. The internal tension between 
impatience and prudence may reach a target wealth/income ratio under which 
consumers tend to save and above which consumers tend to dissave. Secondly, 
consumers with higher income uncertainty tend to have higher buffer stock, and such 
precautionary wealth presumably takes a highly liquid form. Thirdly, although in theory, 
consumers’ consumption-saving decisions are a function of total gross wealth, the 
appropriate place for the buffer-stock model is an explanation of truly discretionary 
“high frequency” saving decisions of the median consumers. Moreover, this model is 
not useful for explaining consumers’ life-cycle saving behaviour, for instance, investing 
in housing wealth and participating in pension plans. (Carroll, 1997)
2.2.2 The quasi-hyperbolic consumption life-cycle model
Following Strotz (1955) and Phelps and Poliak (1968), Laibson (1997, 1998)25 
developed a life-cycle consumption model with a quasi-hyperbolic discount function. 
The quasi-hyperbolic consumption life-cycle model to be presented below integrates 
observed behavioural findings of human beings in the experimental field of Psychology, 
and develops an analytical framework to illustrate the consumers’ intertemporal 
consumption-saving decisions. The psychological notions employed are inconsistent 
time preference, which suggests that consumers have reversed preference or present-
25 Laibson (1997) names the model as a golden egg model, which put emphasis on the allocation of 
illiquid wealth and liquid wealth of households. Along with Laibson (1998), this model is also based on 
the life-cycle hypothesis, thus is considered as well a hybrid of a life-cycle consumption model with 
quasi-hyperbolic discount function.
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biased preference, and this pattern is attributed to the fact that consumers have a self- 
control problem in that they are not perfectly rational as economists have believed. 
Nevertheless, consumers are aware of such a problem and seek solutions of 
precommitments. The evolvement of incorporating psychological elements into a life­
cycle model posits the bounded rationality of consumers in their decision-making 
behaviour.
Model specifications of inconsistent time preference
In the quasi-hyperbolic consumption model, a consumer is modelled as a composite of 
autonomous temporal selves interacting as players in a finite-horizon dynamic game. 
The selves are indexed by their respective periods of control (t = 0,1,2,...T) , over a 
consumption decision. The consumption plan subject to budget constraint is an 
assumption carried over from the buffer-stock model addressed before. Self t receives 
payoff in utility:
f/,(C 0;C„...,Cr ) = £,[«(C,) + /?X<?'«(C,+,)] (2.13)
1=1
subject to
x m  = R (X , - C , )  + yM (2.14)
During period t , the consumer has cash on hand X t > 0 . He/she chooses a 
consumption level Ct e  [0, X t ], which rules out borrowing. Whatever the consumer 
does not spend is saved, St = X t -  Ct e [0, X t ]. The gross return, R , on his/her saving is 
fixed. X t+] denotes cash-on-hand during period t + 1 . Labour income, Y  , is 
independently identically distributed over time with density / .  The consumer cannot 
sell his uncertain stream of future labour-income payments. S,J3 in equation (2.13) are
Clpdiscount parameters, and 0 < 8 ,fi  < 1. w(C) =  is a utility function with constant
i - p
relative risk aversion (CRRA) coefficient p  e (0,oo).
A unique sub-game equilibrium exists in a finite-horizon game. This equilibrium is the 
Markov perfect and is characterised by time-dependent consumption rules which are
32
linear in wealth. The formal derivation is proved by applying a backwards induction 
argument (Laibson, 1996). From the perspective of self t , the marginal benefit of 
postponing ‘ A ’ units of consumption generates a stream of utility perturbation: whilst
A 'u '(C t) utilities are lost at time t ,  p S  — • R -A 'tt'(C (+l) utilities are gained at
dX r+1
dCV .
time t + \ .  — —  is the marginal consumption rate at period t + j .  At time t + 2
dXt+j
p  • S 2  —  • (1------—) • R 2 • A • w'(C,+2) utilities are gained, etc.... Therefore, the net
dXt+2 dxt+]
effect from period t to the last period T sums to:
T~t
A „'(C ,)+
,=i ox t+i R'Au'(Ct+i) (2.15a)
Setting expression (2.15a) to zero and dividing the equation by ‘A* yields an Euler 
equation:
/-I
7=1 0 A t+ j
(2.15b)
The analogous Euler equation for period t +1 is:
T~(t+1)
»XCM ) = P  Z  3
/=] ^ /+!+/a x
M dCn o-§^)
7=1 0 / 1  r+ 1 + y
#V (C ,+]+l) (2.15c)
Substituting equation (2.15c) into equation (2.15b) yields the generalised Euler equation 
below:




9 ftThe Euler equation (2.16) is different from the standard Euler equation in that a 
dynamically inconsistent time preference is applied. The intuition behind this 
equilibrium is that self t gets more marginal utility from incremental consumption in
the distant future, denoted as
the near future, denoted as
1 - ex , than from incremental consumption in/+i
\e c M ( x M)
ex. , as @8 < 8 . This arises because the*+i j
‘overconsumption’ problem, which, from the point of view of self t , self t +1 will have, 
lowers marginal utility at time t +1 relative to marginal utility in future periods.
Therefore, the general discounting term
dCt+l(X )
dX
P S  + 1 - dCt+f X )
dX
is referred
to as the effective discount factor, which varies linearly with the next period’s marginal 
propensity to consume (MPC). Intuitively, the effective discount factor weights the 
discount factor that applies between today and tomorrow - fiS  - by the fraction of 
marginal savings that get consumed tomorrow, and weights the discount factor that 
applies between all other future periods - 8  - by all that remains in the formula. When 
the MPC is close to one(zero), most weight is place on PS{S) , which implies a 
low(high) discount factor. Thus life-cycle variations of the MPC and hence of the 
discount factor gives support to the proposition that the intertemporal 
consumption/savings decisions can be dynamically inconsistent over the life cycle.
As shown in equation (2.15b), the discount function in this model assigns a discrete 
time discount function with values (1 ,p S ,p 5 2 , pS3 , which is called the quasi- 
hyperbolic discount function, in that it captures the quality of the hyperbolic discount
97function -  in this period the discount rate on next-period utility is greater than the 
discount rate on the one-period-ahead utility in any period in the future, and keeps 
analytical tractability of the exponential discount function. Figure 2-1 below graphs the 
exponential discount function (assuming S  = 0.97 ), the generalised hyperbolic discount
26 This equation reduces to the standard Euler equation when /?  =  1.
27 Hyperbolic discount function implies declining discount rate over time. Psychologists have discovered 
that the discount functions of people’s valuing future rewards are displayed as hyperbolas; for instance, 
Ainslie (1992) reviewed the hyperbolic discount rate of animals’ and human’s observed behaviour.
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function28 (assuming a  = 105 and /  = 5 x l 0 3 ), and the quasi-hyperbolic discount 
function (J3 = 0.6 and S  = 0.99), respectively.
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Figure 2-1: Source: Laibson (1998)
Strotz (1955) was the first work that analysed intertemporal choices by providing a 
theory of dynamic inconsistent preference of a myopic economic individual. He posited 
that whilst the plan is optimal from the perspective of today’s individual, the individual 
tomorrow will likely abandon the plan of today because he will be a different person 
with a new discount function from the standpoint of tomorrow. Later, Phelps and Poliak 
(1968) developed a model of the inconsistent time preferences in the context of the 
intergenerational imperfect altruism. Inconsistent time preference has been proposed as 
an anomaly against the intertemporal discount utility model on its assumption of a 
common time preference.
It is generally considered that such inconsistent time preferences occur due to the fact 
that the consumers have self-control problems: they have a taste for immediate 
gratification29 and tend to delay carrying out tasks, namely, to procrastinate30. This is
28 The discount function is characterised by an instantaneous discount rate that falls at T  rises, 
(l + a r ) ' r / a , a , y >  0 .
29 Gratification is the positive emotional response to a fulfilment of desire. 
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gratification]
30 Procrastination is defined as the deferment or avoidance o f an action or task to a later time.
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also termed as the present-bias preference by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999): when an 
economic agent considers trade-offs between two future moments, present-biased 
preferences give stronger relative weight to the earlier moment as it gets closer.
In addition to the quasi-hyperbolic consumption model, the influence of the self-control 
problem was generated in previous theoretical literature: Strotz (1955) noted the self- 
control problem as the future self is not able to follow the plan the current self has set 
up and hoped the future self to follow; Thaler and Shefrin (1981) considered the self- 
control problem as internal conflicts o f  simultaneous preferences within an individual. 
Amongst these theories, sophisticated consumers are assumed to be perfectly aware of 
the self-control problem, whereas naive consumers do not know about such problems. 
The division has led to theoretical analysis on behavioural outcomes as a result of the 
degree of sophistication (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999), e.g. O’Donoghue and Rabin 
(2000) concluded, with some illustrations, that the degree to which a person is aware of 
self-control problems, is a crucial determinant of the implications of the self-control 
problems. Having said so, the awareness of the existence of the self-control problems 
are to be given more attention than the degree of this existence in this thesis. First, 
tractability is required in a modelling environment, thus it is commonly assumed that 
economic agents are sophisticated, in the sense that they make use of commitment 
devices to manage self-control problems. Second, the degree of awareness in each 
individual’s mind is impossible to measure.
When the self-control problem arises as a consequence of inconsistent time preference, 
economic individuals, even rational and sophisticated, practically seek instruments to 
overcome the problem. Strotz (1955) proposed ‘precommitment ’ as a strategy in the 
face of inconsistent time preference. An individual today will try to ensure that he will 
do tomorrow what is optimal from the viewpoint of today; consequently, the individual, 
even rational, is willing to pay a price to precommit to future actions and to avoid 
temptation. Thaler and Shefrin (1981) suggested that individuals would favour rules to 
manage the self-control problem. Implementation of precommitment or rules is to 
control impulsive actions, and in general they take the form of depending on an external 
agency, such as joining pension plans and a Christmas club, or a form of internal control.
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Procrastination]
36
Regarding internal control, two further points can be made: firstly, some rules are 
considered learned as much as chosen, e.g. rules can be learned from parents or other 
role models, which implies that there will be a difference in the use of rules depending 
on social class, education, and age (Shefrin and Thaler, 1988); secondly, rules of thumb 
easily become habits, which bring rigidities into consumers’ behaviour and are 
dynamically stable (Ainslie, 1975; Shefrin and Thaler, 1988). More recently, featuring 
the concept of cognitive control developed in cognitive neuroscience, Benhabib and 
Bisin (2005) explicitly modelled the internal commitment mechanism with respect to 
the self-control problems on dynamic consumption-savings decisions at the 
macroeconomic level.
Model specifications of self-commitment
The quasi-hyperbolic consumption life-cycle model generates a theoretical implication 
that consumers, in order to manage self-control problems, impose liquidity constraints 
on their binding budgets by strategically allocating assets between liquid forms and 
illiquid forms.
In an economy with highly stylised commitment technology, it is assumed that a 
consumer may invest in two instruments, a liquid asset X L, and an illiquid asset Z . 
Instrument Z is illiquid in the sense that the liquidating of this asset has to be initiated 
one period before the actual income is received, and this implies that he/she may borrow 
against his/her Z holdings but will receive cash flow one period later. By contrast, the 
consumer can always consume his/herX Lholdings immediately. In each period/, the 
consumer makes consumption/savings decisions in discrete time/ e {1,2,...,T} . Every 
time period / is divided into four sub-periods: in the first sub-period, production takes 
place, and the consumer’s liquid assets X j^  and illiquid assets Zt_x, which were chosen 
at period / - 1 ,  yield a gross return of Rt = 1 + rt , and the consumer inelastically 
supplies one unit of labour; in the second sub-period the consumer receives 
deterministic labour income Yt and gets access to his/her liquid savings, Rt • X fix; in the 
third sub-period, the consumer chooses current consumption, Ct <Yt + Rt ■ Xf_x. In the
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fourth sub-period, the consumer chooses his/her new asset allocations, X \  and Z ,,
-j -l
subject to the constraints :
Y, +R,(Z,_, + X,i_,)-C , = Z ,+ X f-, X ,\Z , > 0 (2.17)
The left-hand-side of equation (2.17) is considered as savings ( St ) for this period and is
to be carried over as part of the resources for the next period. The right-hand side shows 
the asset allocations, which are decided by current self, in order to make the future self 
follow its expected consumption path. Z, > 0 32 and X tL > 0 33, and these constraints 
exclude forced saving contracts.
Let ht represents a feasible history at time t and this includes all the actions that have 
been made from time 0 to time / -1 : {X q , Z0, (Cr, Xj:, Zr )'rl1}. Let M t represent the set
T
of feasible strategies for self t . Let M  = ]^[M, represent the joint strategy space of all
r=i
selves. If m e  M  , let m \h t represent the path of consumption and asset allocation
levels from t to T which would arise in the condition that history ht were realised, and
self t to T  played the strategies given by m . Finally, let Ut{m \ht) represent the
continuation payoff to self t if self t expects m \h t to be carried out. With an attempt to
overcome the problem that equilibrium strategies cannot be derived from marginal 
conditions under an inconsistent time discounting rate, a restriction is put on 
deterministic labour income process:
u'(Y,) > p 5 ’ ( f \ R m )u \Y ,„ ) V t,r>  1 (2.18)
/ '= !
31 The consumer begins with exogenous endowments X  £ ,Z  Q > 0
32 Creditors are unwilling to make an uncollateralized loan if  an asset reallocation leaves the illiquid 
account negative, because a consumer who received such a loan would not have an incentive to repay.
33 This condition rules out that the consumer could set XL t0 any negative value, because in this case,
he/she could perfectly commit his/her future savings behaviour and hence his/her consumption level. 
Having said so, credit card borrowing behaviour may to some extent be against the constraint and the 
x  i £ o may occur.
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This restriction constrains the sequence {T,}J=f to lie in a band whose thickness is 
parameterised by the value of /?, and calibration shows that such restriction also allows 
for substantial flexibility in the deterministic income process. The equilibrium strategies 
will be characterised under the following definitions:
Firstly, a joint strategy, m , is resource exhausting if m \ hT_x is characterised by 
Z T = X j  = 0 , for all feasible hT_x . Secondly, a sequence of consumption/savings 
actions, {C},X f , Z - CT, X ^ Z T} satisfies properties (2.19a)-(2.19d) below if Vf > t ,
u'(C,)>  max 0 S '< \ \R m )u'(C,„) (2.19a)
u \C ,)  > m ^ p S ' ( Y \ R M)u'(C,„) => C ,= Y I, + R ,X ^  (219b)
«'(C,+I)<  max (2-19c)
/=]
«'(CM )>  max = 0  (2.19d)
Property (2.19a) is a standard Euler equation relation for an environment where 
liquidity constraints exist, that is, C, < Yt + RtX ^  . The inequality arises because 
marginal utility can be too high, which refers to low consumption level, relative to 
future marginal utility, but cannot be too low, referring to high consumption level, as 
consumers always have the option to save. Property (2.19b) indicates a situation in 
which when marginal utility is too high (low consumption level), the liquidity constraint 
must be binding. Property (2.19c) and (2.19d) reflect the strategic decisions that self t 
makes when it chooses asset allocation levels, X f  and Z t : property (2.19c) refers to
that self t will limit self t + 1 ’s liquidity as much as possible ( X f  = 0) if consumption 
at t +1 is expected to be too high relative to what self t would prefer it to be; property 
(2.19d) suggests that self t will not limit self t + l ’s liquidity at all ( Z, = 0 )  if
consumption at t +1 is expected to be too low relative to what self t would prefer it to 
be. Therefore, the equilibrium theorem emerges:
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'Fix any T-period consumption game with exogenous variables satisfies (2.18). There 
exists a unique resource exhausting joint strategy, m* e M , that satisfies (2.19a)- 
(2.19c), and this strategy is the unique (sub-game) equilibrium. ’
This theorem proposes that there exists strategic self-control behaviour in an inter­
temporal consumption/savings decision. Early selves prevent later selves from splurging 
by using illiquid asset holdings ( Z ). On the equilibrium path, each self is endogenously 
liquidity constrained by the allocation choices of earlier selves ( X L). Consumers 
performing such strategic self-control actions will exhibit asset-specific marginal 
propensity to consume (MPC). As mentioned, the current self is always endogenously 
liquidity constrained on the equilibrium path, hence the MPC out of liquid wealth is one 
and the MPC out of illiquid assets is zero. Theoretical propositions are as follows: let 
C, = Ct (RtX f_x, RtZ t_}) represents the equilibrium consumption strategy of self t , then
dC,
d( R X - i )  
dCt
= 1 Vf > 2 (2.20a)
= 0 V/ > 2 (2.20b)
In the quasi-hyperbolic consumption model, consumers are assumed to be sophisticated 
and realise that they have a self-control problem, which is characterised by a higher 
discount rate on the decisions in the short-term future than on the decisions in the 
distant future, namely inconsistent time preference. Intuitively, consumers will be more 
likely to save for the long term than for the short term. Being aware of such a self- 
control problem, sophisticated consumers choose to impose liquidity constraints on 
future consumption by allocating assets into illiquid forms. This is to prevent the future 
selves, in particular the next period self, from over-consumption; also, illiquid assets 
generate investment income flow in the future. Whilst the current selves lack immediate 
access to illiquid assets as a result of the binding decisions of the previous selves, they 
are tempted to spend most of the liquid assets and current cash flow. This confirms in 
theory that the MPC of illiquid wealth equals zero whereas the MPC out of liquid 
wealth is almost or equal to one, from which the implication of asset-specific marginal 
propensity to consume (MPC) is derived.
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The feature of asset-specific MPCs is also realised in the concept of mental accounting, 
which is considered as a type of internal rule for consumers to manage their self-control 
problems in a behavioural model (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981; Shefrin and Thaler, 1988). 
The key assumption is that consumers treat components of their wealth as non-fungible, 
even in the absence of credit rationing, which is contradictory to conventional economic 
theories. Accordingly, the wealth of a consumer can be divided into three accounts34: 
current income ( / ) ,  current asset (accumulation of discretionary savings) ( A ), and 
future wealth ( F  ); it is assumed that the MPC of the wealth is account-specific. This 
model suggests that:
, dC dC dC A 
1* —  > —  > —  * 0  (2.21)
81 8A 8F K }
In expression (2.21), characteristics of account-specific MPCs indicate a prediction in 
the consumer’s consumption/saving behaviour that the portion of wealth regarded as 
future wealth ( F  ) is more likely to be saved than the portion of wealth considered as 
current asset ( A ) as the former account has a lower marginal propensity of consume 
(MPC) assigned to it than does the latter. Analogously, the portion of wealth regarded 
as future wealth ( A ) is more likely to be saved than the portion of wealth considered as 
current asset ( / ) ,  as the former account has a lower MPC assigned to it than does the 
latter account.
The idea of asset-specific MPC proposed in the quasi-hyperbolic consumption model 
conveys the effect of an external binding force and such a force prevents consumers 
from accessing to the liquidity. Mental accounting, in comparison, addressed a self­
directed internal accounting rule within a consumer. Pursuing whether the external 
constraint or the mental accounting rule is the main attribution of account-specific 
MPC/asset-specific MPC is not the focus of this thesis. In the real world, there are no 
comprehensive external commitment schemes for consumers to make use of in order to 
carry out a rational consumption/savings pattern over the life-cycle, and hence assuming 
that consumers, to some extent, command an internal controlling power, is reasonable.
34 Three accounts just represent a general description. In real world, the account of current assets may 
derive a number of sub-accounts, e.g. for children’s education, for holiday, etc. Also, the ways households 
consider housing wealth and pension plans as assets or future wealth vary from one household to another.
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Hence, I would propose that the internal mental accounting rule that the consumer 
possesses, could persuade him/her to distribute assets in both liquid forms and illiquid 
forms, as the illiquidity of assets plays a role in preventing consumer from obtaining 
instant liquidity.
In sum, the quasi-hyperbolic consumption model posits that consumers behave 
differently in the intertemporal decisions between now and the near-term future from 
those between now and the long-term future. Accordingly, consumers’ savings 
behaviour for the long-term future may differ to that for short-term purposes.
It can be recalled that in the buffer-stock model, consumers are both impatient5 and 
prudent, and they save to buffer uncertainty in the next period. By contrast, hyperbolic 
consumers are too myopic so that they tend to over-consume the savings which is easily 
accessible when the next period comes. Such controversy was firstly proposed in 
Laibson (1998) by suggesting that the precautionary saving effect may be missing with 
hyperbolic consumers. Later on, Laibson, Repetto, Tobacman, Hall, Gale, and Akerlof 
(1998) used a second order Taylor expansion of the generalised Euler equation of 
consumption growth yields:
E,(° M C' ) = - ( 1 — + (8C,: ' ('Y,<|)) + 0(2) + s M (2-22)
C, p  RS p  R8 d X t+1
where X  denotes total cash-on-hand, dC,+](Xt+x) has been expanded around zero, and 
0(2) has been substituted for second order terms, which includes the conditional
. In the exponential case ( p  = 1), the new first ordervariance term, £±.
2 ' c
term, J—— ftf-iYE fdCt+l(Xl+]) vanishes. And the relationship between consumption
p R 8  ' dXt+l
growth and expected consumption growth conveys the precautionary saving motive. In 
the hyperbolic case, where 0 < < 1, estimates of the precautionary saving effect
35 This is in the sense that they would borrow against future income if  future income would be certain.
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inferred by ^> + 1jg
2 '
will be biased owing to the new first order term.
Assuming that the first order term dominates the second order terms, the direction of
The intuition is: in the theory of the buffer-stock model, precautionary saving effect 
takes place whilst a high consumption growth is observed, and a higher consumption 
growth is usually associated with a higher MPC in the next period. However, a high 
MPC in the next period implies a low effective discount factor and consumers tend to be 
more short-sighted and indulge, than be rational when making savings. The controversy 
emerges: whilst the buffer-stock model predicts that consumers save in this period to 
buffer income uncertainty in the next period, consumers with a hyperbolic discount 
function are reluctant to save for the next period in order to prevent themselves from 
over-spending.
2.2.3 The savings-age profile over the life cycle
This section gives a brief review of the theoretical implications of the savings-age 
profile in a standard life-cycle model, where time preference is assumed to be consistent 
and in a life-cycle model, where time preference is inconsistent, respectively.
Under a standard life-cycle hypothesis
The life-cycle hypothesis states that the main motivation for saving is to accumulate 
resources for later expenditure and in particular to support consumption at a habitual 
standard during retirement. Consumption smoothing leads to a humped shape - 
inversed ‘U* - age path of wealth holding (Modigliani, 1986): individual households 
dissave during young age, save in middle age, and dissave again after retirement. This 
hypothesis has led to much empirical investigation of whether: 1) households’ savings- 
age profile over the life cycle is humped, or 2) households dissave or decumulate asset 
after retirement, or 3) both.
this bias is given by the co-variation of and
J —L  _ i)£ (dC,+l(-T,+i)  ^? an(j their co-variation is negative as /3 < 1.
p R S ^  dXn]
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Investigating various motives of savings provides insights into the relative importance 
of them over the life cycle. Whilst the main foreseeable event in one’s life is old age and 
retirement under the conventional life-cycle hypothesis, saving for income uncertainty, 
namely the precautionary saving motive, has been modelled in the buffer-stock model, 
as another important driving force of a household’s savings profile (Zeldes, 1989; 
Carroll, 1992, 1997). It is posited that consumers engage in precautionary saving 
behaviour against income uncertainty until roughly age 45 or 50, and thereafter extend
'if:
this to include some retirement saving . In Samwick (1998), a life-cycle model was 
proposed allowing for savings for retirement and as a result of precautionary motives. 
These modifications on a life-cycle model suggest that there is a decumulation after 
retirement and an upward path before middle age. Jappelli and Modigliani (2003) 
commented that ‘Refinement o f  the standard model, allowing fo r  precautionary 
saving...may affect the age which one should start observing wealth decumulation. It 
does not, however, affect the main implication o f the theory that individual wealth 
should eventually tend to fa ll with age, with saving becoming prevailing negative. ’ 
Moreover, the introduction of saving motives into the standard life cycle model helps to 
explain some empirical puzzles, e.g. allowing intergenerational transfer (Kotlikoff and 
Summers, 1981; Kotlikoff, 1988), in particular the bequest motive, and uncertain 
lifetime duration (Davies, 1981), into the standard life-cycle model, is proposed to 
explain the enigma of why wealth decumulation, or dissaving, may not be found 
amongst those who are retired.
Under a life-cycle model with inconsistent time preference
The quasi-hyperbolic consumption model gives up one assumption of the standard life­
cycle model, by allowing for inconsistent time preference in perspectives. This model 
implies that opportunities to save more in the future will be considered more attractive 
than those in the present (Laibson, 1998; Thaler and Benartzi, 2004), and hyperbolic 
consumers are more capable of saving for the long term than for the short term: they are 
aware of the self-control problem, and practice precommitment to accumulate wealth 
for long-term purposes, and meanwhile their present-bias preference tends to cause 
immediate consumption and makes them averse to saving for the short term. 
Accordingly, Laibson (1998) proposed that, in the buffer stock model with hyperbolic
36 This implication was obtained though a simulation on field data, which will be mentioned in the 
following section.
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agents, individuals/households only build up small wealth stocks to buffer high- 
frequency income shocks, such as variable income.
By proposing mental accounting as an internal rule to manage the self-control problem, 
Shefrin and Thaler (1988) suggested that consumers label their wealth according to the 
time when the wealth will be used, therefore, savings put into an account that is for 
long-term future purposes are more easily preserved than those put into one that is for 
short-term future purposes, because people have a higher MPS long-term savings than 
with short-term savings.
The intuitions of the impact of inconsistent time preference on consumers’ saving 
behaviour and the influence of labelling savings converge to allow for a testable 
hypothesis: consumers with inconsistent time preference would have more savings for 
long-term purposes than for short-term purposes. Provided that external saving schemes 
are available, savings for long-term purposes may pick up the effects of average income 
growth throughout the life cycle, whereas savings for short-term purposes remain 
constantly small. Moreover, in equilibrium, a hyperbolic consumer should have a high 
proportion of illiquid wealth and little liquid wealth, which provides an insight into the 
asset portfolio of such households over the life cycle.
2.3 RECENT EMPIRICAL STUDIES
2.3.1 Precautionary saving behaviour
Empirical investigation into household/individual precautionary saving behaviour can 
be categorised into three approaches. Firstly, the uncertainty-savings approach 
straightforwardly examines the relationship between savings and uncertainty of 
expectation in the next period. A second approach is to test the Euler equation of 
consumption growth, i.e. equation (2.12), that conveys the relationship between higher 
income uncertainty and higher consumption growth. Finally, the insurance-savings 
approach investigates the hypothesis that consumers who have been sheltered by a 
private insurance policy or public social security schemes, tend to save less, and this
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hypothesis can suggest a wealth replacement effect, between insurance and 
discretionary precautionary savings.
The most crucial issue which one comes across in an empirical study of precautionary 
saving behaviour is how to choose a suitable proxy indicator for the measurement of 
uncertainty. Consumers face different types of uncertainty throughout the life cycle, for 
instance: longevity risk, health risk, employment risk, earning fluctuations risk, and so 
on, and these risks are considered to have an impact on households’ expectation of their 
future financial situation, hence affecting consumption/savings decisions, throughout 
their entire lives.
Every saving decision regarding the expectation of the future, including future 
uncertainty, involves a time horizon of planning. In theory, precautionary saving 
behaviour is specified as consumers save more this period to buffer income uncertainty 
in the next period. It is often the case that a field survey collects data of 
households/individuals on an annual basis. As a consequence, empirical works that aim 
to test this theoretical insight consider ‘a year’ as the standard formation of ‘period’. 
Therefore, empirical studies have generally considered uncertainty in the next year as 
being in the next period.
Proxy for uncertainty/risk
According to the Euler equation of consumption growth, the uncertainty lies in the 
variability of future consumption. Using the U.S. datasets, Kuehlwein (1991) and 
Dynan (1993) used consumption variability as the indicator for uncertainty. In the 
United Kingdom, Merrigan and Normandin (1996) used consumption variability -  the 
fluctuation of consumption changes and the fluctuation of consumption growth -  to 
investigate the precautionary saving behaviour of British households. However, there 
are some critics. To begin with, in practice, it is likely that consumption variability, 
especially quarterly consumption variation37, is not subject to uncertainty, but due to 
other seasonal reasons, which relate to vacation expenses, children’s education fees, etc 
(Carroll, 1992). Moreover, a high percentage of the consumption variability, especially 
in food consumption, is attributable to noise. (Shapiro, 1984; Runkle, 1991)
37 Dynan (1993) used quarterly consumption variability to represent uncertainty.
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The theoretical model states that the variability arises in the deviations of a household’s 
actual income and its permanent income, and such deviations are presumed to be 
comprised of the effects from both permanent and transitory shocks. Income variability 
thus has been used as an indicator for uncertainty. Carroll and Samwick (1997) 
measured aggregate variance of income by taking the difference between two detrended 
incomes for two periods, divided by the length of the duration, to have an annual figure, 
and this measurement was also applied in Guariglia (2001) and Brown and Taylor 
(2006). Furthermore, Kazarosian (1997) 38 and Carroll and Samwick (1997) 
disaggregated the total variance of the annual income innovation, defined as the 
observed current income and estimated permanent income, into permanent shocks and 
that of transitory shocks. Guariglia (2001) adopted two related measurements of income 
variance: one takes the income variance between two periods, by assuming that income 
shocks are permanent, and the other takes the income variance by assuming that income 
shocks are temporary. Banks, Blundell, and Brugiavini (2001) disaggregated income 
variance into two sources: one is common to all birth cohorts and the other is cohort 
specific39. However, these ways of measuring income variability/variance are subject to 
the problem of selectivity bias. For instance, households in risky occupations, which 
have high income variance, may have chosen them because they are less risk averse40 
(Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese, 1992; Lusardi, 1997). Moreover, the practices 
mentioned above inferred expectations from the data about income realization and made 
assumptions about the process of ‘rational’ expectations formation. This does not 
necessarily correspond with households’ expectation at the point of decision-making, as 
researchers in most cases do not have enough information to know how consumers 
formed expectations regarding income uncertainty. (Dominitz and Manski, 1997)
Carroll (1992) stated that ‘In the buffer stock model..., unemployment expectations are 
therefore important because typically the most drastic fluctuation in a household’s 
income are those associated with spells o f unemployment’. Unemployment risk has 
become a popular proxy indicator for income uncertainty in a number of empirical
38 The variance of income over a spell of periods is decomposed into permanent shock and from transitory 
shock.
39 The motivation of breaking down income risk is to examine the evidence of risk pooling and risk 
sharing across generations.
40 Such a problem also raises attention in that occupation is considered as a proxy for income 
uncertainty/risk. (Skinner, 1988)
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works. In Carroll, Dynan, and Krane (2003), the estimated conditional probability of 
unemployment serves as a proxy indicator for unemployment risk. This measures the 
probabilities of currently employed heads of household becoming unemployed in the 
next period, and this can be seen as a rational expectation of the odds which are 
conditional on demographic, occupational, and educational characteristics of these 
people. In the United Kingdom, a similar approach was applied in Benito (2004). 
However, this method includes the questionable assumption that individuals have an 
identical mindset regarding their rational expectation of their future uncertainty. 
(Dominitz and Manski, 1997)
Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese (1992) raised the importance of the role of subjective 
expectation in measuring income uncertainty. Lusardi’s (1998) was the first paper to use 
subjective data, i.e. the subjective possibility of unemployment, when analysing 
precautionary saving behaviour in the United States. In the survey, individuals were 
asked to evaluate the chances that they will lose their jobs in the next year. A 
measurement of income variance was derived as p{\ -  p)Y2, where p  is the predicted 
subjectively-reported possibility of job loss 41 and Y denotes the income from 
employment. If the unemployment insurance replacement rate is a , the variance of 
income becomes p{\- p X l - a f Y 1. In the United Kingdom, this approach was used by 
Guariglia (2001) and Benito (2004).
Subjective estimates of income uncertainty are well documented in countries where 
there are comprehensive survey datasets. For example, the Bank of Italy Survey of 
Household Income and Wealth (SHIW): Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese (1992), Lusardi 
(1997), Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese (1996), and Jappelli and Pistaferri (2000) used 
households’ subjective expectation on income growth for the next 12 months, to 
estimate the indicator for subjective income risk. In the survey, respondents were asked 
their opinions about their labour earnings or pensions 12 months from now, and they 
were given 100 points to be distributed amongst a given set of opinion categories. The 
reason for asking respondents to give a weighting was to measure how certain they were 
about each condition. However, one criticism of this method is that many respondents
41 The predicted subjective probability is reported from an ordered Probit regression of the probabilities 
of job loss on a set o f job characteristic.
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found it to be a very difficult task to understand the question and to assign weights, and 
thus the rate of non-response was very high (Wameryd, 1999). Moreover, a specific 
concern in eliciting probabilities is that respondents may not think probabilistically 
about uncertain events (Ellsberg, 1961; Zimmer, 1983, 1984; Dominitz and Manski, 
1997).
More recently, empirical applications have reinforced the efficiency of using qualitative 
subjectively reported measurement of households’ income uncertainty. Murata (2003) 
employed the expectations of economic situation in the near future and of future public 
pension benefits, as two indicators of income uncertainty, to explore precautionary 
saving behaviour in Japan. The question regarding the economic situation was:
‘Do you think that Japan’s business conditions will be better in the near future?’ 
Responses were chosen from the following: ‘much better, slightly better, no change, 
slightly worse, and much worse. ’
It was considered that the uncertainty over labour income for the next year, for those 
who selected ‘no change ’, was lower than that of those who replied ‘worse ’ or ‘better ’ , 
with the assumption that households’ economic prospects could generally affect the 
probability distribution of their expected labour earnings. In addition to short-term 
uncertainty, Murata (2003) applied the long-term uncertainty of households regarding 
their public pension benefit, and this measurement was also in a qualitative form. 
Moreover, Hochguertel (2003) used subjective future income uncertainty in the next five  
years as a proxy indicator for income uncertainty. In contrast with previous literature 
that specified income uncertainty as uncertainty expected to occur in the short term 
future, say, in the next 12 months, the indicators of subjective expectations with income 
uncertainty applied in Murata (2003) and Hochguertel (2003) have suggested that 
consumers’ expectation of uncertainty in the long-run future, also plays a role in their 
precautionary savings decisions.
Whilst it has been widely presumed that income uncertainty, in terms of job loss or 
income fluctuations, is the most influential on households’ precautionary saving 
behaviour, the effect of other types of risk on consumers’ savings decisions has also 
caught the attention of some empirical investigation. (Starr-McCluer, 1996; Chou, Liu, 
and Hammitt, 2003)
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Other related empirical studies
As mentioned in the preceding section, precautionary saving behaviour has been 
discovered through three relationships: savings-uncertainty, consumption growth- 
uncertainty, and insurance-savings. According to the Euler equation of consumption 
growth, the second relationship posits that consumption growth is positively correlated 
with income uncertainty (Kuehwein, 1991 and Dynan, 1993 on U.S. data; Merrigan and 
Normandin, 1996; Miles, 1997; Jappelli and Pistaferri, 2000; Banks, Blundell, and 
Brugiavini, 2001, Guariglia and Rossi, 2002; Benito, 200442 on British data)43. The third 
relationship suggests that a certain type of insurance is negatively correlated with 
precautionary wealth, for the purpose of buffering the corresponding type of risk, as 
insurance has played a role in protecting people from experiencing unpleasant incidents, 
and high level of generosity of insurance may crowd out people’s attempts in 
accumulating precautionary wealth (Starr-McCluer, 1996; Gruber and Yelowitz, 1999; 
Engen and Gruber, 2001; Chou, Liu and Hammitt, 2003). The discussion below will 
focus on the first relationship, which indicates that savings is positively related to 
uncertainty.
In the United Kingdom, Guariglia (2001) investigated the impact of income uncertainty 
on the temporal discretionary savings (flow) for sample households selected from the 
data of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), 1991-1998. This work dealt with 
two main issues: the estimation method and the proxies for uncertainty. Regarding 
estimation method, cross-sectional estimation is the most common approach in studying 
precautionary saving behaviour (Kazarasian, 1997; Carroll and Samwick, 1997, 1998; 
Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese, 1992; Lusardi, 1998). However, it is known that, at the 
cross-sectional level, it is impossible to disentangle the effects of proxies of risks from 
those of other consumer attributes, even if an instrumental variable is carefully chosen 
(Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese, 1992). Because of these limitations, she applied a 
panel-data estimation method, which has the advantage of disentangling business-cycle 
effects and other unobserved effects on households’ savings, which cannot be done by a
^Exceptionally, Benito (2004) investigated the effect of job risk on changes in households’ consumption 
level. The intuition is an increase in unemployment risk leads to postponement of the purchase of 
consumer durables, as households instead opt to add to their precautionary assets. A similar study in the 
United States can be found in Carroll and Dunn (1997).
43 There is more literature that examines the theory of precautionary saving by looking at the effects of 
income uncertainty on household consumption. (Menegatti, 2007; Bertola, Guiso, and Pistaferri, 2005; 
Jappelli and Pistaferri, 2000)
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cross-sectional estimation method. In her paper, four measures of income uncertainty 
were employed, ranging from objective income variance to subjective income 
variability44. The results for the panel-data estimates showed that the precautionary 
saving effect was evident45. More recently, carrying out a panel-data estimation method, 
Brown and Tayler (2006) re-examined the relationship between income risk46 and 
savings by using data from the BHPS, 1991-2003, at both individual and household 
levels. Their findings confirmed that a precautionary saving effect was evident.
The buffer-stock model posits that precautionary savings (wealth) ought to be 
accumulated in liquid forms, and thus theoretically, liquid financial wealth is considered 
as the main source of buffer holdings. In the empirical literature, it has become 
prevalent to relate income uncertainty/risk to households’ assets in various forms 
(Carroll and Samwick, 1997, 1998; Lusardi, 1998, Carroll, Dynan, and Krane, 2003; 
Murata, 2003; Jappelli, Padula, and Pastaferri, 2005), and some empirical studies have 
even investigated the precautionary saving effect only on household’s total net worth 
(Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese, 1992; Kazarosian, 1997; Lusardi, 1997), from which, 
the primary source of precautionary wealth can be explored47. Carroll and Samwick
(1997)48 evaluated precautionary saving behaviour by respectively regressing three 
specifications of wealth holdings - very liquid assets, very liquid assets and non-housing, 
non-business wealth49, and total net worth - on the income variability uncertainty. The 
results confirmed that these three types of assets appeared simultaneously evident as the 
sources of precautionary wealth. Furthermore, Carroll and Samwick (1998)50 attempted 
to gauge the proportion of the three types of household wealth, which are mentioned 
above, attributed to precautionary savings. Interestingly, the result suggested that 
precautionary savings were not necessarily held in very liquid forms, and the
44 They are income variance adjusted with subjective probability of job loss, income variability, income 
variance when income shocks are assumed transitory, and income variance when shocks are assumed 
permanent.
5 The last measure of income uncertainty related to precautionary saving only at the 13% significance 
level.
46 The way o f measuring income risk was similar to the second measure in Guariglia (2001): income 
variability.
47 Another possibility concerns the impact of income risk to changes in households’ portfolio 
management strategies (Guiso, Jappeilli, and Terlizzese, 1996; Hochguertel, 2003).
48 The data of wealth information was selected from the year 1984 and the data for measuring income 
variability was selected from the years 1981-1987 of the U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
49 Unsecured debt is deducted from here.
50 Sample included heads of households that were aged 50 or younger, from the 1981 dataset of the PSID.
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explanation was that, compared to the extent to what the occurrence of a large shock 
would cost, the cost of liquidating illiquid assets was small.
More recently, Carroll, Dynan, and Krane (2003) looked at the effect of job loss risk on 
household wealth holdings. The authors selected the sample from the 1983, 1989, and 
1992 waves of the U.S. Current Population Survey (CPS), to estimate unemployment 
risk based on observable household characteristics, and then related the predicted job 
loss risk to corresponding household net worth, provided by the U.S. Survey of 
Consumer Finance (SCF). Interestingly, the results provided little evidence that 
households accumulated more wealth in response to an increased probability of job loss. 
When the wealth holdings are defined as net financial wealth or net worth without home 
equity, the precautionary responses are close to zero, at all income levels and are no 
longer statistical significant. However, net worth, including housing wealth, is 
correlated with unemployment risk. The results here reinforced the findings in Carroll 
and Samwick (1998) in that precautionary savings are likely to be held in illiquid forms. 
Moreover, they point to home equity as a driving force behind the relationship between 
total net worth and unemployment risk. Hence, this was considered rather 
counterintuitive to the theoretical implications, and it was proposed that the preference 
of holding illiquid housing wealth over liquid financial wealth, may relate to consumers 
with a hyperbolic discount function.
Despite these significant findings, it is worth noting that a cross-sectional relationship 
between income uncertainty and wealth was estimated in Carroll, Dynan, and Krane
(2003) as well as in the majority of the empirical studies mentioned above. In addition 
to the concern about using a cross-sectional estimation method, which was pointed out 
previously, there are some issues concerning specifying net worth as savings, in cross- 
sectional data. Savings flows, which are specified as the difference between disposable 
income and consumption in a given period, are a contribution to the changes in the 
value of wealth. However, these changes in wealth also result from other sources, and 
one of them can be capital gains or loss, which does not relate to consumers’ actions or 
decision to postpone current consumption for the future (Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese, 
1992). In contrast with the literature which considers wealth as savings, Guariglia (2001) 
and Brown and Taylor (2006) treated savings as the amount of money that individuals 
managed to put away in a certain period. This specification has the advantage of
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showing the extent to which an individual has postponed his/her consumption for the 
future, in a given period. Moreover, relating such savings to future risk supports the 
concept of precautionary saving, which is different to connecting the relationship 
between asset(wealth) and risk, i.e. higher stock of precautionary savings51 as a result of 
higher future risk.
In sum, regarding literature on precautionary saving behaviour, discussions about the 
variety of proxies for uncertainty, estimation methods - cross-sectional or panel data 
analysis, and the specifications of savings have been presented above.
2.3.2 The quasi-hyperbolic life-cycle consumption model
The fact that people’s time preferences are dynamically inconsistent provides a new 
perspective for economic analyses of consumers’ intertemporal consumption-saving 
decisions. It highlights the importance of looking into consumers’ consumption-saving 
decisions, in the context of short-term purposes or of long-term goals, as consumers’ 
savings decisions for the long term are more likely to be formed as a result of rationality, 
whereas savings decisions for the short term are strongly driven by consumers’ myopia 
and inclination towards instant gratifications. Previous related empirical studies can be 
categorised as follows: 1) to measure the time discount rate through laboratory 
experiment, in order to examine if inconsistent time preferences existed in individuals’ 
decision-making process; 2) to calibrate structure estimation using micro data based on 
a modem consumption model, using basic assumptions of uncertain future income and 
liquidity constraint, and to search econometrically for the values of parameters to fit 
observed data; 3) to launch a natural field experiment.
Estimating time preference
The effect of inconsistent time preference (hyperbolic discounting) can be identified at 
the point of decision-making of a subject, and in many cases, this has been done in 
experiments studies. To estimate time preference, a typical experimental study asks 
subjects if they would prefer £X now or £Y at a specified future date. Often experiments 
have been conducted with hypothetical rewards, or with ‘points’ redeemable at the end
51 Precautionary savings at any date is the stock o f extra wealth that results from the past flow of 
precautionary saving measured during previous discrete time periods.
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of the experiments (thereby eliminating any rationale for time preference). Concerning 
the experimental studies of hyperbolic discounting, subjects were asked how much they 
would like to require at a specific future date, to make them indifferent to now (Thaler, 
1981; Chapman, 1996). Alternatively, the existence of hyperbolic discounting was 
examined in terms of the pattern preference reversal - a subject may prefer £110 in 365 
days over £100 in 364 days, but also prefer £100 now over £110 tomorrow (Kirby and 
Hermstein, 1995). Recent literature from laboratory experiments is still not able to 
come to the conclusion that a human being’s time preference takes the shape of a 
hyperbolic discount function, even though, it is generally rejected that it is in the form 
of an exponential discount function, and time preference should be time inconsistent 
and present-biased (Fernandez-Villaverde and Mukheiji, 2002; Benhabib, Bisin, and 
Schotter, 2004). Concerns with the accountability of laboratory experiments are due to 
the fact that the design of the experiments is seldom immune to issues of strategic 
manipulability or of framing effects (Benhabib, Bisin, and Schotter, 2004). Evidence of 
estimating the time discount rate from observed field data is also widespread . 
However, the complexity of measuring discount rates is located in that, apart from pure 
time preference, there are many possible factors which have an influence on 
individuals’ intertemporal choices (Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue, 2002), 
such as uncertainty53, reference-dependent utility54, etc. These factors can be 
confounding, but ignoring them could cause bias in the estimation of time preference.
Empirical evidence of the quasi-hyperbolic consumption model
With respect to the theory of the quasi-hyperbolic consumption model, there have been 
several empirical studies which were carried out largely in calibrated simulations on 
observed field data, in the United States. A common research design emerged: 
simulated consumption/saving profiles of consumers, who were assigned an exponential 
discount function, and those of consumers, who were assigned a hyperbolic discount 
function, were compared. Laibson, Repetto, Tobacman, Hall, Gale, and Akerlof (1998)
52 Regarding this, Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002) have done a comprehensive survey of 
empirical estimates of annual discount rate via experiments or field data. Dating from 1978 to 2002, these 
estimates display tremendous variability amongst discount rate measurements- ranging from -6% to 
infinity.
53 Empirical evidence suggested that introducing objective uncertainty to both current and future rewards 
can affect estimated discount rates. (Keren and Roelofsman, 1995)
54 A standard approach to estimate discount rates assumes that utility function is linear in the magnitude of 
the choices objects, say the amount of money. However, reference-dependence utility makes this 
approach invalid. (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)
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conducted simulations of intertemporal consumption-savings choices throughout the life 
cycle, within three types of economies - one for exponential consumers, one for 
hyperbolic consumers, and the third for a hybrid economy55. The simulation results 
showed that, compared with the exponential consumers, the hyperbolic consumers are 
more likely to encounter liquidity constraint, and for them the precautionary saving 
effect could appear to be missing. Applying similar calibrations, Angeletos, Laibson, 
Repetto, Tobacman, and Weinberg (2001) investigated the simulated consumption 
profile, liquid and illiquid wealth accumulation profile, and credit card debt 
accumulation profile over the life cycle for the first two of the three types of households. 
Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (2005) estimated the respective long-term and short­
term time preferences, by using the field consumption data of the Federal Reserve’s 
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF)56. The simulation results indicated that the quasi- 
hyperbolic discount function fitted more closely the observed higher stock of illiquid 
wealth before retirement and credit card debt accumulation, than the exponential 
discount function. The benchmark estimates suggested a 40% short-term annualised 
discount rate and a 4.3% long-term discount rate. Moreover, Laibson, Repetto, 
Tobacman, Hall, Gale, and Akerlof (1998) estimated the precautionary saving 
behaviour57 on simulated hyperbolic and the exponential economies. The estimated 
precautionary saving effect58 was lower in the hyperbolic case, than in the exponential 
one. The calibration estimation suggested that the precautionary saving effect was weak, 
or even lost amongst the hyperbolic agents. In general, the simulation studies mentioned 
above provided evidence for the quasi-hyperbolic consumption model. However, such 
structural modelling relies on a large set of explicit and implicit assumptions.
Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2005) conducted a natural field experiment to explore how 
individual’s time preferences practically influenced their saving decisions, in the
55 The dataset for calibrations are largely from the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) 
and the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
56 The calibrations were based on a buffer stock consumption model and included a number of factors that 
affected consumers’ intertemporal consumption-saving decisions, such as liquid and illiquid assets, 
revolving credit, liquidity constraints, household dependents, retirement, Social Security, and stochastic 
labour income.
57 The estimation equation took the form of C(+l - C ,  f  C,+) -  C, Y , according to the Euler
—q ~ ~ a° + a'{ c, J +s,+l 
equation (2.22). cf+1 -  c, is instrumented by the resources reserved -  savings - at time t .
c,
58 This is represented by the coefficient (X] .
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Philippines. To begin with, they examined individual’s time preferences by asking 
hypothetical questions. Next, they explored whether those who had exhibited hyperbolic 
preferences previously, made saving decisions which were consistent with the 
theoretical implications, i.e. taking up a commitment mechanism of savings59 to manage 
a self-control problem.
In Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2005), the effectiveness of a commitment savings account 
on financial savings was evaluated. The findings suggested that there was a strong 
positive impact from saving commitment on increases in savings. Thaler and Benartzi
(2004) designed a savings programme for a field experiment, to explore whether people 
who undertake a savings commitment would save more than those who do not. The key 
findings were: first, a high proportion (78 percent) of those offered the plan joined, 
second, the average saving rates for the programme participants increased from 3.5 
percent to 13.6 percent, over the course of 40 months. These empirical findings point to 
the possibility that those who precommit themselves to saving for the future may 
eventually save more. In contrast with this, under a standard life-cycle hypothesis, the 
existence of a state pension system or private pension system has raised the issue as to 
whether or not this would have a crowd-out effect on discretionary savings. Attempts to 
measure the impact of public pension and private pension wealth on household private 
saving, namely the wealth replacement effect, have taken up much empirical 
investigation (Feldstein, 1974; Alessie, Kapteryn, and Klijn, 1997; Attanasio and 
Brugiavini, 2003; Attanasio and Rohwedder, 2003; Jappelli, Padula, and Bottazzi, 2003). 
As can be seen above, an anomaly has emerged amongst these empirical studies.
Empirical studies on the quasi-hyperbolic consumption model are largely based on 
simulations and there are a few based on field experiments, but empirical estimation 
appears to be rare. Moreover, empirical studies which bring the concept of inconsistent 
time preference or hyperbolic discount function into analysing British households, to 
this researcher’s knowledge, have not been undertaken.
59 The authors also evaluated the effectiveness of using a commitment savings account on financial 
savings. The results showed that the participants that took up this product had a higher probability of 
increasing their savings after twelve months, relative to the control groups. In addition, there is other field 
experimental evidence on the effect o f saving commitment mechanisms on an increase in individuals’ 
savings. (Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick, 2001; Thaler and Benartzi, 2004)
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2.3.3 Empirical evidence of savings-age profiles
The standard life-cycle hypothesis posits that the main motivation for saving is to 
accumulate wealth for later expenditure and in particular to support consumption at the 
habitual standard during retirement. The consequence of consumption smoothing 
throughout the life cycle, leads to a humped shape age path of wealth holdings 
(Modigliani, 1986): individual households dissave, namely borrow, in young age, save 
in middle age, and dissave again after retirement. This theoretical implication has 
drawn much of the attention of researchers in the context of advancing empirical 
examinations via field data. In the literature concerning savings-age profiles, two 
issues have emerged as important: one is the specification of savings, and the other is 
the estimation methods to be applied.
Specification of savings
The issue related to the specification of saving/savings has merited a wealth of 
discussions. In a conventional life-cycle model, a perfect market is assumed to be 
existent and thus household assets are assumed to be fungible. Therefore, the related 
empirical literature largely specifies savings as the total accumulated changes of wealth 
up to some time point, i.e. total wealth stock, or as the periodic changes of wealth 
(Borsch-Supan, 1992; Horioka and Watanabe, 1997; Alessie, Lusardi, and Aldershof, 
1997; Carroll, 1997; Samwick, 1998). Savings derived from the change of wealth could 
take up not only the household decisions to save, but also the capital gains or losses on 
the assets or liabilities held in the household portfolios. Alternatively, income60 net of 
consumption is employed as the measure of saving/savings (Attanasio, 1998; Jappelli 
and Modigliani, 2003). Similarly, in a recent paper of Demery and Duck (2006), who 
investigated the path of saving ratio over the life cycle for British households and 
individuals, specified saving ratio as the log of mean income minus the log of mean 
consumption. Different specifications of savings under a life-cycle model were 
examined, simultaneously, in a recently work by Borsch-Supan and Lusardi (2003). As 
understood, the definition of savings/saving is customised with regard to two aspects: 
one is to justify the core of the research question, and the other is to find out to what
60 Issues of estimation of income range from adjustment of mandated contribution to social security to 
imputed rent of living in current property.
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extent the field data can provide the information needed to construct an empirical 
investigation. In the first sense, given that the research focus is on the disposability of 
resources at a given age phase, the specification of total wealth holdings would be 
favoured. On the other hand, researchers seeing saving(s) as the evidence of 
intertemporal consumption-savings decisions would give preference to identifying 
savings as the difference of temporal income and consumption. In the second sense, the 
plausibility of developing the measurement from the field data is highly subject to the 
comprehensive nature of a given data set.
Related issues in estimation
As understood, age effects (life-cycle effects), cohort effects (year of birth effects) and 
time effects (business-cycle effects) evolve within a complex mechanism which has an 
influence on a household’s savings profile over the life cycle. In order to disentangling 
these three effects, some practices related to estimation methodologies need to be taken. 
For instance, time effects can be assumed to sum to zero and are orthogonal to linear 
(time) trends (Deaton and Paxson, 1994; Attanasio, 1998). Using a time series of cross- 
sections from the U.S. 1980-1991 Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX)61, Attanasio
(1998) explored age effects by applying a cross-sectional parametric estimation -
f i Jregressing average saving rates on the fifth degree of polynomial in age. Jappelli and 
Modigliani (2003) considered cohort effects, age effects, and time effects, by including 
dummies of these effects in the estimation equation of savings. This parametric 
estimation was carried out on a time-series of cross-sections, spanning the years 1989- 
2000 of the Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). Demery and 
Duck (2006) also included dummies of these effects in a parametric estimation. As can 
be seen above, treatments to identify cohort effects from age effects can be applied on 
long panel or pseudo-panel field data. The advantage of applying panel-data analysis is 
that changes in the savings profile of a single economic agent can be tracked over time. 
However, it is often the case that a genuine balanced panel does not exist. Under these 
circumstances, repeated cross-sectional data (a pseudo-panel) is usually considered as 
an alternative. A pseudo-panel can be formed by household surveys which are carried 
out on a regular basis, e.g. annually, and in each year, the survey sample is randomly 
selected from a large population. The British Family Expenditure Survey is an example
61 Note that CEX is not a panel, but a time series of cross sections.
62 This is defined as the ratio o f savings to consumption.
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of a pseudo-panel dataset, as it surveys about 7000 households annually. In a pseudo­
panel, a cohort, instead of an individual, is tracked over time, and estimation of 
economic relationships is based on cohort means rather than individual observations. 
One cohort could be the set of all females bom between 1970 and 1975 or the set of all 
individuals of the same age. Deaton (1985) argued that pseudo-panels do not suffer the 
attrition problem that happens on genuine panels. The justification of this study lies in 
that even though some observations appear only once amongst all of the cross sections, 
a sample from the same age cohort is observed in the other waves. This makes it 
plausible to track the savings, not of the same observations, but of a representative 
sample of individuals of the same age cohort.
Recently in the United Kingdom, Demery and Duck (2006) used a parametric panel- 
data estimation method to analyse the relationship between savings and age structure, 
by regressing the saving ratio63 on the age dummies, cohort dummies, and year 
dummies and other control variables for the UK Family Expenditure Survey (FES) 
dataset over the years 1969-1998. The estimation was done, not only at the household 
level, but also at the individual level. Estimation of the individual savings-age profile 
was made, in order to tackle the sample selection bias: such a problem can be seen 
amongst households with young heads and elderly members, as the elderly members 
usually have a higher propensity to save and this can lead to overestimation of the 
saving ratio of the young heads. Therefore, treatments were taken to extract individual 
income (consumption) estimation from the household survey (Deaton and Paxson, 
2000). Despite the aforementioned, it has been a common practice to estimate savings 
profile at household level in the relevant literature. This is consistent with the traditional 
theoretical position in that the life-cycle hypothesis was originally derived to explain 
households’ savings profile.
Compared with parametric estimation, non-parametric estimation methods can proceed 
without imposing any assumption on a sample’s distribution. Alessie, Lusardi, and 
Aldershof (1997) applied a non-parametric approach on two cross-sectional datasets64 -  
years 1987-88 and 1988-89 -  of the Dutch Socio Economic Panel (SEP), to estimate the
63 Based on a life-cycle model, the saving ratio of an individual is defined as the log of mean income 
minus the log of mean consumption.
64 The two cross sections can be integrated into a balanced panel.
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distribution of household savings, in three quartiles, over the life cycle. This method is 
of particular use as a descriptive tool to analyse the relationship between savings and 
age groups. Also, median analysis is preferred to mean analysis, when a sample is 
skewed, which is common in a survey of household savings and income. A non- 
parametric quantile analysis has been frequently employed to explore wealth 
accumulation against age structure, over the life cycle. (Magee, Burbidge, and Robb, 
1991; Robb, Magee, and Burbidge, 1992)
Empirical findings have not converged to favour or to counter the theoretical predictions. 
Amongst British households and individuals, Demery and Duck (2006) found that the 
estimated saving ratio-age profile, at both household level and individual level, showed 
a humped shape between ages 25 and 65, which was predicted by the life-cycle model; 
the profile at the household level appears to be flatter. Alessie, Lusardi, and Aldershof 
(1997) found that the distribution of savings in the third quartile, whether including 
housing equity or not, showed a hump with a peak between ages 45 and 50. On the 
contrary, the distributions of savings in the median and in the first quartile did not 
support the life-cycle hypothesis. Attanasio (1998) found that the saving rate65-age 
profile displayed itself as a pronounced hump, peaking at age 57. By contrast, Demery 
and Duck (2006) also found saving ratio tended to rise after retirement; Borsch-Supan 
(1992) found that savings for elderly German people were increasing from age 66 
onwards. These results contrasted with the theoretical implications of the life-cycle 
model. On the other hand, Jappelli and Modigliani’s (2003) findings supported the life­
cycle hypothesis of humped wealth, or savings turning negative after retirement.
Behind the aggregate savings
Looking at the heterogeneity of saving motives becomes a useful perspective for a 
better understanding of the savings profile. Based on the buffer-stock model, some 
simulation evidence can be found regarding the path of precautionary savings over the 
life cycle. Carroll (1997) simulated a median financial wealth/income ratio-age profile, 
by using the 1960s U.S. data. In brief, the calibrated savings-age profile displayed itself 
as an inverse V shape66. Furthermore, Samwick (1998) used the 1992 U.S. Survey of
65 This paper uses an unconventional definition saving rate, savings/consumption. This design of the 
variable is claimed to have the advantage of defining zero income and negative income outliers.
66 The calibration predicted that very early in working life the wealth/income ratio is low yet above zero;
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Consumer Finance dataset to simulate the expected wealth67-to-income ratio distribution 
over the life cycle. To illustrate the degree of impatience, the author compared the 
profiles of various time discount rates. The profile of the most impatient case was 
depicted by an inversed V shape: staying constantly low between age 25 and age 55, 
increasing upwards from age 55 to 65, and declining after age 65, whereas the profile of 
the most patient case was more of a humped shape. Samwick’s simulation provides an 
interesting inference that savings profile of a consumer who has a high discount rate 
with now and the next period, may be constantly low during young and middle age.
/ r o
Honoka and Watanabe (1997) explored the paths of net savings for various motives - 
the life-cycle motives, the precautionary motives, and bequest motives - of Japanese 
households69 over the life cycle. The findings suggested that the retirement motive and 
the precautionary motives were of dominant importance. However, savings profiles for 
different saving motives exhibit paths which are not necessarily humped in shape, e.g. 
the path of net savings for retirement exhibited an upward trend between ages 20 and 70. 
As illustrated above, breaking down aggregate savings by saving motives is useful for a 
better comprehension of the composition of savings, over the life cycle. Nevertheless, 
empirical studies do not commonly employ the itemisation of savings by different 
motives. This is ether because, the field data that provides such information is rare, or 
practically speaking, it is not possible to parse savings into every motive component on 
an ex ante basis, because each unit of money can effectively serve more than one 
purpose (Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes, 2002; Jappelli, 2005), e.g. part of bequests left or 
received may constitute unintentional bequests, resulting from the holding of wealth for 
precautionary reasons.
Under the standard life-cycle hypothesis, where time preference is consistent over time, 
wealth allocation is related to households’ risk-taking investment behaviour regarding 
age structure, (Ameriks and Zeldes, 2004), or to the exploration of the decumulation of 
different assets after retirement (Borsch-Supan and Stahl; 1991; Milligan, 2005).
for the middle two decades, it grows slightly, then in the last decade before retirement the wealth ratio 
grows sharply; wealth/savings fall sharply after retirement, reaching zero in the year of death.
67 The expected wealth is a function of a list of parameters: the expected growth rate of income, the 
income uncertainty, the replacement rate on retirement income, and interest rate earned on savings, the 
coefficient o f relative risk aversion, and the rate o f time preference.
68 The savings were estimated as the financial asset which households had accumulated and planned to 
accumulate. The figure of net savings of each household was obtained by: accumulation of financial asset 
+ loan repayment -  decumulation o f financial asset - newly incurred debt.
69 The data was from the 1994 Japanese Survey on the Financial Asset Choice of Households.
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Moreover, the distinction of mandatory savings and discretionary savings is considered 
important in order to gain empirical insight into the life-cycle model (Jappelli and 
Modigliani, 2003; Borsch-Supan; 2003, Milligan, 2005). As discussed in section 2.2.3, 
households’ portfolio strategies, e.g. particularly the relative weights of liquid wealth 
and illiquid wealth, and level of unsecured debt, over the life cycle, can relate to 
consumers who have inconsistent time preference, in that these consumers would 
manage their self-control problem, by means of asset allocation strategies, e.g. mental 
accounting. Hyperbolic consumers would have relatively high illiquid wealth, low 
liquid wealth, and high unsecured debt. See ‘A Debt Puzzle’ in Laibson, Repetto, and 
Tobacman (2000). Simulated paths of liquid wealth, illiquid wealth, and total wealth, 
over the life cycle which were exhibited in Angeletos, Laibson, Repetto, Tobacman, and 
Weinberg (2001), showed that the whist the illiquid wealth-age profiles are humped, 
under an exponential discount specification and a hyperbolic discount specification, the 
liquid wealth profile of the hyperbolic case is lower with regard to level and flatter in
70terms of the curve, than in the exponential case . This supports the implication of 
external commitment in the quasi-hyperbolic consumption model.
Referring to the theoretical implications of a life-cycle model with inconsistent time 
preference (section 2.2.3), such economic agents would have more savings for long­
term purposes than for short-term purposes. Provided that external saving schemes are 
available, savings for long-term purposes may pick up the effects of average income 
growth throughout the life cycle, whereas savings for short-term purposes remain 
constantly small. Thus far, no empirical studies have been developed to disaggregate 
savings into from a long-term and from a short-term perspective, which may provide 
insight into understanding the influence of inconsistent time preference on the 
relationship between household savings and age structure.
2.4 CONCLUSION
Experimental scientists -  experimental economists and psychologists - have indicated 
that dynamic inconsistent time preference ought to be observed in the course of decision 
making processes. This work does not aim to employ an experiment to further confirm
70 Refer to figure 5 in the Angeletos, Laibson, Repetto, Tobacman, and Weinberg (2001), p59.
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whether or not people’s savings behaviour displays hyperbolic time preferences. The 
essence of the quasi-hyperbolic discount function brings about the perspective that 
people’s temporal choices can be broken down into a long-term perspective and a short­
term perspective, because the hyperbolic consumers value immediate consumption more 
than putting money away in the short term, but meanwhile they are conscious of the 
importance of saving money for the long run. Taking this on board for this work, the 
consumers’ observed long-term savings behaviour and short-term savings behaviour are 
examined separately so that the empirical findings can be examined within the scope of 
the behavioural models.
The buffer-stock model posits that households perform precautionary saving to buffer 
income uncertainty in the near future; however, in contrast to this, the quasi-hyperbolic 
life-cycle consumption model suggests that the precautionary saving effect may be 
missing. This anomaly develops because the hyperbolic households, faced with income 
uncertainty in the next period, would save in this period and would sequentially have a 
high MPC in the next period. This is in contrast to the situation that the high MPC in the 
next period suggests that the precautionary wealth saved would in all likelihood be 
spent.
To tackle the temptation of immediate gratification, the hyperbolic households, in this 
period, are inclined to put away only a small amount of money for the near term future 
(the next period), and meanwhile save for long-term purposes as a result of rationality. 
Putting assets in illiquid forms thus becomes the preference of the hyperbolic 
households, because this enables the savings to be carried on and not to be withdrawn 
until the time in the distant future when the accumulated wealth is needed for use.
The first stage empirical work looks at the likelihood of short term saving motives and 
long term saving motives with respect to the households’ short term income uncertainty, 
whether they have become involved with illiquid wealth accumulation and, whether 
they have explicitly committed themselves to retirement savings schemes, and the 
households’ demographic variables. Much of the literature has emphasised on 
investigating whether joining in a savings mechanism makes people end up having 
more savings. It may be that people will have more pension wealth on the day they 
retire, if they pay into pension schemes from now on; on the other hand, they might thus
63
become less cautious with long term savings, which may militate against the effect of 
pension savings schemes. Thus, this work contributes to the view: the awareness of the 
self-control problem encourages consumers to bind themselves by accumulating illiquid 
wealth or by paying into a pension scheme, and it is worth looking into whether this 
self-imposed constraint has any impact on their discretionary saving motives -  both 
long-term and short-term. In the second stage, a simple weight standard is applied to 
estimate each household’s short-term savings and long-term savings, and the 
relationship between the two types of savings and other control variables mentioned 
above is examined. In the third stage, the total savings against age profile is estimated, 
and then the distribution patterns of the two types of savings throughout the life cycle 
are investigated separately.
Hence, this work contributes to the literature on savings behaviour by re-examining the 
buffer-stock behaviour in terms of the relationship between the short-term 
savings/saving motive and uncertainty, whereas, most, if not all, previous investigation 
has concentrated on the correlation between financial wealth or even the total net worth 
and uncertainty and left the savings for long term and for short term undistinguished. 
This disregarded not only the heterogeneity with the variety of consumers’ saving 
motives, but also, as proposed in this work, that consumers may behave dynamically 
inconsistently with saving for the short tern and with saving for the long term. This 
reinforces the need to disaggregate households’ savings/saving motives into for long­
term purposes and for short-term purposes to reflect this inconsistency.
In contrast to previous works that examined the hyperbolic discount function by 
calibration, this work investigates the hypothesis of the inconsistency of saving 
behaviour for a long-term time perspective and that for a short-term perspective on field 
survey data. In addition, as the quasi-hyperbolic consumption model posits that a 
hyperbolic consumer prefers accumulating assets in illiquid forms as a result of being 
rational with long-term saving, an intuition is derived: the hyperbolic households’ 
saving motive for long-term purposes should be reflected in their inclination to 
accumulate illiquid wealth and to save through external commitment schemes, such as 
private pensions. Also, their high discount rates with decisions in the short-term future 
may diminish the level of the short-term savings/saving motive.
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Finally, this work explores the respective distributions of long-term savings and the 
short-term savings across age groups. This study attempts to provide empirical evidence 
for the implications of the behavioural models that two types of savings, as a result of 
two different time preferences, exist over the working life-cycle. Whilst the 
conventional life-cycle assumes that rational consumers have a hump-shaped savings 
distribution across the life cycle, hyperbolic consumers may exhibit a hump-shaped 
long-term savings distribution, as they are rational with long-term decisions. On the 
other hand, the short-term savings distribution ought to show a flat profile across the life 
cycle, because the hyperbolic consumers only keep a relatively small amount of money 
for short-term purposes.
65
CHAPTER 3 : DATA
3.1 INTRODUCTION
This empirical investigation is based on the dataset from the British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS). The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) is a nationally 
representative unbalanced panel survey of the British population, and it provides 
information on respondents’ demographic, occupational, educational, employment and 
earning, finance, and so on. Owing to its being household-based, the BHPS was 
designed as an annual survey of each adult member, aged 16 and over, of a nationally 
representative sample of more than 5000 households, making a total of approximately 
10000 individual interviews drawn from 250 areas of Great Britain. Children are 
interviewed once they reach the age of 16. Additional samples of 1500 households in 
each of Scotland and Wales were added to the main sample in 1999, and in 2001 a 
sample of 2,000 households was added in Northern Ireland, making the panel suitable 
for UK-wide research. The panel includes both male and female individuals, who are 
aged 16 and over and are in or out of employment.
The same individuals are re-interviewed in successive waves and if they leave their 
original households, all adult members of their new household are also interviewed. 
Thus, the sample should remain broadly representative of the population of Britain as it 
changed through the 1990s and beyond. The survey is carried out annually in October of 
each year, collecting the individual’s information dated from the October of the 
previous year to the September of the survey year. By the time this research commenced, 
the available dataset of the BHPS covered from wave 1 to wave 13. The survey year of 
wave 1 covers from October 1990 to September 1991, and that of wave 13 is from 
October 2003 to September 2004.
Since wave 1, individuals have been asked about how much, on average, they manage 
to save per month. Since wave 3, individuals have been asked about their reasons for 
saving. In wave 10 (year 2000-2001), the individuals have, for the first time, been asked 
to distinguish between their short-term or long-term savings, accumulated during the 
past year. The individuals interviewed in the consecutive waves were also asked this 
question. Accordingly, the dataset available for this study consists of wave 10, wave 11,
66
wavel2, and wave 13, covering years 2000-2004 as information about individuals’ 
saving behaviour - motives and savings amount - regarding different time horizon, can 
be obtained.
In section 3.2, the constructions of the dependent variables subject to the content of the 
survey questions, which are saving motives in the first stage, saving ratio in the second 
stage, and savings amount in the third stage, are illustrated. Comprehensive descriptions 
of these dependent variables are made. Moreover, the relevant explanatory variables are 
presented in detail and necessary theoretical and empirical justifications are also 
considered. The empirical studies are carried out at the household level, and this is 
mainly because the theoretical implications of both the buffer-stock model and the 
quasi-hyperbolic life-cycle consumption model have been developed under the 
assumption that a household is considered as a consumer unit. Because of this, the 
saving motives in the first stage refer to those of heads of household. In reality, it is 
impossible to obtain socioeconomic factors and demographic features at household 
level. Accordingly, the demographic characteristics of the heads of the household are 
assumed to represent their households. The only exception is that the permanent income 
variable of a household with its head recognised has been measured at the household 
level, by summing up the respective income of the individuals within the household. In 
the second and third stages, saving ratio and savings amount will also be measured at 
household level.
In section 3.3, the selections of the samples for this empirical study are described 
consecutively. Next, the samples are filtered with respect to the other criteria, such as 
age, employment status, etc. The whole samples include heads of the household who are 
aged between 25 and 65 and in employment (self-employed/employee). In addition, 
because saving motives and savings amount are dependent variables, the samples are 
restricted to the heads of the households and other members of the households who give 
clear responses on their saving motives and the amount of money they have managed to 
save. Moreover, samples of two sub-groups -  homeowners and private pension 
participants -  are constructed respectively. Regarding the subgroups chosen, there is 
overlap between the two samples; nevertheless, as both of the groups are considered as 
households who commit themselves to illiquid long-term savings via different 
instruments, carrying out the comparisons between them is considered to be insightful.
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Eventually, the valid sample sizes of the whole samples and each sub-sample are 
tabulated. Moreover, elementary data analysis is demonstrated: firstly, the basic 
descriptive statistics of the dependent variables are outlined. Succeeding this, simple 
cross-tabulation is applied as a preliminarily investigation of the relationship between 
the dependent variables and the key explanatory variables. In addition, the association 
between the main explanatory variables is also demonstrated. Finally, section 3.4 ends 
with a conclusion.
3.2 SURVEY QUESTIONS AND VARIABLES 
CONSTRUCTION
3.2.1 Construction of dependent variables
From wave 10 onwards in the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), every 
individual adult of the annual survey was asked:
- 'Do you save any amount o f  your income fo r  example by putting something away now 
and then in a bank, building society, or Post Office account other than to meet regular 
bills? Please include share purchase schemes ISA ’s and Tessa accounts. ’ - 
Individuals who answered "yes” were then asked:
‘About how much on average do you personally manage to save a monthV Individuals 
answering with the savings amount stated or answering ‘don’t know’ were asked,
- ‘What are you saving for? ’ - and
- ‘ Would you say your savings are mainly long term savings fo r  the future or mainly 
short term savings fo r  things you need now and fo r  unexpected eventsT The list of 
responses is: ‘Mainly long term (coded as 1)’, ‘Mainly short term (coded as 2)’, ‘Both 
equally (coded as 3)’, ‘Not applicable (coded as -8)’, ‘Proxy respondent (coded as -7)’, 
and ‘D on’t know (coded as -1)’.
3.2.1.1 Saving motives
The last question which is mentioned above asked every individual in a household 
whether their primary saving motive was for the long term, for the short term, or for 
both equally, provided that they had reported that they had saved in the past 12 months.
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The long-term saving motives were reckoned to be for retirement or any other long-term 
purposes, such as leaving bequests to the next generation. On the other hand, the short­
term saving motives were considered as precaution with short-term uncertainty or other 
expenditure that was planned with certainty to be used in the short-term future. This 
question reveals respondents’ primary preferences in terms of the planning time horizon 
of an intertemporal saving decision. These field observations allow for an investigation
71into households’ savings decisions regarding a short-term and a long-term perspective , 
which, as suggested by the quasi-hyperbolic discount function hypothesis, relates to 
inconsistent time preference. Accordingly, the precautionary saving effect can be 
reinvestigated via the relationship between the short-term saving motive and short-term 
uncertainty. In the literature of households’ saving behaviour, total savings have often 
been the object of observations; however, it is understood that this gives rise to the 
concern of ignoring the heterogeneity of household’s saving motives, which may be 
detrimental to attaining accurate estimation results. Regarding this, this work partially 
resolves the issue of the heterogeneity of saving motives by distinguishing motives into 
that for the long term, for the short term, and for both equally. The first-stage study aims 
to investigate how the changes in household’s saving motives varies between mainly for 
the long term and mainly for the short term and other important factors that may have 
an effect on these saving motives.
3.2.1.2 Saving ratios
Referring to the survey questions listed previously, the first two questions revealed the 
interviewed individual’s monthly discretionary savings flow, which could be 
transformed into an annually-equivalent figure. Savings here referred to the difference 
between individual disposable income and expenditure, and they did not take into 
account regular instalments in housing wealth, for instance, a mortgage. Furthermore, 
individuals were asked to state what amount of savings was mainly for the long-term 
future or mainly for short-term needs and unforeseen events. As mentioned above, this 
question had the advantage of pinning down savings as a result of heterogeneous 
motives; in addition, it helped to match each individual’s stated savings amount with 
his/her main saving motive - mainly short term, mainly long term, or both equally.
71 It is assumed that individual’s saving behaviour was consistent with the reported saving preferences.
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Before measuring long-term savings and short-term savings at household level, each 
individual’s long-term savings and short-term savings were measured with a simple 
weighting rule; given that this study is performed at the household level, each 
household’s long-term and short-term savings can be measured by aggregating its 
individual member’s long-term and short-term savings. The rule of imputing short-term 
savings is as follows: 100% weight is given on the individual’s reported amount of 
savings if he/she saved mainly for the short term, 50% weight if he/she saved for both 
equally, and 0% if he/she saved mainly for the long term. The weighting standard 
developed here tends to generalise the proportion of savings as a result of buffering 
uncertainty in the near-term future and of current needs. The individuals who saved 
mainly for the long term thus gained zero weight on the item of short-term savings, the 
individuals who saved for both long-term and short-term gained a half weight, and 
individuals saving mainly for the short term gained a full weight. Analogously, each 
individual’s long-term savings is measured as follows: 100% weight is given on the 
individual’s reported amount of savings if he/she saved mainly for the long run, 50% 
weight if  he/she saved for both equally, and 0% if he/she saved mainly for the short
79run . In order to measure the short-term and long-term savings amount for an 
individual, only those individuals who reported their savings amount and specified 
clearly whether the savings were for the long term, the short term, or for both equally, 
were selected. After measuring each individual’s savings, they were aggregated at the 
household level with heads of households identified. Finally, only the savings amount of 
those households whose heads met the criteria of sample selection, were considered as 
valid observations. Saving amounts as well as income in this study are deflated 
according to the index numbers of September of each year of the monthly Retail Prices 
Index (RPI). Index number of January 1983 =100,73 and the money value in each wave 
of this study is deflated at the price level of September 2000.
The measured short-term savings accumulated in the past 12 months are for any purpose 
of certainty (things needed now) and/or for uncertainty (unexpected events), and the
72 This research is aware of that when measuring short-term (long-term) savings amount, giving 0% to an 
individual saving if he/she saved mainly for long term (short term) is at the expense o f underestimating 
his/her short-term (long-term) savings. However, this study assumes that an individual’s long-term (short­
term) saving motive is trivial when he/she saves mainly for the short term (long term). To the researcher’s 
knowledge, this weighting strategy has not been used in other studies.
73 [http://www.statistics.gov.uk/StatBase/tsdataset.asp ?vlnk=229&More=N&All=Y]
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latter intention, to a reasonable extent, has captured the savings for any short-term 
uncertainty. In order to distinguish the short-term savings for things needed now from 
those for unexpected events, this work assumed that the savings for things needed now 
contained certainty and were known to the savers when they commenced the saving. 
Hence, this assumption granted the possibility that the latter savings played the role as 
precautionary savings which may vary according to the uncertainty in the near-term 
future.
The saving motives in the first stage represented only the saving preferences of the 
heads of households; by contrast, the estimated savings amount in this stage took into 
account saving preferences of every individual’s saving decisions in a given household. 
In this stage, the change in the long-term saving ratio and short-term saving ratio were 
examined, with respect to the subjective uncertainty and other crucial factors, based on 
a similar framework in the first stage. The dependent variable is the (measured) savings 
amount to permanent income74 ratio, and is named saving ratios hereafter - long-term 
saving ratio and short-term saving ratio, respectively.
3,2.13 Saving amounts
In the third stage analysis, the savings amount - long-term and short-term, respectively - 
imputed earlier took the role of the dependent variable in the regression analysis on the 
relationship between households’ savings amount and age structure.
3.2.2 Construction of independent variables
3.2.2.1 Financial expectation, current status, and realisation
75Financial expectations play the role of the proxy for uncertainty of the 
individuals/households in the short term. The individuals were surveyed about their 
financial expectation in the next twelve months:
‘Looking ahead, how do you think you will be financially a year from now, will you be 
‘better than now (recoded as ‘1’)’, ‘about the same (recoded as ‘2’)’, ‘worse than now
74 The estimation method of the permanent income is to be explained in the next section.
75 In Guariglia (2001), this variable played the role as a control variable but not a proxy indicator for the 
household’s income uncertainty.
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(recoded as ‘3’) ’, ‘missing or wild (coded as ‘-9’) ’, ‘proxy respondent (coded as ‘-7’)', 
or ‘don’t know (coded as ‘-1 ’)’ .76
Following the concept applied in Murata (2003), if the individual expected to be 
financially worse-off 12 months later, he/she, at that moment, had the expectation of 
shocks on financial status, and that consumption would be at a risk of decreasing. 
Future risk here is specified as subjectively-perceived risk, indicating households’ 
perception that their future needs/goals would be under threat (Wameryd, 1999). As 
reviewed in the section on the proxy of uncertainty, this way of defining future risk is 
rarely used by economists as it provides only a limited explicit numerical estimation on 
income variability or possibility distribution of occurrences of future situations. 
However, it does provide a more psychologically driven sense of risk; as proposed in 
Stone and Winter (1987), risk was defined as a subjectively-determined expectation o f  
loss; the more certain one is about the expectation, the more risk he/she has. This idea 
has widely applied in the field of consumer behaviour (Lim, 2003; Cunningham, 
Gerlach, Harper, and Young, 2005). Accordingly, households who expect to have a 
worse-off financial situation are considered to perceive higher risk, than those who 
expect to have a better-off financial situation and those who expect things to remain the 
same.
Moreover, the uncertainty/risk here does not point to a single type of risk, but can be 
attributed to the possibility of becoming unemployed, the possibility of requiring higher 
health expenditure, or any other type of risk that would have a negative impact on the 
individual’s finances. The subjective expectation of financial status may not have 
captured the ex post facts that happen in a year due to possible expectation error. 
However, it is proposed here that the households normally rely on their subjectively- 
perceived anticipation for the decisions to be made today, instead of on the actual 
realisation that hasn’t taken place until one year later. Thus, the expectation of the 
financial situation over the next 12 months was employed as the proxy for short-term 
uncertainty/risk. The relationship between the short-term uncertainty/risk and saving 
motives will be examined in accordance with the buffer-stock model. At the whole 
sample level, 31.8% of observations perceived that they had a better-off financial
76 Response observations of ‘missing or wild’, ‘proxy respondent’, or ‘don’t know’ were considered 
invalid observations in this study. This is also the case for financial realizations as well as current 
financial situations to be mentioned below.
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situation, and only 7.3% of observations perceived that they had a worse-off one; over 
half of the households perceived their financial situation in the near future would remain 
the same.
In addition, the individuals were surveyed about their changes in financial situation 
during the past 12 months, i.e. financial realisation, and their current financial status, 
which were considered influential in households’ saving motives. The individuals were 
asked:
‘ Would you say that you yourself are better o ff or worse o ff financially than you were a 
year ago? ‘Better o ff than last year’ (coded as ‘1’), ’ about the same’ (recoded as ‘2’), 
‘worse-off than last year’ (recoded as ‘3’), ‘missing or wild (coded as ‘-9’) ’, ‘proxy 
respondent (coded as ‘-7’) or ‘don ft know (coded as ‘-1’) '.
The change of financial position during the last year, called financial realisation 
hereafter, aims to captures the effect of recent financial experience, in comparison with 
present status. 39.7% of the valid observations reported as having a better-off financial 
realisation, referring to the fact that these households perceived their financial situations 
as having improved since the previous year. 14.2% of observations reported to have 
worse-off financial realisation, meaning that these households considered that their 
financial situations had got weaker. Regarding current financial status, the individuals 
were asked:
‘How well would you say you yourself are managing financially these days? ‘Living 
comfortably /  doing all right’ (recoded as ‘1’), ‘just about getting by’ (recoded as ‘2’), 
‘finding it quite difficult / finding it very difficult’ (recoded as ‘3’), ‘missing or wild 
(coded as ‘-9’) ‘proxy respondent (coded as ‘-7’) or ‘don ’t know (coded as ‘-1’) ’. 
84.9% of the valid observations responded that in their current financial situation they 
were living comfortably or doing all right. Only 1.7% of the observations stated that 
their financial situation was quite difficult or very difficult. In sum, most of the sample 
observations had a positive, or at least neutral, current financial situation.
3.2.2.2 Homeownership and private pension enrolment
Two proxy variables are presented below, representing respectively, whether the 
households owned housing wealth and whether the households regularly paid into 
private pension schemes. Both those who had a mortgage or owned their houses
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outright were considered as being homeowners. In this study, homeownership plays the 
role of a proxy for the possession of illiquid assets, and housing wealth is considered to 
be part of homeowners’ long-term savings; private pension enrolment as a proxy for the 
household’s willingness to commitment themselves to an external mechanism, which 
aims to help them save for retirement. The application of the proxies for the illiquid 
assets holding and the external commitment scheme is derived from the implication of 
the quasi-hyperbolic consumption life-cycle model, which posits that the consumers 
with inconsistent time preference prefer to save money in illiquid forms or take up a 
savings commitment to tackle their self-control problems.
Both housing wealth and pension wealth are illiquid wealth and they provide the 
household with constraints on instant liquidity. Having said so, there still exists a 
difference between the two types of wealth. Housing wealth can be collaterallable, 
which can provide liquidity for those homeowners whenever needed; on the other hand, 
households do not have access to their pension wealth until they retire. In terms of goals 
for savings, households’ paying into a private pension explicitly indicates that they have 
taken action to save primarily for retirement; by contrast, accumulating housing wealth 
is considered to be saving as a consequence of various incentives: saving for the long 
term, the intention of saving regularly by paying a mortgage (self-imposed saving 
commitment), or bequeathing to heirs. It was found that 86.4% of the total valid sample 
observations owned a property, and 27% had joined a private pension scheme.
3.2,23 Habit effects77
The individuals who save were also surveyed about their first reason for saving. They 
were asked:
- ‘What are you saving for? ’
The listed reasons cover ‘holidays’, ‘old age’, ‘car’, ‘children’, ‘house purchases’, 
‘home improvement’, ‘household bills’, ’special events’, ‘no specific reason’, ‘share 
schemes’, ‘own education’, ‘grandchild’, and ‘other’. The motive o f ‘no specific reason’ 
is considered as a habitual effect; this can suggest the influence of an endowment effect, 
suggesting that households develop a routine/rule on their saving decisions, and they are 
resistant to changing it. Moreover, savings for no specific reason are likely to be an
77 Note that this variable is considered only in the savings ratio analysis.
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outcome of households’ controlling expenditure (Wameryd, 1999). In order to 
investigate such an effect, the households were grouped into two: one group contained 
those who have clearly specified their main reason for saving, and the other included 
those who saved for no specific reason. Hence a dummy indicator was generated to 
represent the latter group.
3.2.2.4 Permanent income
Estimated household permanent income is suggested as a proxy indicator for the 
household wealth level. (Guariglia, 2001) The concept of permanent income comes 
from Milton Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis. Permanent income is 
determined by a consumer's assets: physical (shares, bonds, property) and human 
(education and experience). These influence the consumer's ability to earn income. The 
measured income contains a permanent (anticipated and planned) element and a 
transitory (windfall gain/unexpected) element.
First, the measurement of the total household available income, which includes the 
labour income, transfer income, and investment income, is required for permanent 
income estimation. The estimated permanent income was obtained by regressing, based
no
on a random-effect model, the log of the household’s observed total annual income on 
the observable characteristics of the heads of the households. The observed 
characteristics included: gender, age, age-square, educational level dummies, 
occupation dummies, interaction of the age and the age-square with the educational 
level dummies and the occupation dummies - age x education dummies, age x occupation 
dummies, age2 x education dummies, and age2 x occupation dummies -, residence area 
dummies, marital status, number of children in the household, whether the heads of 
household have spouse/partner in employment, and the homeownership dummy. 
(Kazarosian, 1997; Guariglia, 2001; Carroll, Dynan, and Krane 2003; Benito, 2004)
78 Annual income is deflated according to the index numbers of September of each year of the monthly 
Retail Price Index (RPI). Index number of January 1987=100. 
[http://www.statistics.gov.uk/StatBase/tsdataset.asp?vlnk=229&More=N&All=Y]
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3.2.2.5 Other control variables
The following outlines the set of the geographic characteristic, socio-economic features, 
and life-cycle factors of the households. The geographic characteristic refers to the 
residential area. The life-cycle factors include the age79 of the heads of the households, 
family size, and whether the households have children. The sample included only the 
heads of the households who were aged between 25 and 65, and the age effect mainly 
captured the life-cycle effect.
Socioeconomic features were considered to have a significant influence on savings 
behaviour. For instance, highly educated people may carry out precautionary saving 
behaviour better than those with the lower educational attainment levels. The socio­
economic features considered in this work took into account: gender, occupation types, 
educational level, employment status (self-employed/employee), full-time/part-time job, 
marital status and whether the partner was employed or not if the head of the 
households had a partner.
The occupational indicators, educational level indicators, and the residential area 
indicators were rearranged and recoded. The new indicators for the occupation dummies, 
the education dummies, and the residence area dummies against the old ones are 
reported in Tables A.l- Table A.3 in Section A in the Appendices.
3.3 SAMPLE DESCRIPTION AND DATA ANALYSIS
3.3.1 Analysis of saving motives
3.3.1.1 Sample description
The final sample selected for the first-stage analysis had 7763 effective observations in 
total out of four waves - wave 10 to wave 13, forming an unbalanced panel dataset. 
Respectively, 1923 observations were from wave 10, 1999 observations from wave 11, 
1945 observations from wave 12, and 1896 observations from wave 13. A sample where 
the individuals are observed over the entire sample period is a balanced or a complete 
panel, whereas a sample where some of the individuals are observed only over a partial
79 In the econometric analysis, the value of age-square is included as well as it captures the non-linearity 
between age and the ratio of wealth to permanent income.
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period is an incomplete or an unbalanced panel. Incomplete panels are more likely to be 
the norm in the typical economic empirical setting; for example, whilst using consumer 
panels on households, one may find that some households have moved and can no 
longer be included in the panel (Baltagi, 2001).
Advantages of using a panel data in this study are as follows (Baltagi, 2001). Firstly, 
unobserved heterogeneity of households can be controlled in a panel-data estimation 
method, through a random-effect or fixed-effect specification; meanwhile, business- 
cycle effects (time-effects) can be disentangled, e.g. an exogenous macroeconomic 
shock occurring in a specific year has an impact on households’ saving/consumption 
decisions. Secondly, panel data is better able to identify and measure effects that are 
simply not detectable in pure cross-section or time-series data. For instance, suppose 
that there is a cross-section of households with a 50% average labour participation rate. 
This might be due to a) each household having a 50% chance of being in the labour 
force, or b) 50% of the households working all the time and 50% not at all. Panel data 
can discriminate between these cases. Thirdly, panel data are better able to study the 
dynamics of changes. This allows for the saving behaviour of a household to be 
observed over time. Fourthly, a panel data gives more variability, less collinearity 
amongst the variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency.
The whole sample was disaggregated by homeownership and private pension enrolment 
into two sub-samples: homeowners and private pension participants. The size of each of 
the sub-samples is shown in Table 3.1 below. Putting homeowners and private pension 
participants into comparison shows the effects of two distinct external commitment 
mechanisms to long-term savings -  homeownership and private pension enrolment. The 
quasi-hyperbolic consumption model posits that housing wealth is illiquid savings for 
the long term, as it does not serve as instant liquidity and households are unlikely to 
splurge with it. In addition housing wealth can be collateralised to finance households’ 
difficulties in the long-term future. As also suggested by the behavioural models, a 
household’s participation in a private pension schemes suggests it is saving for 
retirement, by committing itself to a regular saving scheme. In contrast to housing 
wealth, pension wealth can be only accessed after a household’s retirement and thus 
generates no liquidity beforehand.
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In the previous section, the sample size attributed to each cross-sectional dataset has 
been stated as: 1923 observations in wave 10, 1999 observations in wave 11, 1945 
observations in wave 12, and 1896 in wave 13. Similarly, each cross-sectional dataset 
was disaggregated into two sub-samples using the criteria of homeownership and 
private pension enrolment. The sample sizes of each cross-sectional dataset and sub­
samples are also shown in Table 3.1 below.
T a b le  3 .1 :  S a m p le  s iz e  o f  th e  w h o le  sa m p le  a n d  tw o  su b -g r o u p s  by w a v e s
Homeowners Private pension participants W h o le  sa m p le
10 1631 540 1923
11 1718 539 1999
12 1709 542 1945
13 1646 A ll 1896
Total waves 6704 2098 7763
3.3.1.2 Data analysis
To begin with, simple descriptive analysis of saving motives as the dependent variable 
is demonstrated. Table 3.2 illustrates the shares of the three types of saving motives -  
mainly long-term, mainly short-term savers, and both equally - across the four waves of 
the whole samples and the sub-samples. At the whole sample level, the shares of the 
households reporting to save mainly for the long term are generally higher than those of 
the households reporting to save mainly for the short term. The trends of the shares 
across the four waves are depicted in Figure 3-1. As shown in the figure, the trend of 
saving mainly for the short term remains relatively flat across the four waves; the trend 
of saving mainly for long term starts to go downward and the trend of saving for both 
equally starts to go upward between wave 11 (year 2001-2002) and wave 13 (year 2003- 










—♦ —  Save mainly long term B  Save equally long term and short term —A—  Save mainly short term 
Figure 3-1: Saving motives a t the whole sample level
Table 3.2 shows that the shares of the long-term savers of the private pension 
participants are slightly higher than those of the homeowners. Figure 3-2 exhibits the 
trend of the shares of pension participants’ three types of savers across the four waves 
and Figure 3-4 the same for the homeowners. Both figures generally show a similar 
profile to the whole sample, in the sense that the shares of the short-term savers remain 
relatively stable at a lower level, whilst increasing shares of savers for both equally 
make up for the decreasing shares of the long-term savers between wave 11 (year 2001- 
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2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004
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Save mainly long tenm —■ — Save equally long term and short term —A—  Save mainly short term
Figure 3-4: Hom eowners’ saving motives
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Table 3 .2 : Shares o f  three types o f  s a v e r s  a c r o ss  the fo u r  w a v e s
Number of 
observations
Save mainly long term Save equally long term and short term Save mainly short term
2000- 2001- 2002- 2003- 2000- 2001- 2002- 2003- 2000- 2001- 2002- 2003-
2001 2002 2003 2004 2001 2002 2003 2004 2001 2002 2003 2004
Whole sample 7763 43.73% 45.92% 43.80% 38.40% 24.28% 23.71% 28.02% 31.65% 31.98% 30.37% 28.17% 29.96%
Homeowner 6704 45.80% 46.74% 45.11% 39.49% 24.28% 24.16% 28.55% 31.65% 29.92% 29.10% 26.33% 28.86%
Pension
participants
2098 49.44% 49.17% 45.20% 44.03% 22.78% 23.19% 27.12% 29.77% 27.78% 27.64% 27.68% 26.21%
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The short-term uncertainty/risk is captured by the proxy indicator of the households’ 
subjective financial expectation. In Table 3.3, it is shown that over 40% of the sample, 
regardless of whether they have a positive, negative, or neutral financial expectation, 
have mainly a long-term saving motive, and the percentage is the highest amongst those 
who have a negative financial expectation. The share of saving mainly for the short term 
is the highest amongst those who perceive that they will experience negative shocks in 
the next 12 months. The indicator of financial realisation captures the effect of previous 
financial experience on the saving motives. As shown in the fifth row of Table 3.4, the 
shares of the observations with mainly short-term saving motive are monotonically 
increasing when the current situation is worse than the previous year. Table 3.5 exhibits 
the profile of saving motives against current financial status. Two trends can be 
observed: as the current financial status gets worse, the shares of the observations with 
mainly short-term saving motive are increasing and the shares of those with both saving 
motives are decreasing.
T a b le  3 .3 :  T h e  p e r c e n ta g e  th r e e  ty p e s  o f  sa v e r s  b y  th r e e  ty p e s  o f  f in a n c ia l e x p e c ta t io n  a t  th e  w h o le  
sa m p le  le v e l
Financial expectation
Saving motive Better off About the same Worse off
Mainly long term 43.45% 42.59% 44.64%
Both equally 26.17% 27.81% 22.14%
Mainly short term 30.39% 29.60% 33.22%
100% 100% 100%
T a b le  3 .4 :  T h e  p e r c e n ta g e  th r e e  ty p e s  o f  sa v e r s b y  th r e e  ty p e s  o f  f in a n c ia l r e a lisa tio n  a t  th e  w h o le
s a m p le  le v e l
Financial realisation
Saving motive Better than last year About the same Worse than last year
Mainly long term 42.98% 42.22% 45.65%
Both equally 27.23% 27.73% 23.10%
Mainly short term 29.79% 30.05% 31.25%
100% 100% 100%
T a b le  3 .5 :  T h e  p e r c e n ta g e  th r e e  ty p e s  o f  sa v e r s  b y  th r e e  ty p e s  o f  c u r r e n t  f in a n c ia l s ta tu s  a t  th e  
w h o le  sa m p le  le v e l
Current financial status
Saving motive Doing alright or well Just getting by Finding it difficult
Mainly long term 43.77% 38.31% 42.31%
Both equally 28.15% 20.59% 12.31%
Mainly short term 28.08% 41.09% 45.38%
100% 100% 100%
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Homeownership is an indicator for the holding of illiquid assets. Table 3.6 illustrates the 
association between homeownership and saving motives. It is clearly shown that the 
proportion of the homeowners who engage in mainly long-term saving is higher than 
that of non-homeowners; on the other hand, the share of the non-homeowners who save 
mainly for the short term is significantly higher, than that of the homeowners. The 
households who have paid into a private pension scheme are considered as having 
committed themselves to an external mechanism, in order to save for the retirement. In 
Table 3.7, it can be seen that more people with a private pension save mainly for the 
long term than those who don’t have one, whereas fewer save mainly for short term 
than non-pension participants.
T a b le  3 .6 :  T h r e e  ty p e s  o f  sa v e r s  b y  w ith /w ith o u t  h o m e o w  n e r s h ip  a t th e  w h o le  sa m p le  le v e l
Homeownership
Saving motive Homeowner Non-homeowner
Mainly long term 44.32% 34.75%
Both equally 27.15% 25.12%
Mainly short term 28.54% 40.13%
100% 100%
T a b le  3 .7 : T h r e e  ty p e s  o f  sa v e r s  b y  w ith /w ith o u t  p e n s io n  e n r o lm e n t  a t th e  w h o le  sa m p le  le v e l
Pension enrolment
Saving motive Pensioners Non-pensioners
Mainly long term 47.04% 41.52%
Both equally 25.60% 27.34%
Mainly short term 27.36% 31.14%
100% 100%
With the consideration that the households who owned a property would feel less 
liquidity constrained and thus feel more positive with their financial expectations, a 
simple cross tabulation was applied on homeowners and non-homeowners with respect 
to their financial expectation. In Table 3.8, the third column shows that a higher 
proportion of the homeowners than of the non-homeowners have neutral financial 
expectations (61.55% against 56.94%). Moreover, the share of the observations with 
worse-off expectations is higher amongst the homeowners than amongst the non­
homeowners, and the share of those with better-off expectations is smaller amongst the 
homeowners than amongst the non-homeowners. Table 3.9 exhibits the breakdown of 
homeownership against financial realisation. Whilst the proportion of the observations 
with neutral financial realisations is larger amongst the homeowners than amongst the 
non-homeowners, the share of the observations with a situation better than last year is
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lower amongst homeowners than amongst their counterparts. Conversely, the share of 
the observations with a situation worse than last year is higher amongst the homeowners 
than amongst non-homeowners. The classification of homeownership against the 
current financial situations is displayed in Table 3.10. It is observed that the vast 
majority of both homeowners and non-homeowners have a satisfactory current financial 
status, and only less than 4% of them find themselves in a difficult situation.
T a b le  3 .8 :  T h e  sh a r e  o f  h o m e o w n e r s /n o n -h o m e o w n e r s  b y  th r e e  ty p e s  o f  f in a n c ia l e x p e c ta t io n
Financial expectation
Home ownership Better off About the same Worse off
Homeowners 30.83% 61.55% 7.62% 100%
Non-homeowners 37.58% 56.94% 5.48% 100%
T a b le  3 .9 :  T h e  sh a r e  o f  h o m e o w  n e r s /n o n -h o m e o w n e r s  b y  th r e e  ty p e s  o f  f in a n c ia l r e a lisa tio n
Financial realisation
Home ownership Better than last year About the same Worse than last year
Homeowners 38.62% 46.87% 14.51% 100%
N on-homeo wners 46.18% 41.45% 12.37% 100%
T a b le  3 .1 0 :  T h e  sh a r e  o f  h o m e o w n e r s /n o n -h o m e o w n e r s  by th r e e  ty p e s  o f  c u r r e n t  f in a n c ia l  s ta tu s
Current financial status
Home ownership Doing alright or well Just getting by Finding it difficult
Homeowners 86.31% 12.23% 1.46% 100%
Non-homeowners 75.83% 21.15% 3.02% 100%
3.3.2 Analysis of saving ratios
3.3.2.1 Sample description
The sample was selected by similar criteria to those applied in the first stage. The 
observations with the estimated saving ratio above one were filtered out of the 
sample80in that it distorted the sample distribution. In total, there were 7197 effective 
observations, representing 3561 households in total across the four waves, forming an 
unbalanced panel dataset. Respectively, there were 1705 observations in wave 10, 1958 
observations in wave 11, 1781 observations in wave 12, and 1753 observations in wave 
13. The whole sample was also disaggregated by homeownership and private pension 
enrolment into two sub-samples: homeowners and private pensioner participants. The 
size of each sub-sample is reported in Table 3.11 below.
80 There are 6 observations with savings ratio above one.
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T a b le  3 .1 1 :  S a m p le  s iz e  fo r  ea ch  w a v e  b y  su b -sa m p le s
;Huriple H o m e o w n e rs P r iv a te  p e n s io n  p a r tic ip a n ts T o ta l sa m p le
10 1445 460 1705
11 1679 525 1958
12 1561 481 1781
13 1520 433 1753
3.3.2.2 Data analysis
Table 3.12 below provides descriptive statistics of the imputed short-term and long-term 
saving ratio. The mean values overall are above the median values, that is, the sample 
dataset is right-skewed. The short-term saving ratios range from 3.8% to 4.2% and the 
long-term saving ratios are located between 5.2% and 5.8%.
T a b le  3 .1 2 :  D e s c r ip t iv e  s ta t is t ic s  o f  th e  im p u te d  lo n g -te r m  s a v in g  ra tio  a n d  sh o r t-te r m  sa v in g  r a tio  
b y  w a v e s
Saving ratio




S h o r t  te r m  s a v in g  ra tio  (% )
Wave 10 3.8 5.9 1.9 0 5.2
Wave 11 4.0 6.6 2.1 0 5.3
Wave 12 3.8 5.6 2.1 0 5.3
Wave 13 4.2 6.3 2.4 0 5.8
L o n g  te r m  s a v in g  r a t io  (% )
Wave 10 5.3 7.6 3.0 0 7.1
Wave 11 5.5 7.3 3.3 0 7.4
Wave 12 5.8 8.1 3.2 0.6 7.4
Wave 13 5.2 7.4 3.0 0.3 6.7
Table 3.13 reports the descriptive statistics of each sub-sample. In comparison to the 
panel of the short-term saving ratios, the long-term saving ratios are generally higher 
than the short-term saving ratios. Of the two groups, pension participants, on average, 
have a higher saving ratio -  long-term and short-term -  than homeowners.
T a b le  3 .1 3 :  D e s c r ip t iv e  s ta t is t ic s  o f  tw o  ty p e s  o f  sa v in g  ra t io  by su b -sa m p le s
Mean Std deviation Median 1st quartile 3rd quartile
L o n g -te r m  sa v in g  r a t io  (% )
Homeowners 5.5 7.5 3.3 0.6 7.1
Private pension participants 6.4 9.1 3.6 0.9 8.3
S h o r t- te r m  s a v in g  ra tio  (% )
Homeowners 3.8 5.8 2.1 0 5.3
Private pension participants 4.0 6.6 1.9 0 5.2
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The mean figures of the saving ratios by financial situations are exhibited in Table 3.14. 
The short-term average saving ratios and the long-term saving ratios do not vary much 
with financial expectations. Hence this provides little evidence that households’ saving 
ratios, long-term or short-term, are significantly influenced by short-term uncertainty. In 
contrast, the difference between the financial situation now and a year ago appears to be 
associated monotonically. Compared with the previous year, a better-off financial 
realisation tends to be related to a higher short-term saving ratio and higher long-term 
saving ratio, and vice versa. Similarly, the households have higher long-term saving 
ratio and short-term saving ratio whilst their current financial situations are positive. 
Comparing the two types of saving ratios, it is obvious that the long-term saving ratios 
are generally above the short-term ones, but the exception occurs amongst the 
households that are having financial difficulties, as they tend to save more for the short 
term than for the long term and hence the gap between the two saving ratios is narrower.
Table 3.14: The mean of two types of saving ratio against financial expectations, financial 
realisations, and cu rren t financial status______________________________________________
Short-term saving ratio (%) Long-term saving ratio (%)
Financial expectation
Better off 4.1 5.5
About the same 3.9 5.4
Worse off 4.0 5.4
Financial realisation
Better than last year 4.4 6.0
About the same 3.8 5.3
Worse than last year 3.2 4.5
C u rren t financial status
Doing well or alright 4.0 5.9
Just getting by 3.4 3.3
Finding it difficult 3.5 2.1
Table 3.15 shows that the average short-term saving ratio of homeowners is lower than 
that of non-homeowners, whereas the average long-term saving ratio of homeowners is 
higher than that of non-homeowners. Whilst it is observed in both groups that the long­
term saving ratios are higher than the short-term saving ratio, the gap between the two 
types of saving ratio appears to be bigger for homeowners than for non-homeowners. 
This may be due to homeowners having a preference for long-term saving over short­
term saving. The average short-term saving ratio of pension-participants is similar to 
that of non pension-participants. However, the average long-term saving ratio of 
pension-participants appears to be higher than that of their counterparts. This may
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indicate that whilst the households have paid into private pension schemes to guarantee 
consumption after retirement, they have also managed to build up more discretionary 
long-term savings than their counterparts.
T a b le  3 .1 5 :  T h e  m ea n  o f  tw o  ty p e s  o f  sa v in g  ra t io  a g a in s t  w ith /w ith o u t  h o m e o w n e r sh ip  a n d  
w ith /w ith o u t  p e n s io n  e n r o lm e n t
Short-term saving ratio (%) Long-tenn saving ratio (%)
H o m e o w n e r sh ip
Homeowners 3.8 5.5
N on-homeo wners 4.9 5.1
P e n s io n  e n r o lm e n t
Pension-participants 4.0 6.4
Non pension-participants 3.9 5.1
3.3.3 A nalysis o f saving am ounts
3.3.3.1 Sample description
In the third stage analysis, the savings amount took the role of the dependent variable as 
the distribution of the savings amount against age was examined. In addition to the 
whole sample and sub-groups of homeowners and private pension participants, three 
additional sub-groups were considered: males, females, and employees. Separating 
males and females was as a result of previous findings in the first and the second stages 
which have suggested that gender difference plays a robust role in determining 
households’ saving preferences. Moreover, the self-employed are distinct from 
employees in that they are more financially vulnerable as their social security welfare 
are less guaranteed. In addition, the self-employed can be considered as both private 
persons and enterprises, and entrepreneurs tend to save, on average, a larger proportion 
of their income than other people with similar incomes and have a unique and 
apparently powerful motive to save (Katona, 1960). Therefore, in this study, the
Q 1
employees group is taken as a subgroup in this study . Valid samples are reported in 
Table 3.16 below.
81 Owing to the small sample sizes o f the self-employed group over the four waves, their savings-age 
profiles are not able to be estimated from the estimation method chosen.
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T a b le  3 .1 6 :  S a m p le  s iz e  fo r  ea ch  w a v e  b y  su b -sa m p le s
' i^xqnple Males Females Homeowners Pensioners Self-employed Employees T o ta l sa m p le
10 1316 389 1445 460 165 1540 1705
11 1516 442 1679 525 218 1740 1958
12 1396 385 1561 481 195 1586 1781
13 1363 390 1520 433 200 1553 1753
3.3.3.2 Data analysis
In an attempt to classify the effect of inconsistent time preference on the households’ 
savings-age profiles, this work intended to explore the short-term savings and long-term 
savings distributions throughout the working life cycle, between age 25 and age 65. The 
reason for confining the age range of the sample between 25 and 65 was to ensure that 
there was consistency in the sample throughout the three stages. The descriptive 
statistics of the savings amount are reported in Table 3.17. As shown, long-term savings 
are well above short-term savings in all four waves, and this implies that the households 
generally put away more money for future use than for short-term purposes.
T a b le  3 .1 7 :  D e s c r ip t iv e  s ta t is t ic s  o f  th e  sh o r t- te r m  sa v in g s  a n d  lo n g -te r m  sa v in g s  b y  w a v e  (y e a r  £  in  
S e p te m b e r  2 0 0 0  p r ic e s )
Savings amount
M e a n S td . D e v ia tio n M e d ia n 1* 
q u a r ti le q u a r ti le
S h o r t  te r m  sa v in g s
Wave 10 1172.26 1849.81 600 0 1500
Wave 11 1250.03 2288.06 590.03 0 1534.09
Wave 12 1225.74 2023.16 580.07 0 1740.2
Wave 13 1401.61 2279.82 564.49 0 1693.48
L o n g  te r m  sa v in g s
Wave 10 1882.61 3031.73 900 0 2400
Wave 11 1986.6 3303.36 1032.56 0 2360.14
Wave 12 2087.57 3354.67 1160.14 174.02 2436.28
Wave 13 1982.11 3831.35 903.19 112.9 2257.97
Table 3.18 displays the descriptive statistics of total savings and their breakdown into 
long-term savings and short-term savings. It is observed across all the four waves and 
across all the sub-samples, that the long-term savings amount considerably exceeds the 
short-term savings amount. This demonstrates that households put away more resources 
for the long run than for short-term purposes. The table below shows that, on average, 
the self-employed save more, for both the long term and the short term than employees. 
Male households have both higher long-term savings and short-term savings than
female ones. Comparing homeowners with pension-participants, both have accumulated 
illiquid assets, but pension-participants, on average, have higher discretionary savings 
both for the long term and the short term.
T a b le  3 .1 8 :  T h e  d e sc r ip t iv e  s ta t is t ic s  o f  s a v in g s  a m o u n t b y  w a v e s  an d  b y  su b -s a m p le s  (y e a r  £  in  
S e p te m b e r  2 0 0 0  p r ic e s )
Mean Std deviation Median 1st quartile 3rd quartile
W a v e  1 0
T o ta l sa v in g s
Males 3376.11 3789.16 2400 1200 4200
Females 1968.06 2491.94 1200 600 2400
Homeowners 3226.98 3735.43 2220 1200 4080
Private pension participants 3257.27 3793.4 2160 1080 4140
Employees 2908.36 3341.17 1800 960 3600
Self-employed82 4422.26 5157.9 2880 1200 5400
S h o r t- te r m  sa v in g s
Males 1279.04 1991.74 600 0 1800
Females 811 1188.8 360 0 1200
Homeowners 1197.72 1859.28 600 0 1800
Private pension participants 1160.86 1939.58 600 0 1665
Employees 1170.96 1841.87 600 0 1500
Self-employed 1184.33 1928.05 360 0 1500
L o n g -te r m  sa v in g s
Males 2097.07 3220.51 1200 180 2610
Females 1157.06 2128.65 420 0 1200
Homeowners 2029.26 3198.82 960 120 2400
Private pension participants 2096.41 3382.83 1104 180 2610
Employees 1737.39 2727.9 900 0 2400
Self-employed 3237.93 4860.4 1500 600 3600
W a v e  11
T o ta l sa v in g s
Males 3524.43 4155.79 2360.14 1180.07 4130.24
Females 2249.5 4043.63 1180.07 590.03 2478.14
Homeowners 3391.08 4320.24 2360.14 1180.07 4130.24
Private pension participants 3646.73 4990.25 2360.14 1180.07 4130.24
Employees 3057.82 3514.22 2065.12 1180.07 3540.21
Self-employed 4663.76 7422.79 2360.14 1180.07 4720.27
S h o r t- te r m  sa v in g s
Males 1328.82 2443.67 590.03 0 1770.1
Females 979.8 1619.58 590.03 0 1180.07
Homeowners 1295.563 2385.52 590.03 0 1652.1
Private pension participants 1335.94 2562.84 590.03 0 1770.1
Employees 1154.38 1765.17 590.03 0 1475.09
Self-employed 2013.48 4645.94 590.03 0 1770.1
L o n g -te r m  sa v in g s
82 The self-employed is not a subgroup.
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Males 2195.61 3234.86 1180.07 236.01 2950.17
Females 1269.7 3436.61 472.03 0 1180.07
Homeowners 2095.51 3414.23 1180.07 177.01 2360.14
Private pension participants 2310.79 4066.52 1180.07 236.01 2761.36
Employees 1903.44 2966.66 944.05 0 2360.14
Self-employed 2650.28 5232.86 1180.07 236.01 2950.17
W a v e  1 2
Total savings
Males 3632.16 4203.99 2320.27 1160.14 4640.54
Females 2157.13 2620.83 1160.14 580.07 2320.27
Homeowners 3449.64 4085.11 2320.27 1160.14 4292.5
Private pension participants 3938.62 5091.32 2320.27 1160.14 4640.54
Employees 3219.96 3885.31 2320.27 1160.14 4060.47
Self-employed 4072.49 4481.38 2529.1 1160.14 5800.68
Short-term savings
Males 1339.36 2178.03 580.07 0 1740.2
Females 813.75 1234.13 464.05 0 1160.14
Homeowners 1252.38 2072.62 580.07 0 1740.2
Private pension participants 1376.51 2663.14 580.07 0 1740.2
Employees 1201.3 1957.93 580.07 0 1740.2
Self-employed 1424.47 2488.23 580.07 0 1740.2
Long-term savings
Males 2292.81 3527.34 1160.14 290.03 2900.34
Females 1343.38 2501.59 580.07 0 1450.17
Homeowners 2197.26 3457.24 1160.14 232.03 2610.31
Private pension participants 2562.11 4299.38 1160.14 232.03 2900.34
Employees 2018.66 3290.22 1160.14 116.01 2320.27
Self-employed 2648.02 3802.14 1160.14 464.05 3480.41
W a v e  1 3
Total savings
Males 3766.29 4827.62 2257.97 1128.99 4515.95
Females 2046.68 3208.33 1128.99 564.49 2257.97
Homeowners 3540.84 4771.17 2257.97 1128.99 4515.95
Private pension participants 4286.84 6372.34 2257.97 1128.99 4515.95
Employees 3250.6 4301.78 2257.97 1128.99 3951.45
Self-employed 4417.39 6213.14 2263.62 1128.99 4515.95
Short-term savings
Males 1541.79 2483.25 790.29 0 2088.63
Females 911.69 1228.38 564.49 0 1128.99
Homeowners 1437.55 2340.37 677.392 0 1707.59
Private pension participants 1589.71 2757.2 677.39 0 1862.83
Employees 1357.31 2063.3 564.49 0 1693.48
Self-employed 1745.53 3524.72 677.39 0 2257.97
Long-term savings
Males 2224.5 4022.04 1128.99 225.8 2596.67
Females 1134.99 2923.71 451.59 0 1128.99
Homeowners 2103.3 4025.4 1128.99 169.35 2257.97
Private pension participants 2697.13 5619.02 1128.99 282.25 2709.57
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Employees 1893.28 3621.32 846.74 56.45 2257.97
Self-employed 2671.86 5140.1 1128.99 282.25 2822.47
A preliminary investigation of the savings profiles against the age cohorts was carried 
out, and the results are exhibited in Table 3.19. It is evident that across the four waves, 
the long-term savings are at their lowest level during young working age, and increase 
afterwards. A similar trend can be found in total savings of waves 10, 11, and 12 with 
wave 13 being the exception. In wave 13, the total savings median of the households 
whose heads are aged between 35 and 44 appears to be the lowest, and this can be 
attributed to a macroeconomic effect occurring in that year or to sample selection. In 
general, the short-term savings of the four waves do not present a pattern of increase or 
decrease with age; in addition, the medians of the short-term savings remain consistent 
or only vary moderately across the age groups. However, in wave 13, the short-term 
savings increase between age 25 and 44, and decrease afterwards; this shows itself as a 
small hump shape.
T a b le  3 .1 9 :  T h e  m e d ia n  sa v in g s  a m o u n t  o f  a g iv e  a g e  r a n g e  (y e a r  £  in S e p te m b e r  2 0 0 0  p r ic e s )
Total savings Short-term savings Long-term savings
W a v e  10
Age 25 to 34 1800 600 660
Age 35 to 44 1800 540 600
Age 45 to 54 2400 600 1200
Age 55 to 65 2400 450 1200
W a v e  11
Age 25 to 34 1770.1 590.03 604.79
Age 35 to 44 1888.11 590.03 944.05
Age 45 to 54 2360.14 590.03 1180.07
Age 55 to 65 2360.14 472.03 1180.07
W a v e  12
Age 25 to 34 1972.23 580.07 870.1
Age 35 to 44 2320.27 580.07 1160.14
Age 45 to 54 2320.27 580.07 1160.14
Age 55 to 65 2320.27 580.07 1160.14
W a v e  13
Age 25 to 34 2257.97 564.49 592.72
Age 35 to 44 2145.08 677.39 852.39
Age 45 to 54 2257.97 620.94 1128.99
Age 55 to 65 2257.97 564.49 1128.99
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3.4 CONCLUSION
In the first stage, of the whole sample and of the sub-samples: homeowners and private 
pension participants, it is shown that, in general, around 40% to 45% of the observations 
have been reported as saving mainly for the long term. This demonstrates that a 
significant portion of households mainly engage in long-term savings. In the second 
stage, the short-term saving ratios range from 3.8 % to 4.2 % and the long-term saving 
ratios from 5.2 % to 5.8 %. In the third stage, it is found throughout the four waves and 
across all the sub-samples83, that the long-term savings amount considerably exceeds 
the short-term savings amount. In addition, the self-employed save more for both long­
term and short term than employees; male households have higher long-term and short­
term savings than female households; pension-participants, on average, have higher 
savings both for long-term and short-term purposes than homeowners.
Next, the relationships between the dependent variables and the independent variables 
were also examined. The effects of the financial realisations and of the current financial 
status are more evident as influences on the saving motives than the effects of financial 
expectations. Nevertheless, it is still observed that, of the households saving mainly for 
the short term, the share of those with a worse-off expectation is slightly higher than 
those with a better-off expectation. This suggests that the households who save mainly 
for the short term, to some extent, tend to identify with negative shocks. The percentage 
of mainly short-term savers of the non-homeowners lies significantly above that of the 
homeowners, and the share of the mainly long-term savers of homeowners is larger than 
that of non-homeowners. This implies that homeowners are more inclined to save 
discretionarily for the long term and less inclined to save for the short term than non­
homeowners. A similar pattern can be observed amongst pension participants and their 
counterparts. Nevertheless, comparing these two groups, the gap between the shares of 
either the long-term savers or of the short-term savers, is relatively small.
It is shown that the short-term average saving ratios and the long-term saving ratios do 
not vary much with financial expectations, whilst the effects of the financial realisations 
and current financial situations are evident. The effect of homeownership is reflected in
83 In the third stage, sub-samples include males, females, homeowners, private pension participants, and 
employees.
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both the long-term saving ratio and the short-term saving ratio, whereas pension 
enrolment only makes a difference on the long-term saving ratio.
Regarding the association between the savings amount and the age cohorts, it is evident 
that the long-term savings are at their lowest level during young working age, and 
increase afterwards. However, the medians of the short-term savings remain consistent 
or only vary moderately across the age groups. Hence, the preliminary findings suggest 
that the age effect appears to be more significant on long-term savings than on short­
term savings.
Having summarised the findings from the descriptive statistics, econometric analytical 
tools will be employed to examine the association of the saving motives, the saving 
ratio, and the savings amount, with the independent variables discussed previously, so 
as to enhance an understanding of British households’ saving behaviour.
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CHAPTER 4 : ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter addresses the econometric estimation methods that are used in the 
empirical analyses for the three stages of empirical investigation.
A single econometric function with saving motives as the dependent variable is used to 
estimate the first stage. Owing to the qualitative characteristic of the dependent variable, 
a random-effect ordered Probit regression model is applied on unbalanced panel data 
from the year 2000 to 2004 (wave 10 to wave 13) of the British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS). Whilst individual-invariant time effects -  through time dummies - and 
unobserved individual heterogeneity -  though fixed-effect or random-effect parameters 
- can be explicitly measured in the panel data analysis, it is assumed that the estimated 
coefficient of a given control variable is consistent over time. To follow up, a seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) model is employed. A SUR model allows for multiple 
equations in the same framework (system) by assuming that these equations are 
correlated; in this study, the SUR model applied comprised of four equations, 
representing individual cross-sectional ordered Probit specification for the four waves. 
Hypothesis tests for the equality of the coefficients of the given independent variables 
over the four waves are applied.
The second stage empirical work aims to examine the extent to which households’ long­
term and short-term saving ratios change, with respect to the specified control variables. 
The measured long-term savings-to-permanent income ratio and the imputed short-term 
savings-to-permanent income ratio are the dependent variables respectively. As 
explained in chapter three, household’s long-term savings and short-term savings are 
measured according to a weighting standard: total savings amount of every individual 
member of a given household is collected and separated, according to his/her saving 
motive, into savings for the long term and saving for the short term. Household’s long­
term savings and short-term savings are obtained by summing up each member’s long­
term and short-term savings. A very common problem in microeconomic data is the 
censoring of a dependent variable. When the dependent variable is censored, values in a
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certain range are all transformed to a single value (Greene, 2003). The censoring point 
can be at an upper limit, at a lower limit, or both. The distributions of two types of 
imputed household saving ratio have the censoring point at value ‘O’. In pursuing the 
panel data estimation, a random-effect Tobit regression model was applied to two single 
equations, one with the long-term saving ratio as the dependent variable and the other 
with the short-term saving ratio as the dependent variable in this role. The estimated 
coefficients from the Tobit model contain two types of effect: one is on the change in 
the possibility of the observations that are censored and the other is on the change in the 
level of the observations that are not censored. Marginal effect estimation was also 
applied to break down the two aforementioned types of effect.
In the third stage, the research explores the long-term savings-age profile and the short­
term savings-age profile at the household level. A nonparametric kernel-smoothed 
conditional quantile regression model was adopted to investigate the relationship 
between the savings amount and age for each cross-sectional wave sample.
The main body of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 addresses the 
estimation methods applied for the first stage empirical work. Section 4.3 explains the 
methodology of the second-stage empirical work. Section 4.4 goes through the third- 
stage estimation approach. Finally, this chapter is completed with a conclusion in 
section 4.5.
4.2 ANALYSIS OF SAVING MOTIVES
4.2.1 Random-effect ordered Probit model
The first empirical work of this research aims to examine simultaneously the change in 
likelihood that a household (represented by head of household) has mainly a short-term 
saving motive or mainly one for the long term. In chapter 3, it was stated that the 
households, namely, the heads of the households, were asked the main savings motives 
for their savings over the past 12 months. The savings motives were particularly 
specified as for the long-term motive, the short-term motive, or both long-term and 
short-term equally. The long-term motive observations are coded as ‘O’, both long-term
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and short-term motive as ‘1’, and short-term motive as ‘2’. When playing the role of a 
dependent variable, the three saving motives are characterised as a rank of categories. 
An ordered Probit model is able to account for the ordinal nature of it (Zavonia and 
McElvey, 1975); a random-effect ordered Probit model is chosen as the econometric 
methodology, and this method is illustrated below.
The econometric equation is defined as,
SIT* = aYp + P'IUU + ylAit + <p'Xit + Xtime, + v(. + s i( ,
SITit = 0 if SIT* < 0 ,
= 1 if 0 < SIT* < ml ,
= 2 if m] < 577)* < m2,
where t denotes waves (10-13) and i denotes households. The m s are unknown 
parameters to be estimated with the coefficient parameters. In the model, the dependent 
variable, SIT* , is a latent variable and is unobserved. What is observed is SITit , 
representing saving motives reported by household i at wave t . SITit denotes the three 
specified saving motives: 577), = 0 represents the motive of mainly for the long term, 
577), = 1 represents the motive of for both equally, and 577), = 2 represents the motive 
of mainly for the short term. The dependent variable is categorised in an ordered form, 
indicating that the strength of the short-term saving motive increases as the code is close 
to two and, on the other hand, the long-term saving motive increases as the code is close 
to zero. Owing to being in a panel-data specification, the saving motive of a household 
(the head) can be changing temporally. Y p denotes the estimated permanent income of 
each household, and the estimation method will be addressed in the following section. 
IU  denotes a matrix of three variables, each of them including three dummy variables. 
These variables consist of each household’s expectation of its uncertainty in the next 12 
months, of its household’s current financial situation, and of its financial situation in 
comparison to that of the previous year. IA denotes a matrix of two variables: one is the 
dummy indicator for homeownership and the other is the dummy indicator for private 
pension enrolment. X  denotes a matrix of the socio-economic and demographic 
features of each head of household. Finally, time denotes a matrix of year (wave)
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dummies. The details of these explanatory variables have been presented in chapter 
three. o r , X denote the coefficient parameters to be estimated.
The error term is made up of an unobservable household-specific time-invariant effect, 
denoted as v(., which is assumed to be randomly distributed and captures the unobserved
heterogeneity of the household, and of an idiosyncratic error term, denoted as s it, where
v;. ~ IID(0, <tv2 ), s it ~ IID(0, cr] ). There are two justifications to be made regarding the
assumption of the error term: one is the assumption of the unobserved element of the 
household heterogeneity being a random effect as opposed to being a fixed effect, and 
the other is the specification of the one way error against the two way error component.
The justifications of choosing a random-effect model will be discussed below. In a fixed 
effect model, the unobserved individual/household effect, denoted as vf, is assumed to
be a fixed parameter to be estimated. A fixed effect model would be an appropriate 
specification if the research aimed to focus on a specific of N  individuals or firms, but 
this would restrict the analysis to the behaviour of these sets of micro units. However, 
for large consumer panel where N  is large, a fixed effect regression may not be feasible 
as one is including N  -1  dummies in the regression and thus this suffers from a large 
loss of degrees of freedom. If a fixed effect model is employed on panel data, as 
N  —> oo, for a fixed time period (T )  , the number of parameters v; increases with N , 
which means that v, cannot be consistently estimated for a fixed T . This is known as
the incidental parameters problem. In addition, a fixed effect model cannot estimate the 
effect of any time-invariant variables, such as sex and highest educational attainment 
level. It would seriously weaken the empirical specification in this research to drop such 
factors as sex, because it is evident that the difference in gender makes a significant 
contribution in explaining the households’ saving behaviour. A random effect model 
appears to be an appropriate specification, if the N  individuals are drawn randomly 
from a large population, which is the case for the British Household Panel Survey. 
Hence, in a random effect model, the unobserved effect (v;.) is assumed to be random 
and independent from the explanatory variables and the rest of the error term.
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Most of the panel data analyses utilize a one-way error component model for the 
disturbances, with juit = vt + e it , where v;. denotes the unobservable time-invariant
individual specific effect and s it denotes the remainder disturbance. By comparison, a
two-way error component disturbance is exhibited as juit = v, + Xt + s it , where v,
denotes the unobservable time-invariant individual specific effect, Xt denotes the
unobservable individual-invariant time effect, and s it denotes the remainder
disturbance. In this research, the framework employs a one-way error component 
regression model, as the time dummies are specified explicitly in order to capture 
unobserved macroeconomic effect, and hence, the one-way error component refers only 
to the time-invariant individual effect.
The estimation is carried out using a maximum likelihood estimator. The estimated 
coefficients are to be interpreted as the direction and scale of the effect that the 
explanatory variables have on the change o f the likelihood of the saving motives. A 
positive sign on an explanatory variable’s coefficient indicates the tendency towards 
saving for the short term and the absolute value of the coefficient shows the change in 
likelihood of such saving. A negative sign shows the opposite effect, i.e. a household 
saves mainly for the long term.
4.2.2 Estimation method of permanent income
The concept of permanent income comes from the Milton Friedman’s permanent 
income hypothesis. Permanent income is determined by a consumer’s assets: physical 
assets (shares, bonds, property) and human assets (education and experience). These 
influence the consumer's ability to earn income. The measured income contains a 
permanent (anticipated and planned) element and a transitory (windfall gain/unexpected) 
element.
In Kazarosian (1997), to distinguish permanent income from current measured income, 
a random effect general least square (linear) model was employed on panel data, 
Y f = Z tf3 + 8t , where Z; is a vector of households’ observable characteristics, with the
parameter vector (3. 8, is the time consistent household-specific error, 8t ~ A (0,crj).
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Permanent income Y? is the annual income with no transitory component, evaluated at 
the same age for everyone. The current income is,
Eit = Z itfi  + g(Ait) + Si + juit, where Eit is the household annual income in year t for
household i , g(A it) is the age-income profile, and p it is the observation-specific error.
The estimated permanent income is obtained from the fitted value of a random-effect 
general least square model, in which the log of the household’s observed total annual 
income is regressed on observable characteristics of the heads of household.
In this study, the observed characteristics include: gender, age, age2 , education 
dummies, occupation dummies, interaction of age and age2 with the education 
dummies and the occupation dummies - age x education dummies, age x occupation 
dummies, age2 x education dummies, and age2 x occupation dummies -, residential 
area dummies, marital status, number of children in the household, whether individuals 
have spouse/partner in employment, and homeownership dummy (Kazarosian, 1997; 
Guariglia, 2001; Carroll, Dynan, and Krane 2003; Benito, 2004). Hence, the estimating 
equation is,
In Eit = a0 +b]ageit +b2ageft + b3genderit -(- bADUM{education) + bsDUM{occupation)
+ b6age x DUM{education) + b7age x DUM{occupation) + bsage2 x DUM{education)
+ b9age2 x DUM {occupation) + bl0DUM {residence) + bx XDUM {maritalstatus)
+ bnDUM {children) + bnDUM {spouseemployment) + bu DUM {homeownership) + 5t + p it
where i denotes household, t denotes waves 10-13, St denotes the time-invariant 
unobserved household characteristic which is assumed to be randomly distributed, and 
p it is the idiosyncratic error term. The estimated value of the log permanent income is 
the sum of the predicted value and the estimated time-invariant household effect, 
denoted as ( In Eit + ). The estimated permanent income level is calculated by taking 
the function below,
Yitp = (in Eit + SiJ . The estimated coefficients are reported in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Random effect general least square model on log of household income
Independent variables Coefficient Stand Deviation
Female -0.06*** 0.022
Age 0.135*** 0.044
Age squared -0.002*** 0.000
Education
Higher than first degree 0.770 0.607
First degree 0.443 0.408
Some college 0.273 0.318
A Level 0.901** 0.419
Occupation




Clerical & Secretarial 1.763* 0.958
Craft related 1.950** 0.949
Personal & Protective service 2.268** 1.111
Sales 0.726 1.035
Age*Education
Higher than first degree -0.019 0.030
First degree -0.004 0.020
Some college -0.006 0.015
A Level -0.036* 0.020
Age squared *Education
Higher than first degree 0.0003 0.0004
First degree 0.000 0.0002
Some college 0.0001 0.0002
A Level 0.0004* 0.0002
Age*Occupation




Clerical & Secretarial -0.077* 0.045
Craft related -0.088** 0.044
Personal & Protective service -0.106** 0.053
Sales -0.051 0.048
Age square*Occupation




Clerical & Secretarial 0.001* 0.0005
Craft related 0.001** 0.0005
Personal & Protective service 0.001** 0.001
Sales 0.001 0.001
Region
Greater London 0.044 0.041
South West -0.159*** 0.042
East -0.143*** 0.037
West Midlands -0.174*** 0.043
Greater Manchester -0.116** 0.057
North West -0.124*** 0.046
Yorkshire & Humberside -0.166*** 0.041
Tyne & Wear -0.162*** 0.046
Wales -0.246*** 0.031
Scotland -0.191*** 0.029
Northern Ireland -0.210*** 0.031
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Married/Cohabiting 0.315*** 0.025
With children -0.001 0.016
Spouse/partner employed 0.210*** 0.020







Number of observations 7763
Log likelihood -4894.445
LR Chi square 1782.84
P-value 0.000
P Oho) 0.658
(***) At the 1% significance level; (**) at the 5% significance level; (*) at the 10% significance level
4.2.3 The Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model
In this section, the aim is to investigate both the influence and stability, over time, of the 
explanatory parameters. A seemingly unrelated regression, known as a SUR model, is 
applied to accommodate multi-equations in a single model. In this model, the time- 
consistency of the effects of a given independent variable over time can be tested.
Panel data estimation is an example of systems of equations, as all explanatory variables 
are dated contemporaneously; estimated correlations reported by a panel data estimation 
method are assumed to be long-term relationships. For instance, previously in the 
random-effect ordered Probit model, the estimated coefficients of the independent 
variables were assumed to be consistent over time. The error component in such a 
model took into account of the time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity of households 
and time effects. A SUR model is another example of systems of equations (Zellner, 
1962) and is considered an alternative estimation approach to be used on cross-sections 
with time-series data. A SUR estimation technique is employed in this study mainly to 
test whether or not the coefficients would be statistically significantly time-invariant, 
that is, to test the stability of the estimated coefficients of each set of cross-section data 
over time. The hypotheses will not be rejected in the case of stability.
The SUR model, in this case, specifies the t th of the T equations, where T denotes the 
waves 10-13 for the i th of N  households to be given by:
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SITi ]o =  a ]o^no + A i o ^ „ o  + / io ^ /io  +(P\o^i\o + ^/io’
SITn i =ocu YiXX + PiX,  IUiX,  + yx,  Z4n x+(pu X n,  + s , ,
SH'il2 = a \2 ^i\2 + Pin1Ui\2 + YnIAin + ^l2 ^jl2 + £*j1 2 >
577^ 13 = ccxiYiX3 + PiX^ IUin + ynIAin + (pxiX jX2 + £n3,
Where disturbance is independent of any control variables, and disturbances are 
uncorrelated across observations. The definitions of the variables are identical to those 
in the previous section. The four equations above have identical explanatory variables, 
and are linked by their disturbances. The SUR model is based on an assumption that 
there are correlations amongst disturbances of equations, that is, the equations are 
related if the errors s  in different equations are correlated84. For example in this study, 
the relationship between, say SIT*l0 and SIT*U , is indirect, as it comes through 
correlation in the errors across different equations.
Accounting for these correlations amongst the errors aims to increase the asymptotic 
efficiency of the estimates of the causal parameters. One may assume some pattern 
regarding the correlations of the errors, such as a first order autoregressive scheme in 
the time direction, in order to reduce the number of unknown parameters to manageable 
proportions (Wallace and Hussain, 1969). For instance, applying this method to 
estimate the determinants of the percent of each state’s population receiving general 
assistant payment by using cross-sections with time-series data in the United States, 
Brehm and Saving (1964) assumed that the correlations were bothersome only in one 
direction, i.e. time.
Compared with that of a cross-sectional estimation model, the efficiency gain of a SUR 
model is affected by the correlation between disturbances of equations: the greater the 
correlation the greater the difference between the SUR variance and the ordered Probit 
variance, in the case of this study. Moreover, Binkley and Nelson (1988) proposed that 
the multicollinearity of variables influenced the gain in efficiency, in a SUR model. 
Such multicollinearity operates in two distinct ways: the first involves correlation 
amongst variables in one equation and those in the other. The second involves not only
84 If the assumption does not hold, the SUR system would collapse to single equation estimation.
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the correlation amongst the variables across the equations but also that within them85. It 
thus was posited that the gain in efficiency could be large, even if correlation between 
variables within the equation and between the equations existed.
Concerning this study, the estimation thus combines observations over both equations 
(waves) and households, and the estimates obtained exhibit identical coefficients with 
those obtained in the cross-sectional ordered Probit model, yet, there are difference in 
the standard deviations. This is because such a joint estimation is the gain in efficiency 
that results from incorporating correlation in unobservable factors across equations for a 
given individual. Thus, it does not impose a distribution on those unobservable effects, 
in contrast to the random-effect panel data estimation. The assumption of the 
correlations across equations can allow for unobserved effects for a given household. 
For instance, a household had a major consumption of durable goods in a specific wave, 
and there is reason to believe that such an effect also exists in the preceding or 
succeeding waves. Moreover, a macroeconomic shock, such as a change in policy, is 
likely to last over time.
After the estimated coefficients are estimated in a SUR model, it is possible to test the 
coefficients across the equations. Zellner (1962) developed a technique to test the 
aggregation bias: this is in the case that the control variables matrices of each equation 
are all of the same size and represent matrices of observations on particular variables 
relating to different micro-units. The testable hypothesis is H 0 : p x = p 2 =... = f3M , 
where each ft  denotes the coefficient parameter of each equation, and M  counts as the 
number of equations in the regression model. The hypothesis mentioned above states 
that micro-units, i.e. households in this study, are homogeneous insofar as their 
regression coefficient vectors are concerned. The adapted regression model in this study 
contains four equations and each of them represents the estimates for a given wave. 
Accordingly, the test is eligible for determining whether the coefficient vectors are 
time-consistent across the four waves. For example, when the coefficient vector of a 
given control variable, say permanent income, is to be tested, the null hypothesis is 
proposed as:
85 See Binkley and Nelson (1988) for technical illustrations.
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a l0 = a n = a l2 = a i3, for which chi-squared statistics are applied. Given the hypothesis
of aggregation bias is not rejected, the estimated coefficients of the SUR model exhibit 
the fluctuations of coefficients of a given independent variable. Moreover, the SUR 
model cannot measure the unobservable household effect, which, by contrast, can be 
done in panel-data analysis.
The SUR model has become a popular tool in investigating financial market behaviour, 
for instance, the determinants of the expected return of five different financial 
commodities can be modelled in a SUR model with five equations, allowing for the 
correlation among the return rates of those commodities. Also, it is also widely used in 
other fields, such as environmental studies, Biology, etc. (Nassset, Bollandsas, and 
Gobakken, 2005; Carroll, Midthune, Freedman, and Kipnis, 2006)
4.3 ANALYSIS OF SAVING RATIOS
4.3.1 Random-effect Tobit model
A very common problem in microeconomic data is the censoring of the dependent 
variable. When the dependent variable is censored, values in a certain range are all 
transformed to a single value (Greene, 2003). In this study, the short-term saving ratio 
and the long-term saving ratio will be examined separately with respect to the 
explanatory variables. It is observed that many households have a zero (measured) 
short-term saving ratio or a zero (measured) long-term saving ratio. Figure 4-1 and 
Figure 4-2 below demonstrate the distribution of the two dependent variables; as can be 
seen, the dataset contains censored observations at value’0’. The distribution theory for 
a censored variable is similar to that for a truncated one. In a truncated distribution, only 
the part of the distribution above the censoring point, say zero, is relevant to the 
computation; when the data is censored, the distribution is a mixture of both discrete 
and continuous86.
86 To analyse this distribution, a newly-defined random variable y  is transformed from the original one,
>> * , by y  =  0  if y *  <  0 ,  y  =  y *  if  y*  >  0 .  The distribution that applies if y *  ~  [ // , <T2 ] is 
Prob( y  =  0 )  = Prob( y *  <  0 )  = <X>(—fl  /  &) =  1 — 0 ( / i  /  & ), and if y *  >  0 ,  then y  has the density of 
y  *.
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Figure 4-1: Distribution of the short-term saving ratio
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Figure 4-2: Distribution of the long-term saving ratio
A censored regression model or the Tobit model (Tobin, 1958) assumes that the 
dependent variable has a number of its values clustered at a limiting value, usually zero. 
It can be employed to meet the characteristic of the censored dependent variable at no 
cost of invalidating some observations because the Tobit technique uses all observations, 
both those censoring and above the limit, to estimate a regression line.
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In this study, a random-effect Tobit model is applied for estimation. The estimation 
equation is given in terms of an index function,
| i -  = « 0 + a j f  + a 2F ‘ + X \,p  + g 'j  +• v, + e„ , e, ~ v, ~ IID(0,<jv2)
* it
where i denotes each household, and t denotes the waves 10-13.
S. *—j  is a latent variable and denotes either the observed short-term saving ratio or the
it
observed long-term saving ratio of each household at a given wave.
c* n  *
—— = 0 if —^  <0
y p  y p
1 it 1 it
_ *  *
^JL = ^JL if  ^JL > 0
y p  y P  y p
1 it 1 it 1 it
Y* represents the estimated permanent income of each household at a given time, and 
serves as a proxy for the household wealth level. F* denotes each household’s
subjective evaluation of its financial situation in the next 12 months, reflecting 
expectation regarding the general economic situation, including inflation and 
unemployment, as well as the expectation of their financial status. X it denotes a vector 
of control variables, such as the household’s current financial situation, financial 
realisation compared to one year ago, age, age squared, education dummies, region 
dummies, the household size, with/without children, marital status, self­
employed/employee, owning housing wealth, paying into a private pension, saving for 
any specific reason or not, and fulltime/part-time employment. gt denotes the year
dummies, v, denotes unobserved household effect and is assumed to be randomly 
distributed and independent of the independent variables and the rest of the error term. 
eit is the idiosyncratic error term. The estimated coefficients are taken as the value of 
the maximum of a log-likelihood function.
The estimation formula of the random effect Tobit model is simplified as 
y*it =x'itf i  + vi + eit, where y* is the index variable, or latent variable, and jc is a
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vector of control variables, v, denotes the household-specific characteristics, and eit is 
the error term. The marginal effect for the index variable is calculated as
dE{yit | x it)
dx: = P -"it
However this does not reveal to what extent the change of a given explanatory variable 
affect the dependent variable because y* is only an index variable and unobserved. 
For the observed data, y t , in the case with censoring at zero and normally distributed 
disturbances, the result specialises to
dE(.yl,\x ,„ v  = 0) R 
Pit
CXu
P%, , where O denotes the standard normal cumulative
distribution function, x it denotes the sample mean, and a e denotes the standard
deviation of the error term. The estimation in a random effect model involves 
unobserved household effect, thus, in practice, the marginal effects are estimated by 
making normalization of the household effects such as E{v) = 0 .
I x  ^
McDonald and Moffitt (1980) have suggested a useful decomposition o f ------ -— — ,
dx„
™ = P r » 4  U , l w ,  >o]dPro^ ly">0hl
8xu dxu dxu
The equation above indicates that the change of a given explanatory variable on the 
short-term/long-term saving ratio is composed of two elements: the effect from the 
increased short-term/long-term saving ratio of the households who did already save for 
a short-run/long-run purpose, and the effect due to those households who did not have 
short-term/long-term savings before and start to save for the short term/ long term as a 
consequence. The proportion of the former effect can be expressed in the formula, 
zf(z)  f i z pA = 1 -  —------------     , where / (z) represents the unit normal density, and F(z)
F(z ) F(z)
represents the cumulative normal density function. In this work, the two types of
87 This equation confirms that a change in x t has two effects: it affects the conditional mean of y f in the
positive part of the distribution, and it affects the probability that the observation will fall in that part of 
the distribution. The relative magnitudes of these two quantities are an important indicator with economic 
implication. (McDonald and Moffitt, 1980)
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estimated marginal effect will be reported simultaneously, and the relative magnitudes 
of the two effects on a given control variable measured and compared.
There has been much fruitful literature on the application of the random effect Tobit 
model as the estimation approach, and a few of these works are outlined here. 
Guariglia (2001) employed a random effect Tobit model to investigate British 
household’s saving behaviour, by looking at how the change in income uncertainty 
affects the changes in savings. Coxhead and Demeke (2004) employed a random 
effect Tobit model to quantify the land-use responses to economic signals, especially 
agricultural prices. Jaegar, Bonin, Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2007) 
employed a random effect Tobit model on a recent dataset of the German 
Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP), to estimate the relationship between an individual’s 
attitude toward risk and his/her migration propensities. Considering the technique 
suggested in McDonald and Moffitt (1980), the results seemed to show that the risk 
attitudes play a much larger role in determining whether or not people migrate than in 
determining how far they migrate. This underlines the effectiveness of using the 
technique developed by McDonald and Moffitt (1980), after estimation of the random- 
effect Tobit regression, to distinguish the two effects, as is one of the key aims of this 
study.
4.4 ANALYSIS OF SAVINGS-AGE PROFILE
In the previous stages, the parametric analysis has included an investigation of the 
effects that age or any other characteristic factors have on households’ saving 
behaviour. However, the overall savings-age profile over the working life cycle is still 
unknown by this method. In this stage, the research question lies in the distribution of 
savings -  long-term savings and short-term savings -  throughout the working life 
cycle, which is specified as between age 25 and age 65 in this work.
Correspondingly, the empirical framework simplifies into a univariate function,
Savings = f{age ) .
Life-cycle consumption/saving decisions have been addressed at the household level in 
the conventional life-cycle hypothesis. The information about consumption/savings is
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generally collected at the household level; accordingly in the empirical literature the 
heads of the households are assumed to represent the household units. Yet, there is no 
reason to believe that the head of household’s saving behaviour is consistent with other 
members in the household. Deaton and Paxson (2000) developed a life-cycle model at 
the individual level, to address the possible bias problem with estimating savings-age 
profile at the household level. Such a concern arises, in that the members who live in 
the same household are at different age phases of the life cycle, for example, a 50-year- 
old head of household living with a 22-year-old son and a 75-year-old parent. Demery 
and Duck (2006) also examined this issue and found that the estimation at the 
household level exaggerates the savings rate of young adults and the elderly, whilst 
underestimating the savings rate of the 45 to 60-year-olds.
Nevertheless, this work remains focused at the household level with two justifications. 
Firstly, the research question of this study is derived from the life-cycle theories in 
which arguments are addressed at the household level. Secondly, the observed savings 
of each household unit is obtained by aggregating individual savings for every adult 
member interviewed within the household; this not only reflects individual saving 
decision-making of each member within the same household but also allows for 
interactive influence amongst family members. For instance, whilst the main earners 
may mainly take charge of savings for the long term, the spouses put their emphasis on 
saving mainly for the short term.
4.4.1 Nonparametric kernel-smooth conditional quantile model
The non-parametric kernel-smoothed conditional quantile estimation method, 
developed by Magee, Burbidge, and Robb (1991), is employed to accomplish the 
estimations for savings-age profiles. This method was originally developed to estimate 
the savings-age profile at the first, second, and the third quartiles. In this work, only 
the estimated median savings-age distribution is reported. A non-parametric estimation 
method plays a role in descriptively showing the relationship between the variables, 
with no need for any specific assumption about the distribution of the error term. The 
quantile analysis method allows one to look at not only the sample in the middle of the 
distribution, but also at that in the upper and lower bands. In addition, the median 
estimates are less vulnerable to distortion due to extreme observations, whereas the
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mean estimates would easily encounter such a problem in a skewed dataset, which is 
the case in the dataset of this work.
A kernel is a weighting function used in non-parametric estimation techniques. 
Kernels are used in kernel density estimation to estimate random variables' density 
functions, or in kernel regression to estimate the conditional expectation of a random 
variable. Several types of kernel functions are commonly used: uniform, triangle, 
epanechnikov, quartic(biweight), tricube (triweight), gaussian, and cosinus.
Accordingly, a non-parametrically quantile estimation conditioned on ages, seems to 
be a favourable approach to look into households’ saving/consumption behaviour over 
the working life-cycle. Magee, Burbidge, and Robb (1991) firstly applied this method 
to examine the wealth holdings-age profile of Canadian households. The data they 
used was a survey conducted by Statistics Canada in 1977. Robb, Magee and Burbidge 
(1992) investigated the consumption-age profile of Canadian households by using a 
kernel-smoothed conditional quantile estimator on four cross-sectional datasets from 
1978, 1982, 1984, and 1986 of the Canadian Consumer Expenditure Survey. Alessie, 
Lusardi, and Aldershof (1997) used the kernel-smoothed conditional quantile estimator 
to study the net worth-age and savings-age profile on the 1987 Dutch dataset, Socio- 
Economic Panel (SEP).
The basic algorithm is presented below. In the following, a  represents the quantile of 
the distribution of Y  given X  = x  as qa (x), which solves
evaluated at Y = y . An estimate qa (x) can be obtained from the observed pairs ( X i, Yi )
Where K  is a kernel function and /  is the indicator function: I[A\ = 1 if A is true, 
I[A] = 0 otherwise. In order to choose the bandwidth parameter h , a leave-one-out
Where ^(yjx) is the conditional cumulative distribution function (cdf) of Y  given
(i  = 1,...,«) by solving (1) after replacing F  with some estimate F . One choice of F , 
which smoothes over X , is
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cross-validation (CV) approach is used in which h is chosen to minimise the loss 
function
i
Where ra (z) = \a -  I[z < 0]|. |z| is the leave-one-out loss function employed and 
denotes the estimate of qn (X t) using bandwidth h , where observation i has been 
dropped from the sample.
The cross-validation approach is a non-parametric estimation of statistical error, 
mainly the bias and standard error of an estimator. It is a way of obtaining nearly 
unbiased estimators of prediction error. The method deletes the observations X i from
the data set one at a time, and recalculates the prediction rule on the basis of the leave- 
one-out sample. It shows how well the recalculated rule predicts the deleted 
observation, and takes the averages of these predictions calculated by deleting one 
observation at a time. (Efron and Gong, 1983)
Under the empirical framework of this study, Yt denotes either the imputed short-term 
savings or the imputed long-term savings of each household, and X { denotes the age 
of the head of each household, a  = 0.25,0.5,0.75. Kernel smoothing involves a kernel 
function, f ( x - a ) ,  which gives the weight to be attached to observations at age x in 
the estimation of age a .
Two aspects of the kernel should be chosen by investigators: the bandwidth and the 
shape. The h parameter is the bandwidth, or range, of the kernel, over which the 
function is non-zero; the shape of the kernel is usually chosen to be symmetric about 
zero. A triangular kernel is subjectively chosen for this study, as different types of 
kernel function seem not to matter a great deal (Robb, Magee, and Burbidge, 1992). 
As previously mentioned, the selection of bandwidth h is a crucial parameter for the 
estimation, and as a consequence a great deal of repetition is involved in the estimation 
process. The initial bandwidth is chosen by the experience rule in the literature; 
accordingly, a first guess starts from ‘10’ for the estimation of each sample. The 
savings-age profile estimation is employed for the whole sample and in the five sub­
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samples -  males, females, homeowners, private pension participants, and employees. 
Correspondingly, an individual bandwidth is chosen for each sample in the estimation 
process. See Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 below for choices of bandwidth. It is the case that 
the estimated profiles of some the sub-groups appear to be too fluctuating, and as a 
result of that the small sample sizes carry a lot of noise (Robb, Magee, and Burbidge, 
1992). In an attempt to smooth out the curve, a larger bandwidth is chosen, taking care 
that the new bandwidth will not distort the trend throughout the age ranges.
T a b le  4 .2 :  B a n d w id th  c h o se  fo r  w h o le  sa m p le
Wave 10 Wave 11 Wave 12 Wave 13
Total savings 10.4 16 16.4 13.6
- Long-Term savings 12 10 14 24
- Short-Term savings 14.6 18 8.8 12.2
T a b le  4 .3 :  B a n d w id th  o f  su b -sa m p le s
Wave 10 Wave 11 Wave 12 Wave 13
Males - Total savings 12 16.6 23 21
- Short-term savings 17.7 16 15.2 12
- Long-term  sav ings 12.2 16 11.8 14.3
Females - Total savings 17.8 15.4 14.9 20
- Short-term savings 20 22 25 27.2
- Long-term  sav ings 21 26 20.6 19.6
Employees - Total savings 108 ....20.... 18 10.4
- Short-term savings 28 22 9 9.6
- Long-term  sav ings 9.6 9.9 10.3 24
Homeowners - Total savings 102 ... 16 18 id
- Short-term savings 21.8 17.5 9.9 9.8
- L ong-term  sav ings 10.2 21.6 12 12
Pension-participants - Total savings 10.4 10 12.8 16
- Short-term savings 13 22 10 20
- L ong-term  savings 9.3 10 15.1 12.2
One shortcoming of cross-sectional analysis is that it is not able to track changes in the 
savings-age profile of the same individuals over time. A repeated cross-sectional data is 
an alternative under the condition of a lack of genuine panel data. In the dataset 
obtained for this study, some household observations only appear once among the four
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cross sections, a sample of the same age cohort is observed in the four waves. 
Accordingly, it is to track the savings distribution not of the same observations, but of a 
representative sample of households of the same age cohort.
Treatments for distinguishing the age effect from the cohort (year of birth) effect and 
time effect have been abundantly applied in a number of empirical works that adopt 
parametric estimation methods, which will be discussed below. In practice, it is not 
possible to disentangle the three types of effect. As a complex mechanism among these 
three types of effects evolves, making some assumption is a common procedure. For 
instance, the time effect, which captures the business cycle effect, is often assumed to 
average to zero and is orthogonal to the linear trends (See Attanasio, 1998; Demery and 
Duck, 2006). A long panel data or a long quasi-panel is required to make age and cohort 
effects analysis feasible: Attanasio (1998) aimed to discriminate between the two effects 
when looking at the savings-age profile of US households by using a long panel taken 
from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), for the year 1980 to 1991; Jappelli and 
Modigliani (2003) investigated the cohort effect and age effect by taking a repeated 
cross-section dataset over 11 years; Demery and Duck (2006) investigated savings-age 
profile of UK households with a long panel dataset, using the British Family 
Expenditure Survey (FES), for the period 1969 to 1998.
By contrast, the dataset for this study only covers a short time period, i.e. four years. 
This makes it implausible for this study to disentangle cohort effects from age effects. 
Furthermore, such a limitation is attributed to the estimation method applied for this 
study as this method was originally designed for cross-sectional dataset. 
Notwithstanding this, by applying cross-comparing estimates for each wave, it is still 
possible to detect other effects, other than the age effects, if a common trend in the four 
profiles representing the four waves can be observed. In addition, to control for the 
influence of the households’ other characteristics, five sub-samples are selected out of 
each cross-sectional dataset, covering: gender, homeownership, pension-enrolment, and 
employment status (employees/self-employed). Comparisons of the savings-age profiles 
for different groups can be made, to discover whether the subgroups behave differently.
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4.5 CONCLUSION
Three estimation methods chosen to carry out the empirical analyses of the three stages 
have been presented and related issues have also been discussed in this chapter88. In the 
first stage, a random-effect ordered Probit model was employed on a unbalanced panel 
data, consisting of four cross-sectional waves, in order to investigate the shift in 
likelihood of heads of households’ saving motives, with respect to short-term 
uncertainty, wealth possession, and socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. In 
an attempt to test the time-consistency of coefficients over the four waves, a seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) model was subsequently carried out, which represented a 
single regression framework consisting of equations by waves.
In the second stage, a random-effect Tobit model was adopted to examine separately the 
changes in household’s short-term saving ratio and long-term saving ratio, with respect 
to short-term uncertainty, wealth possession, and socioeconomic and demographic 
variables. Two types of marginal effects were estimated: one was the effect on changes 
of saving ratio of households who were already saving, and the other was the effect on 
changes in likelihood of households’ making savings when they were not already doing 
so.
In the third stage, a non-parametric kernel quantile model was applied on each wave, to 
predict the median savings-age profile over the working life cycle. Households’ short­
term savings, long-term savings, and total savings -  sum of the two types of savings -  
were consecutively estimated against age. Disentangling age effects, cohort (year of 
birth) effect, and life-cycle effects has been an important issue needing to be dealt with 
in previous empirical literature on savings-age profile. In this work, the time effect can 
be inspected by comparing the profiles of the four waves, however, the treatment for 
distinguishing cohort effect from age effect would require a long panel data, whereas 
the panel data used only covered four years, which was too short to allow for this 
treatment.
88 This work used STATA version 8.0 to obtain estimation results for the first and second empirical studies, 
and GAUSS version 8.0 for the third empirical study. The programming code for the third empirical study 
is presented in section B o f appendices.
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CHAPTER 5 : SAVING MOTIVES, RISK, AND 
SELF-CONTROL PROBLEMS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Since the 1990s, economists have paid much attention to the importance of the 
precautionary saving motive of households and individuals, and much of the related 
empirical literature has been accomplished by examining the change in savings/wealth 
in response to risk. Income uncertainty or risk is the most frequently employed risk 
indicator, which is specified as the small year-to-year fluctuations in wages and 
occasional large falls due to unemployment. This is used because unemployment risk 
has the biggest impact on people’s income and consumption decisions. (Guariglia, 2001; 
Carroll, Dynan, and Krane, 2003; Benito, 2004) However, in addition to unemployment 
risk, other types of risks, such as health risk, are also reckoned to be important sources 
of uncertainty/risk over the life cycle, for instance, elderly households may perceive 
there to be a health risk rather than young households.
One aim of this study is to re-examine households’ precautionary saving behaviour 
through the relationship between short-term saving motive and short-term aggregate 
risk. In comparison with the previous literature, this study has two advantages. One is 
that it looks directly at households’ saving motives, and this, to some extent, solves the 
problem of heterogeneity of saving motives. This problem arises in that total saving 
amounts usually reflect a variety of saving motives, e.g. precautionary saving of a short­
term time horizon and saving for retirement in the long term. In this work, a 
precautionary saving motive is clearly specified as the short-term motive of ‘saving for 
unexpected events in the short term’. The other advantage is that this work uses 
subjectively perceived risk to capture a household’s short-term aggregate risk over the 
next 12 months. This comes with two justifications: first, it is sensible to presume that 
households make decisions based largely on their subjective experiences and 
evaluations; second, financial expectation reflects not only whether the household will 
lose the income source, to wit, become unemployed, but also the shocks on financial
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management, such as medical expenditure due to a health issue, and the volatility of 
income flow.
One contribution of this study is to take into account the concept that people possess 
inconsistent time preference (hyperbolic discount function) -  a higher discount rate for 
the short term and a lower discount rate for the long term, and these two time 
preferences are dynamically changing. A saving motive for the long term shows 
households’ preference for an intertemporal choice -  giving up consumption now for 
consumption in the long-term future. Moreover, a saving motive for the short term is 
about giving up consumption now for a near-term purpose. As discussed previously, 
saving for the short term is posited to be unfavoured by a consumer with inconsistent 
time preferences and saving for the long term is more preferable.
The primary hypothetical correlation to support the buffer-stock model is that between 
financial expectations and saving motives. If subjective financial expectation plays a 
role in indicating the aggregate uncertainty or risk in the near future, presumed to be in 
the next 1 2  months, a precautionary saving motive hypothesis can be pinned down, by 
looking at the extent to which the households react to their perceived risk in the sense 
that their saving motive changes to being short-term oriented. To be specific, it is 
considered that, compared with those households with neutral financial expectation, 
households with a worse-off financial expectation are more likely to save mainly for the 
short term to buffer uncertainty in the near future.
The hypothetical correlation to support the quasi-hyperbolic consumption model is 
between holding of savings in illiquid forms and saving motives. Such a saving pattern 
ought to be observed amongst hyperbolic consumers: they prefer saving for the long 
term than saving for the short term, and tend to save in illiquid wealth or to join external 
saving schemes to commit themselves to savings. Thus, the hypothesis is that 
homeowners or private pension participants tend to save for the long term. Moreover, 
the precautionary saving effect may be missing amongst households whose time 
preferences are hyperbolic and thus inconsistent, and this is one anomaly between the 
buffer-stock and the quasi-hyperbolic consumption models. The intuition is that whilst 
consumers save more this period in response to higher risk in the next period,
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households, if  they have a hyperbolic time preference, would be too impatient to 
accumulate wealth for the next period.
In general, the purpose here is to examine the determinants of households’ long-term 
and short-term saving motives. Precautionary saving behaviour, from a short-term 
perspective, is also investigated. Section 5.2 reviews the econometric models employed 
in this chapter. Section 5.3 discusses the results from the random-effect ordered Probit 
model for the whole sample and two subgroups -  homeowners and private pension 
participants. Section 5.4 exhibits the estimation results from a Seeming Unrelated 
Regression (SUR) model. The fluctuations of effects for a given variable can be seen; 
moreover, the consistency over time of these effects can be investigated. Section 5.5 
concludes this chapter.
5.2 REVIEW OF METHODOLOGY
5.2.1 Random-effect Ordered Probit model
In this model, the change in likelihood of discretionary saving motives - for short-term 
purposes or for long-term purposes, was investigated upon households’ subjectively- 
perceived risk in the next year, ownership of housing wealth, private pension enrolment, 
and other socio-economic and demographic factors. The empirical model is as follows: 
SIT*, = aY l + fi'IUu + yU it + <p'Xu + Mime, + v, + s M ,
SITi t=0  if 577].; < 0 ,
= 1 if 0 < SIT*, < mx,
= 2 if mx < SIT*t < m2,
where t denotes waves (10-13) and i denotes households. The m s are unknown 
parameters to be estimated with the coefficient parameters.
In the model, the dependent variable, SlT*t , is a latent variable and is unobserved. What 
is observed is SITit, representing saving motives reported by household i at wave t . 
SITit denotes the three specified saving motives: SITit = 0 represents the motive of 
mainly for long term, SITit = 1 represents the motive of for both equally, and SITjt = 2
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represents the motive of mainly for short term. In this model, changes in the short-term 
saving perspective and long-term saving perspective of a household are observed over 
the four waves, and this allows for the change of saving preference of a given 
households, thus enabling the concept of dynamically inconsistent time preference to be 
explored.
Independent variables are in the right hand side of the equation. Y p denotes the 
estimated permanent income of each household. IU  denotes a matrix of three variables, 
each of them including three dummy variables. These variables consist of each 
household’s expectation of its aggregate risk/uncertainty in the next 1 2  months, of its 
household’s current financial situation, and of its recent financial experience compared 
with current status. LA denotes a matrix of two variables: one is the dummy indicator 
for homeownership and the other is the dummy indicator for private pension enrolment. 
X  denotes a matrix of the socio-economic and demographic features o f each head of 
household. Finally, time denotes a matrix of wave (year) dummies. The details of these 
explanatory variables have been presented in chapter three. a,fL,y,(p,A  denote the 
coefficient parameters to be estimated. Please refer to section 4.2 for more details of this 
model.
The estimated coefficients are to be interpreted as the direction and scale of the effect 
that the explanatory variables have on the change o f  the likelihood of the saving motives. 
A positive sign on an explanatory variable’s coefficient indicates that the higher 
absolute value of a coefficient increases the likelihood that a household saves mainly for 
the short term. A negative sign shows the opposite effect, i.e. a household saves mainly 
for the long term.
In order to obtain marginal effect estimates, an ordered Probit model estimation is 
applied on the dataset in which four cross-sections are pooled, by allowing for 
clustering over time in the error term. In succession, marginal effects estimates on three 
saving motives are carried out respectively.
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5.2.2 The seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model
A seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model is employed and this model 
accommodates four cross-sectional waves into a system, by allowing for correlations 
between the four waves. Time consistency of the estimated coefficients over the four 
waves can be tested.
The SUR model, in this study, specifies the t th of the T equations, where T denotes the 
waves 10-13 for the i th of N  households to be given by:
SITno +finoIUao + y ]0IAn0 +(p]0X jl0 + £ n0,
SITjU = a uYft] + f i niIU m + y uIAjU +<pnX in + £ iU>
= a \2 ^ i \ 2  +  P i \ 2 ^ i \ 2  +  Y \ 2 ^ i l 2  +  ^12^/12 +  £ i \ 2 ’
SITiU = a nYiyj + + y nIAin +(p^X in + £,13;>
The definitions of the variables are identical to those in the previous section. The four 
equations above have identical explanatory variables, and are linked by their 
disturbances. The SUR model is based on an assumption that there are correlations 
amongst disturbances of equations, that is, the equations are related as the errors s  in 
different equations are assumed to be correlated.
After the estimated coefficients are estimated in a SUR model, it is possible to test the 
consistency of the coefficients over the four waves. For example, when the coefficient 
vector of permanent income is to be tested, the null hypothesis is proposed as: 
a \o = a u -  a n = # 1 3 , for which chi-squared statistics are applied. Given that such a 
hypothesis of a given variable is not rejected, the estimated coefficients exhibit the 
fluctuations over the four periods. However, in comparison with a panel-data estimation 
method, the SUR model estimations cannot measure a single long-term relationship. 
Moreover, they cannot explicitly measure the unobservable individual household effects.
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5.3 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS -  RANDOM- 
EFFECT ORDERED PROBIT MODEL
5.3.1 The whole sample level
Table 5.2 reports the estimation results from a random-effect ordered Probit regression 
model. The rho ( p )  values reported at the bottom of the tables indicate what proportion 
of the aggregate error term is captured by the random-effect error term, which denotes 
the unobserved household heterogeneity, and this is 46.6% at the whole sample level. 
Furthermore, results of the ordered Probit estimates and marginal effect estimates are 
reported in Table 5.3. In the general case, only the signs of the changes in the possibility 
of the rightmost category and that of the leftmost one are unambiguous (Greene, 2003); 
hence, only the marginal effect estimates on the changes in the probability of 
households’ saving mainly for the long term and that of households’ saving mainly for 
the short term, are interpreted.
To start with, the subjectively perceived aggregate risk, which is represented by 
‘financial expectations’, does not have a significant effect on households’ saving 
motives. The estimated results show that the coefficient of a lower aggregate risk is - 
0.031 and 0.067 for a higher aggregate risk, showing a tendency of saving mainly for 
the long term in the former case and one of saving mainly for the short term in the latter 
case. However, these coefficients are not statistically different from zero at the 10% 
significance level, and thus the relationship, which suggests that households with a 
worse-off financial expectation are more likely to save mainly for short-term 
precautionary reasons, is not evident. Therefore, this finding does not support the 
precautionary saving effect which is suggested by the buffer-stock model, as it posits 
that households that expect higher uncertainty/risk in the near future are supposed to 
accumulate wealth, to buffer short-term consumption fluctuation. Having a good current 
financial situation has a statistically significant effect on households’ saving motives, as 
the households that report to be either ‘doing alright’ or ‘living comfortably’, are more 
likely to save mainly for the long term at the 1 % significance level, with a coefficient - 
0.177; by contrast, a bad current financial situation is not found to be influential on 
determining households’ saving motives. Recent financial experience, which is denoted 
by ‘financial realisations’, is not an evident determinant on households’ saving motives.
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As shown in Table 5.3, the marginal effect of having good current financial situation on 
the probability of households’ saving mainly for the long term increases by 0.063 and 
that on the probability of households’ saving mainly for the short term decreases by 
0.057.
Two explanations are provided for the insignificant relationship between short-term 
uncertainty and the short-term saving motive. First, short-term uncertainty is not as 
influential as theoretically suggested, so as to enact households’ precautionary motive, 
and make them more inclined to save mainly for the short term. Second, the idea of the 
‘missing precautionary saving effect’ proposed by Laibson (1998, p 8 8 6 ) suggests that a 
household with a hyperbolic discount function tends to self-impose liquidity constraint 
now on their accessibility to the short-term savings, in order to prevent himself/herself 
from splurging in the next period. Accordingly, households are averse to save for the 
short term. Moreover, saving for the long term is normally more highly valued than 
saving for the short term by households with a hyperbolic discount function. 
Consequently, as a result of this, either households are inclined to instant gratification 
from available liquidity or households prefer to save for the long term, and this makes 
the effect of precautionary saving insignificant. Whilst short-term precautionary saving 
effect is not evident here, there is no reason to rule out precautionary saving motive with 
the long-term uncertainty, as Carroll, Dynan, and Krane (p602, 2003) conclude that 
consumers, in particular when their discount function is hyperbolic, may want to hold a 
buffer stock, mainly in illiquid assets, against unemployment risk in the long term.
It is suggested that collinearity may exist amongst subjective financial evaluations, 
namely, financial expectations, financial realisations, and current financial status, which 
can distort the estimation results. For example, households who are in a good financial 
status can be more likely to have a positive financial expectation. Hence, robustness 
check is thus carried out: three sets of subjective financial evaluations - financial 
expectations, financial realisations, and current financial situations -  enter the 
regression one set at a time, together with other explanatory variables. The effects of 
each set of financial evaluations can therefore be estimated respectively. Results of the 
model II, in Table 5.4, show that the subjective financial expectations remain 
uncorrelated with the tendency toward saving mainly for the short term, at the 1 0 % 
significant level. Moreover, results of the model I exhibit that households in a good
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financial status are more likely to save mainly for the long term; in addition, as can be 
seen from results of the model III, financial realisations do not have an influence on 
saving motives, at the 10% significance level. These results are consistent with the 
previous estimates of the full model. To sum up, this robustness check rules out the 
possibility of collinearity problem. Furthermore, the estimation results strengthen the 
previous argument that short-term precautionary saving effect is missing.
An implication of the quasi-hyperbolic life-cycle consumption model, is that consumers 
with a hyperbolic discount function are inclined to save for the long term and 
accumulate wealth in illiquid forms, such as housing wealth or pension wealth; also, 
they are less in favour of making short-term savings because the discount rate for the 
short term is greater than that for the long term. Thus, a relationship between 
homeownership/pension enrolment and a decrease in the possibility of households 
saving mainly for the short term can be a testable hypothesis supported by the quasi- 
hyperbolic life-cycle consumption model. Results show that the households that own 
housing wealth are more likely to save mainly for the long term, at the 1 % significance 
level, with a coefficient of -0.165. The corresponding marginal effect estimates in Table 
5.3 show that the probability of saving mainly for the long term increases by 0.048, 
whereas the probability of saving mainly for the short term decreases by 0.043. This 
relationship supports the quasi-hyperbolic consumption model. By contrast, the 
coefficient of pension enrolment is -0.065, but this is not statistically evident, at the 
1 0 % significance level; therefore, the effect of paying into a private pension is not 
influential on households’ saving motives. These findings have the implication that the 
quasi-hyperbolic consumption model is robust only amongst homeowners.
The status of self-employment is associated with a relatively high financial risk, in the 
sense that the self-employed are more vulnerable to income losses, when their financial 
condition deteriorates and the fact that they are less likely to be covered by 
unemployment insurance. This leads to a hypothesis that the self-employed households 
are more likely to save for the short term due to having a stronger precautionary saving 
motive than employees. The estimated results show that the self-employed households 
are more likely to save mainly for the long term at the 1 0 % significance level, with a 
coefficient of -0.143. As shown in Table 5.3, self-employment contributes to a marginal 
increase in the probability of saving mainly for the long term by 0.030, which is higher
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than a marginal decrease in the probability of saving mainly for the short term, i.e. 
0.026. This finding shows that the self-employed have a stronger long-term saving 
motive than employees, and this suggests the possibility that the self-employed make 
long-term savings for retirement and uncertainty in the long term future. Having said so, 
this coefficient emerges as only weakly evident.
Occupations characterise employment-specific effects, such as a certain risk related to a 
specific employment type. As shown in Table 5.1, the income variability of the ‘plants 
& machine operatives’ sector is the lowest amongst those sectors with average income 
level below £30000, such as the ‘associate professional & technical’ sector, the ‘craft 
related’ sector, the ‘personal & protective services’ sector, and the ‘sales’ sector. O f the 
rest of the groups -  the ‘managers & administrators’ sector, the ‘professional’ sector, 
and the ‘clerical & secretarial’ sector, the ‘clerical & secretarial’ sector has the lowest 
income variability. The indicator for occupation categories was applied as a proxy for 
income uncertainty in the literature; however, the estimation results can be weakened by 
the, so-called, self-selection problem. The problem arises in that people who are more 
risk-averse tend to work in occupations which are less risky. However, advanced work 
is required to identify the self-selection problem, because whilst some people are free to 
choose their jobs, others only have access to jobs with higher risk.
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics of household income (£/year) by occupation groups
Occupation group Mean Standard Deviation
Managers & administrators 43153.62 24811.51
Professional 46217.44 25717.88
Associate professional & technical 27630.36 16861.51
Clerical & secretarial 35879.88 24240.28
Craft related 29651.08 14495.56
Personal & protective services 24893.37 15206.87
Sales 27314.8 17021.26
Plants & machine operatives 23145.68 13805.97
The estimated results exhibit that, compared with those who in the ‘plants & machine 
operatives’ occupation89, households in the ‘craft related’ or ‘personal & protective 
services’ occupations, are more likely to save mainly for the short term at the 1 % 
significance level, with coefficients of 0.559 and 0.599, respectively. Moreover, 
households in the ‘sales’ sector are more likely to save mainly for the short term at the 
5% significance level, with a coefficient of 0.516. To some extent, these results can be
89 This is the dummy base for occupation groups.
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explained by the higher income variability within these three occupational groups. 
Households in the ‘clerical & secretarial’ sector are more likely to save for the short 
term at the 10% significance level, with a coefficient of 0.362. The relationships 
between the short-term saving motive and jobs that are inherently risky are seen to be 
robust, which supports the idea of precautionary saving behaviour.
Estimates of marginal effects of each occupation type are reported in Table 5.3. 
Compared with those in the ‘plants & machine operatives’ sector, for the households in 
the ‘managers & administrators’, the ‘professional’, the ‘associate professional & 
technical’, the ‘clerical & secretarial’, or the ‘craft related’ sectors, the probabilities of 
saving mainly for the long term decrease by 0.099, 0.114, 0.113, 0.131, and 0.189, 
respectively. For these households, the possibilities of saving mainly for the short term 
increase by 0.091, 0.109, 0.108, 0.125, and 0.182, respectively, and these are in greater 
magnitudes. By contrast, for those in the ‘personal & protective services’ or the ‘sales’ 
sector, the probabilities of saving mainly for the short term increase by 0.188 and 0.157, 
respectively, which are in greater magnitudes than the decreases in the probability of 
saving mainly for the long term.
As shown in Table 5.2, different gender type affects heads of households’ saving 
motives. Female heads of households are more likely to save mainly for the short term 
at the 1% significance level than males, with a coefficient of 0.379. As shown in Table 
5.3, the marginal decrease in the probability of saving mainly for the long term, 0.116, 
is in greater magnitude than the marginal increase in the probability of saving mainly 
for the short term, 0.109. This implies that females are more likely to engage themselves 
in short-term precautionary saving as well as less likely to save mainly for the long term, 
than males. An explanation is proposed: in a household, the female is mainly in charge 
of the management of family expenditures over a short-term horizon, such as paying 
bills, managing children’s education fees, monthly budget allocations, etc.; such 
tendency is even enhanced in the situation that the female is the head of a household.
Educational attainment is a key indicator for a household’s socioeconomic status. 
Results indicate that, compared with those who have finished education below A level, 
households, who have a postgraduate degree, have a first degree, or have had a college 
education, are more likely to save mainly for the long term at the 1 % significance level,
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with coefficients of -0.511, -0.344, and -0.215, respectively. Those who have attained 
A-level education are more likely to save mainly for the long term at the 10% 
significance level, with a coefficient of -0.126. For the four groups, marginal increases 
in the probability of saving mainly for the long term -  0.141, 0.092, 0.059, and 0.032, 
respectively -  are in greater magnitudes than marginal decreases in the probability of 
saving mainly for the short term -  0.110, 0.077, 0.051, and 0.027, respectively. This 
shows that having undertaken higher education enhances households’ long-term saving 
motive, and strongly imply that such households are more likely to save to this end. 
People with higher education attainment are usually more prudent than low-educated 
people, so are more aware of long-term savings. Furthermore, highly-educated people 
usually have jobs with better payment and occupational welfare coverage, and as a 
consequence, are less concerned with needs and risk in the short-term future.
Estimated permanent income is considered as a proxy for a household’s wealth level. 
The results show a negative coefficient of permanent income, indicating that households 
with higher permanent income, or wealth, are more likely to save mainly for the long 
term at a 1% significance level, with a coefficient of -6.00e-06. As reported in Table 5.3, 
the marginal increase in the probability of saving mainly for the long term is 1.56e-06, 
which is in greater magnitude than the marginal decrease in the probability of saving 
mainly for the short term -  1.37e-06. This finding also suggests that households with 
less wealth concern themselves more with short-term precautionary savings, than those 
with more wealth. In comparison, Guariglia (2001) did not find that permanent income 
was influential on households’ saving ratios; Carroll, Dynan, and Krane (2003) found 
that households in the lowest permanent income group did not engage in precautionary 
saving, yet precautionary behaviour became significant once households’ incomes 
increased.
It is reasonable to presume that young cohorts are more likely to engage in 
precautionary saving because they are easily liquidity constrained. The variables ‘age’ 
and ‘ age2 ’ represent age effects over the life cycle, and age effects are not significant 
on influencing households’ saving motives, at the whole sample level.
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It is sensible to think that households with joint income sources are less influenced by a 
financial shock, and they tend to have a lower precautionary saving motive and are less 
concerned with short-term saving as a consequence (Carroll, Dynan, and Krane, 2003). 
The estimated results show that households with a spouse/partner employed, are more 
likely to save mainly for the short term at the 1 % significance level, with a coefficient 
of 0.160. As can be seen in Table 5.3, the marginal increase in the probability of saving 
mainly for the short term is in smaller magnitude than the marginal decrease in the 
probability of saving mainly for the long term. This finding seems to go against 
precautionary saving theory.
Results here show that family size has a significant influence on saving motives, at the 
10% significance level, with coefficients of -0.186 and -0.142 regarding the dummy 
variable of 1-2 members and that of 3-4 members, respectively. As shown in Table 5.3, 
for both cases, the marginal increases in the probability of saving mainly for the long 
term, 0.051 and 0.036 respectively, emerge in greater magnitude than marginal 
decreases in the probability of saving mainly for the short term, 0.045 and 0.032 
respectively. These results suggest that the heads of households with more family 
members have a stronger precautionary saving motive for the short term.
Compared with those living in South East, households living in the West Midlands are 
more likely to save mainly for the short term, at the 1 % significance level, with a 
coefficient of 0.328; apart from this, there is no other evidence of a residential effect. 
Table 5.3 reports that the marginal increase in the probability of saving mainly for the 
short term, 0.094, is smaller than the marginal decrease in the probability of saving 
mainly for the long term, 0.098. This finding may imply that either the residents in the 
West Midlands are more concerned with short-term saving, or are more precautionary, 
or that the local economic situation in this area is less stable than in other British 
regions.
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Table 5.2: Random effect ordered Probit estimates on saving motives -  Whole sample
Independent Variables____________________




Financial expectation (About the same) 
B etter-o ff  
W o rse -o ff  
Financial realisation (About the same) 
B etter than last year 
W orse than last year 
Private p ension  enrolm ent (o therw ise) 
H om eow nersh ip  (otherw ise)
F em ale (M ale)
A g e
A g e  squared
Education (Less than A level)
H igher than first degree  
First degree  
S om e co lleg e  
A  L evel
M arried/C ohabiting (O therw ise) 
S elf-em p loyed  (E m p loyee)
Spouse/partner em p loyed  (O therw ise) 
F u ll-tim e em p loyed  (Part-tim e em p loyed ) 
Occupation (Plant & machine operatives) 
M anagers &  Adm inistrators  
Profession al
A ssoc ia te  p rofession al & T echnical 
C lerical &  Secretarial 
Craft related
Personal &  P rotective services  
Sales
W ith children (W ithout children) 
Household size (5 members or more)
1-2 m em bers  





-6 .0 0 e -0 6 * * *
Std Dev. 
1,4 0 e-0 6
0 .8 4 9 -0 .1 7 7 * * * 0 .055
0 .0 1 7 -0 .0 5 4 0 .1 4 8
0 .3 1 8 -0 .031 0 .0 4 0
0.073 0 .0 6 7 0 .0 6 7
0 .3 9 7 -0 .0 0 4 0 .0 3 9
0 .142 -0 .0 3 3 0 .0 5 4
0 .2 7 0 -0 .0 6 5 0 .0 4 6
0 .8 6 4 -0 .1 6 5 * * * 0.061
0 .2 1 7 0 .3 7 9 * * * 0 .0 6 4
42 .4 4 8 -0 .0 2 5 0 .0 1 9
1903.721 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0
0 .0 5 9 -0 .5 1 1 * * * 0 .1 0 9
0.171 -0 .3 4 4 * * * 0 .0 7 4
0 .342 -0 .2 1 5 * * * 0 .055
0 .118 -0 .1 2 6 * 0 .0 7 4
0 .7 3 6 -0 .0 3 5 0 .0 7 9
0 .1 2 0 -0 .1 4 3 * 0 .0 8 0
0.601 0 .1 6 0 * * * 0 .0 6 2
0 .9 2 4 0 .0 5 7 0 .0 7 7
0 .2 6 0 0 .2 7 4 0 .1 9 2
0 .093 0 .3 0 9 0.201
0 .1 3 4 0 .303 0 .1 9 7
0 .182 0 .3 6 2 * 0 .195
0 .2 4 6 0 .5 5 9 * * * 0 .193
0 .023 0 .5 9 9 * * * 0 .2 2 9
0 .052 0 .5 1 6 * * 0 .2 0 8
0 .402 0 .043 0 .065
0 .4 9 0 -0 .1 8 6 * 0 .1 0 0
0 .4 2 9 -0 .1 4 2 * 0 .0 7 9
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Residential area (South East)
Greater London 0.0 5 2 -0 .1 3 2 0.113
South W est 0 .055 -0 .101 0 .1 1 4
East 0 .075 -0 .0 5 4 0.101
W est M idlands 0 .0 4 9 0 .3 2 8 * * * 0 .1 1 7
Greater M anchester 0 .0 2 4 -0 .0 0 6 0 .153
North W est 0 .043 0 .1 3 4 0 .1 2 4
Y orkshire & H um berside 0 .0 5 8 -0 .0 7 2 0 .1 1 0
T yne & W ear 0.041 0 .2 0 4 0 .1 2 6
W ales 0 .143 0 .0 3 8 0 .085
Scotland 0.201 -0 .0 8 2 0 .0 8 0
Northern Ireland 0.131 -0 .0 8 6 0 .0 8 7
Year dummy (2003-2004)
2000-2001 -0 .1 3 3 * * * 0 .045
2 0 0 1 -2 0 0 2 -0 .1 4 9 * * * 0 .043
20 0 2 -2 0 0 3 -0 .1 3 7 * * * 0 .043
cut 1 -1 .4 7 4 * * * 0 .4 5 9
cut 2 -0 .4 8 4 0 .4 5 8
N um ber o f  observations 77 6 3
L og  lik elih ood -7 7 8 0 .8 7 8
LR Chi square 363.61
P -va lue 0 .0 0 0 0
P  (rho) 0 .4 6 6
(***) At the 1% significance level; (**) at the 5% significance level; (*) at the 10% significance level
N o te :  T h e  b a s e  d u m m y  fo r  e a c h  d u m m y  v a r ia b le  is  s p e c i f ie d  in  b rack et.
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Table 5.3: Ordered Probit estimates and marginal effect estimates
Ordered Probit estimation M arginal effect estim ation
Ordered probit model Savin g m ainly for the long term Savin g for both long-term  and short-term S avin g  m ain ly for the short term
Independent Variables Coef Std Dev. dyLT / d x90 Standard error d y ^ J d x Standard error dy ST1 dx Standard error
Perm anent incom e  
Financial situation (Neutral)
-3 .9 9 e-0 6 * * * 7 .1 5 e-0 7 1 .56e-06*** 0.000 -1 .9 0 e-0 7 * * * 0.000 -1 .3 7 e -0 6 * * * 0.000
G ood -0 .1 6 2 * * * 0 .0 2 4 0 .0 6 3 * * * 0 .010 -0 .0 0 5 * * * 0.001 -0 .0 5 7 * * * 0 .0 0 9
Bad
Financial expectation (About the same)
-0 .0 3 6 0 .125 0 .014 0 .049 -0 .002 0 .0 0 7 -0 .0 1 2 0 .0 4 2
B etter-o ff -0 .0 0 9 0 .0 3 0 0.003 0 .012 -0 .0 0 0 4 0.001 -0 .003 0 .0 1 0
W o r se -o ff  
Financial realisation (About the same)
0 .0 5 6 0 .0 3 6 -0 .0 2 2 0 .014 0 .002** 0.001 0 .0 1 9 0 .013
Better than last year 0 .0 0 8 0.021 -0 .003 0 .008 0 .0004 0.001 0 .003 0 .0 0 7
W orse than last year -0 .0 5 1 * * * 0 .0 0 6 0 .020*** 0.003 -0 .003*** 0 .0 0 0 3 -0 .0 1 7 * * * 0 .0 0 2
Private p ension  enrolm ent (otherw ise) -0 .0 5 7 0 .0 3 7 0 .022 0 .015 -0 .003 0 .0 0 2 -0 .0 1 9 0 .013
H om eow nersh ip  (otherw ise) -0 .1 2 3 * * * 0 .043 0 .048*** 0 .0 1 6 -0 .004*** 0.001 -0 .0 4 3 * * * 0 .015
Fem ale (M ale) 0 .3 0 3 * * * 0 .0 3 8 -0 .1 1 6 * * * 0 .014 0 .0 0 7 * * * 0 .0 0 2 0 .1 0 9 * * * 0 .0 1 4
A ge -0 .0 2 0 0 .012 0 .008 0.005 -0.001 0.001 -0 .0 0 7 * 0 .0 0 4
A g e  squared
Education (Less than A level)
0.0001 0.0001 - 0.000 0.000 6 .0 0 e-0 6 0.00001 0.000 0.000
H igher than first degree -0 .3 5 4 * * * 0 .008 0 .1 4 1 * * * 0.003 -0 .0 3 0 * * * 0 .0 0 2 -0 .1 1 0 * * * 0 .0 0 2
First degree -0 .2 3 2 * * * 0 .0 4 0 0 .092*** 0 .016 -0 .0 1 5 * * * 0 .003 -0 .0 7 7 * * * 0 .013
Som e co lleg e -0 .1 5 0 * * * 0 .0 2 7 0 .0 5 9 * * * 0 .0 1 0 -0 .008*** 0 .0 0 2 -0 .0 5 1 * * * 0 .0 0 9
A  L evel -0 .0 8 0 * * 0 .0 3 4 0 .0 3 2 * * 0 .014 -0 .004** 0 .0 0 2 -0 .0 2 7 * * 0.011
M arried/C ohabiting (O therw ise) -0 .0 0 5 0 .044 0 .002 0 .0 1 7 -0 .00003 0 .0 0 2 -0 .0 0 2 0 .015
S elf-em p loyed  (E m p loyee) -0 .0 7 7 * * 0 .039 0 .030** 0 .015 -0 .004* 0 .0 0 2 -0 .0 2 6 * * 0 .013
Spouse/partner em p loyed  (O therw ise) 0 .1 0 8 * * * 0 .0 2 4 -0 .042*** 0 .009 0 .005 0.001 0 .0 3 7 * * * 0 .0 0 8
F u ll-tim e em p loyed  (Part-tim e em p loyed )  
Occupation (Plant & machine operatives)
0 .0 4 4 0 .038 -0 .0 1 7 0.015 0 .002 0 .0 0 2 0 .015 0 .013
90 y LT denotes the probability o f saving mainly for the long term, y ST for saving mainly for the short term, and y bolh for both long-term and short-term equally.
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M anagers & Adm inistrators i 0 .2 5 7 * * 0 .1 2 8  i -0 .099** 0 .0 4 8  | 0 .0 0 8 * * * 0.001 | 0 .091* 0 .0 4 7
Profession al 0 .3 0 0 * * * 0 .105 -0 .114*** 0 .0 3 7  1 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 4 i 0 .1 0 9 * * * 0 .0 4 0
A ssoc ia te  p rofession al &  T echnical ! 0 .2 9 8 * * * 0 .1 1 6  ! -0 .113*** 0.041 ! 0 .005* 0 .003 ! 0 .1 0 8 * * 0 .0 4 4
C lerical & Secretarial | 0 .3 4 6 * * 0.141 | -0 .131*** 0 .0 5 0  | 0 .006* 0 .0 0 4 | 0 .1 2 5 * * 0 .0 5 4
Craft related 1 0 .5 0 2 * * * 0 .0 9 9  1 -0 .1 8 9 * * * 0 .0 3 4  ' 0 .0 0 7 0 .005 ' 0 .1 8 2 * * * 0 .0 3 8
Personal & P rotective services i 0 .4 9 8 * * * 0 .1 2 2  i -0 .1 8 0 * * * 0.041 ! -0 .0 0 8 0 .0 1 0 ! 0 .1 8 8 * * * 0 .0 4 9
Sales [ 0 .4 2 2 * * * 0 .145  | -0 .1 5 6 * * * 0 .0 4 9  | -0 .001 0 .0 1 0 1 0 .1 5 7 * * * 0 .0 5 8
W ith children (W ithout children) 1 0 .0 4 7 * *i 0 .0 2 0  ' i -0 .018** 0 .0 0 8  ' ■ 0 .0 0 2 * * * 0.001 ' 0 .0 1 6 * *  ■ 0 .0 0 7









1 -2 m em bers 1 -0 .1 3 1 * * * 0 .0 4 7  1 0 .05 1 * * * 0 .0 1 8  | -0 .0 0 6 * * * 0 .002 1 -0 .0 4 5 * * * 0 .0 1 6
3 -4  m em bers 1 -0 .0 9 3 * 0 .0 4 8  ' 0 .036* 0 .0 1 9  ' -0 .0 0 5 * * 0 .0 0 2 ' -0 .0 3 2 * 0 .0 1 7









Greater L ondon I -0 .1 0 0 * * 0 .0 4 2  | 0 .039** 0 .0 1 7  1 -0 .006* 0 .0 0 3 | -0 .0 3 3 * * 0 .0 1 4
South W est ' -0 .0 4 2 0 .0 4 7  ' 0 .017 0 .0 1 9  ' -0 .0 0 2 0 .003 ' -0 .0 1 4 0 .0 1 6
East ! -0 .0 1 2 0 .0 3 0  ! 0 .005 0 .012  ! -0.001 0.001 ! -0 .0 0 4 0 .0 1 0
W est M idlands | 0 .2 5 8 * * * 0 .0 4 6  | -0 .098*** 0 .0 1 7  | 0 .004** 0 .0 0 2 j 0 .0 9 4 * * * 0 .0 1 8
Greater M anchester ' 0 .0 2 7 0 .073  ' -0 .0 1 0 0 .0 2 8  ' 0 .001 0 .003 ' 0 .009 0 .025
N orth W est ! 0 .0 9 4 0.071 | -0 .0 3 7 0 .0 2 7  | 0 .003* 0 .0 0 2 ! 0 .033 0 .025
Y orkshire & H um berside [ -0 .025 0 .045  | 0 .0 1 0 0 .018 -0.001 0 .0 0 2 ] -0 .0 0 9 0 .015
T yne & W ear ' 0 .1 5 3 * * 0 .0 6 2  ' -0 .0 5 9 * * 0.024 ' 0 .00 4 * * * 0.001 ' 0 .0 5 4 * * 0 .023
W ales ! 0 .031 0 .023  | -0 .0 1 2 0 .0 0 9  ; 0.001 0.001 | 0.011 0 .008
Scotland ] -0 .0 4 4 0 .0 2 9  | 0 .017 0.011 j -0 .0 0 2 0.001 \ -0 .0 1 5 0 .0 1 0
Northern Ireland i -0 .0 4 6 * 0 .0 2 5  ' 0 .018* 0 .0 1 0  i -0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 2 i -0 .0 1 6 * 0 .0 0 8
N um ber o f  observations 7763 1
L og p seu d olik elih ood -8 1 0 8 .9 6 7  1 |
W ald chi square 16.87 i
P -value 0.001 |
P seudo  R~ 0.031 !
(* * * ) A t the 1% sign ifican ce  level; (* * ) at the 5% sign ifican ce  level; (* ) at the 10% significan ce level
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Model I -  
Current financial status
- -
Model 11 -  
Financial expectations
Model I II  -  
Financial realisation
Independent Variables Coefficient Standard Devi. Coefficient Standard Devi. Coefficient Standard Devi.
Perm anent incom e  
Financial situation (Neutral)
-6.01 e -06*** 1 .40e-06 -6.41 e -06*** 1 .40e-06 -6 .3 9 e-0 6 * * * 1 .40e-06
G ood -0 .1 7 1 * * * 0 .0 5 4 - - - -
Bad
Financial expectation (About the same)
-0 .0 6 0
j
0 .147 — . . —
B etter-o ff
i
— -0 .0 3 0 0 .0 3 9 — “
W o rse -o ff  
Financial realisation (About the same)
— — 0 .072 0 .0 6 7 — —
Better than last year — - - -0 .0 2 2 0 .0 3 8
W orse than last year „ - - - -0 .001 0 .053
Private pension  enrolm ent (O therw ise) -0 .0 6 6 0 .0 4 6 -0 .0 6 7 0 .0 4 6 -0 .0 6 7 0 .0 4 6
H om eow nersh ip  (O therw ise) -0 .1 6 3 * * * 0.061 -0 .1 7 4 * * * 0.061 -0 .1 7 3 * * * 0.061
F em ale (M ale) 0 .3 8 3 * * * 0 .063 0 .3 7 8 * * * 0 .0 6 4 0 .3 8 1 * * * 0 .0 6 4
A ge -0 .025 0 .0 1 9 -0 .0 2 4 0 .0 1 9 -0 .0 2 5 0 .0 1 9
A ge squared
Education (Less than A level)
0.0001 0 .0002 0.0001 0 .0 0 0 2 0.0001 0 .0 0 0 2
H igher than first degree -0 .5 1 1 * * * 0 .108 -0 .5 1 2 * * * 0 .1 0 9 -0 .5 0 9 * * * 0 .1 0 9
First degree -0 .3 4 4 * * * 0 .074 -0 .3 4 8 * * * 0 .0 7 4 -0 .3 4 5 * * * 0 .0 7 4
S om e co lleg e -0 .2 1 7 * * * 0 .055 -0 .2 1 4 * * * 0 .055 -0 .2 1 4 * * * 0 .055
A  L evel -0 .1 2 7 * 0 .0 7 4 -0 .1 3 1 * 0 .0 7 4 -0 .1 3 0 * 0 .0 7 4
M arried/C ohabiting (O therw ise) -0 .035 0 .0 7 9 -0 .0 4 0 0 .0 7 9 -0 .0 4 0 0 .0 7 9
S elf-em p loyed  (E m p loyee) -0 .1 4 5 * 0 .0 8 0 -0 .1 4 3 * 0 .0 8 0 -0 .1 4 5 * 0 .0 8 0
Spouse/partner em p loyed  (O therw ise) 0 .1 6 1 * * * 0 .062 0 .1 6 1 * * * 0 .0 6 2 0 .1 6 2 * * * 0 .0 6 2
F u ll-tim e em p loyed  (Part-tim e em p loyed )  
Occupation (Plant & machine operatives)
0 .0 5 6 0 .0 7 7 0.051 0 .0 7 7 0 .0 5 2 0 .0 7 7
M anagers & A dm inistrators 0 .275 0 .192 0 .2 5 6 0 .193 0 .2 5 5 0 .193
P rofession al 0 .3 1 0 0.201 0 .2 8 9 0.201 0 .2 8 9 0.201
A ssocia te  p rofession al & T echnical 0 .3 0 4 0 .197 0 .292 0 .1 9 7 0 .2 9 2 0 .1 9 7
C lerical &  Secretarial 0 .3 6 3 * 0 .195 0 .349* 0 .195 0 .3 4 9 * 0 .195
Craft related 0 .5 6 0 * * * 0 .193 0 .5 5 1 * * * 0 .1 9 3 0 .5 4 9 * * * 0 .193
Personal & P rotective services 0 .5 9 8 * * * 0 .2 2 9 0 .5 9 1 * * * 0 .2 2 9 0 .5 8 8 * * * 0 .2 2 9
Sales 0 .5 1 7 * * 0 .208 0 .5 0 2 * * 0 .2 0 8 0 .5 0 2 * * 0 .2 0 8
W ith children (W ithout children) 
Household size (5 members or more)
0 .043]
0 .065 0 .045 0 .065 0 .0 4 4 0 .065
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1-2 m em bers -0 .1 8 7 * 0 .100 -0 .200** 0 .1 0 0 -0 .2 0 1 * * 0 .1 0 0
3-4  m em bers -0 .1 4 2 * 0 .0 7 9 -0 .1 4 8 * 0 .0 7 9 -0 .1 4 9 * 0 .0 7 9
Residential area (South East)
Greater London -0.131 0 .113 -0 .1 2 9 0 .113 -0 .1 2 8 0 .113
South W est -0 .0 9 8 0 .1 1 4 -0.101 0 .1 1 4 -0 .0 9 9 0 .115
East -0 .0 5 6 0.101 -0.061 0.101 -0 .0 6 4 0.101
W est M idlands 0 .3 3 0 * * * 0 .1 1 7 0 .3 2 5 * * * 0 .1 1 7 0 .3 2 5 * * * 0 .1 1 7
Greater M anchester -0 .0 1 0 0 .153 -0 .0 1 2 0 .153 -0 .0 1 8 0 .1 5 3
North W est 0 .135 0 .1 2 4 0 .1 3 4 0 .125 0 .1 3 2 0 .125
Y orkshire &  H um berside -0 .0 7 2 0 .1 1 0 -0 .0 7 8 0.111 -0 .0 7 9 0.111
T yne &  W ear 0 .2 0 7 * 0 .1 2 6 0 .2 0 0 0 .1 2 6 0 .2 0 2 0 .1 2 6
W ales 0 .038 0 .085 0 .0 4 0 0 .085 0 .0 3 8 0 .085
Scotland -0.081 0 .080 -0.081 0 .0 8 0 -0 .0 8 3 0 .0 8 0
Northern Ireland -0 .0 8 4 0 .0 8 7 -0.091 0 .0 8 7 -0 .0 9 5 0 .0 8 7
Year dummy (2003-2004) iii
2000-2001 -0 .1 3 5 * * * 0 .045 -0 .1 2 3 * * * 0 .045 -0 .1 2 4 * * * 0 .045
2 0 0 1 -2 0 0 2 -0 .1 4 9 * * * 0 .043 -0 .1 4 5 * * * 0 .043 -0 .1 4 3 * * * 0 .043
2 0 0 2 -2 0 0 3 -0 .1 3 8 * * * 0 .043 -0 .135*** 0 .043 -0 .1 3 5 * * * 0 .043
iii
Cut 1 -1 .4 4 4 * * * 0 .456 -1 .3 4 7 * * * 0 .457 -1 .3 5 1 * * * 0 .4 5 7
_C ut 2 -0 .4 5 4 0 .455 -0 .3 5 6 0 .4 3 6 -0.361 0 .4 5 6
P  (rho) 0 .4 6 6 * * * 0 .018 0 .4 6 8 * * * 0 .018 0 .4 6 8 * * *
1
0 .0 1 8
!
N um ber o f  observations 7763 7763 7763
L og lik elih ood -7 7 8 2 .0 5 2 -7786 .161 iiI -7 7 8 7 .0 3 4
LR Chi square 361 .26 3 53 .04
i| 35 1 .3 0
P -value 0.000 0.000 0.000
(***) At the 1% significance level; (**) at the 5% significance level; (*) at the 10% significance level 
Note: The base dummy for each dummy variable is specified in bracket.
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5.3.2 At the sub-sample level
In this section, the comparison between homeowners and private pension participants is 
discussed. This section aims to investigate, for households who save money in illiquid 
forms or save regularly through an external mechanism for retirement, how their saving 
motives change with respect to the independent variables. The second and the third 
panels of Table 5.5 report the estimated coefficients of homeowners and pension 
participants. Of the whole sample, homeowners make up 86.4% and private pension 
participants 27%.
Amongst homeowners, those who have a good financial situation are more likely to 
save mainly for the long term at the 1% significance level, with a coefficient of -0.168. 
In addition, private pension participants who have a good financial situation are also 
more likely to save mainly for the long term at the 10% significance level, with a 
coefficient of -0.196. In comparison, such an effect is robust for homeowners, although 
the scale of effect can be greater for pension participants, according to the coefficients. 
On the other hand, for homeowners and private pension participants, financial 
expectations, indicators for aggregate risk, do not appear to have a statistically 
significant impact on saving motives. Therefore, short-term precautionary saving effect 
cannot be found here. Moreover, financial realisations, indicators for recent financial 
experience, are not influential on the saving motives of either group.
This section discusses the impact of private pension enrolment on homeowners and that 
of homeownership on private pension participants. Around 28% of the homeowners 
have also paid into a private pension scheme; results show that, amongst homeowners, 
saving preferences of a long-term horizon and a short-term horizon do not vary between 
those who are accumulating private pension wealth and those who are not. Around 90% 
of pension participants possess housing wealth; results show that the effect of 
homeownership is not evident on changes in the saving motives of pension participants.
Self-employment status does not have an impact on the saving motives of homeowners. 
By contrast, self-employed pension participants are more likely to save mainly for the 
long term at the 10% significance level than employee pension participants, with a 
coefficient of -0.224.
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Occupational effects are evident for homeowners but not private pension participants. 
Regarding occupational effects, homeowners in some specific occupations which 
feature high volatility of income flow or high risk, such as the ‘craft related’, ‘personal 
& protective services’, and ‘sales’ sectors, are more likely to save mainly for the short 
term at the 5% significance level than those in ‘plants & machine operatives’ sector, 
with coefficients of 0.600, 0.729, and 0.542, respectively. Homeowners in the ‘clerical 
& secretarial’ sector are more likely to save mainly for the short term at the 10% 
significance level, with a coefficient of 0.422. On the other hand, occupational effect 
emerges to be insignificant on pension participants’ saving motives.
Female homeowners are more likely to save for the short term at the 1% significance 
level, than male homeowners, with a coefficient of 0.414. Female pension participants 
are also more likely to save for the short term at the 1% significance level, than their 
male equivalents, with a coefficient of 0.374. Combining these two findings, females 
who own illiquid wealth and have been accumulating pension wealth, are still more 
likely to save for the short term than their male counterparts. This suggests the 
possibility that females, in general, have a stronger inclination to save for the short term 
than males, and females thus have a stronger short-term precautionary motive than 
males.
For both homeowners and private pension participants, the effects of educational 
attainment emerge as strongly significant. Homeowners, who have a postgraduate 
degree, a first degree, or have had some college education, are more likely to save 
mainly for the long term at the 1% significance level, with coefficients of -0.460, -0.318, 
and -0.197, respectively. For private pension participants, the coefficients are -0.779, - 
0.369, and -0.307, respectively, at the 1% significance level. For both groups, higher 
education has enhancing effects on long-term saving motives; moreover, the effects 
appear greater in scale on pension participants than on homeowners.
Homeowners who have higher permanent income, i.e. wealth level, are more likely to 
save mainly for the long term at the 1% significance level, with a coefficient of -6.82e- 
06; private pension participants with high wealth levels (permanent income) are more 
likely to save mainly for the long term at the 5% significance level, with a coefficient of
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-4.92e-06. Comparing the two, such an effect is more profound for homeowners than 
for private pension participants.
Homeowners with few members are more likely to save mainly for the long term at the 
5% significance level, with coefficients of -0.266 where there are 1-2 members and - 
0.192 for 3-4 members. On the other hand, effects of household size do not emerge as 
significant for private pension participants.
Homeowners with joint income sources are more likely to save mainly for the short 
term at the 1% significance level, with a coefficient of 0.187, and equivalent pension 
participants are more likely to save mainly for the short term at the 1 0 % significance 
level, with a coefficient of 0 .2 2 1 .
Homeowners living in the West Midlands are more likely to save for short term at the 
1% significance level than those in any other residential area. Pension participants 
living in the ‘North West’ region are more likely to save mainly for the short term, at 
the 1 0 % significance level.
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Mean Coef. Std Dev.
---------------------
Mean Coef. Std Dev.
Permanent income 36512.600 -6.82e-06*** 1,49e-06 37059.340 -4.92e-06** 2.04e-06
Financial situation (Neutral)
Good 0.863 -0.168*** 0.062 0.867 -0.196* 0.115
Bad 0.015 -0.179 0.168 0.014 -0.331 0.308
Financial expectation (About the same)
Better-off 0.308 -0.017 0.043 0.314 -0.112 0.079
Worse-off 0.076 0.060 0.072 0.069 0.091 0.139
Financial realisation (About the same)
Better than last year 0.386 -0.006 0.042 0.388 0.118 0.078
Worse than last year 0.145 -0.007 0.058 0.152 0.104 0.105
Pension enrolment (Otherwise) 0.284 -0.043 0.049 - -
Homeownership (Otherwise) - - - 0.908 0.048 0.138
Female (Male) 0.189 0.414*** 0.073 0.135 0.374*** 0.138
Age 42.863 -0.037* 0.021 43.103 -0.058 0.038
Age squared 1935.061 0.0003 0.0002 1955.750 0.0005 0.0004
Education (Less than A level)
Higher than first degree 0.061 -0.460*** 0.117 0.049 -0.779*** 0.222
First degree 0.178 -0.318*** 0.080 0.179 -0.369*** 0.139
Some college 0.35 -0.197*** 0.061 0.358 -0.307*** 0.104
A Level 0.123 -0.094 0.080 0.112 -0.083 0.144
Married/Cohabiting (Otherwise) 0.77 -0.022 0.088 0.787 -0.089 0.157
Self-employed (Employee) 0.121 -0.141 0.087 0.257 -0.224* 0.116
Spouse/partner employed (Otherwise) 0.631 0.187*** 0.066 0.637 0.221* 0.115
Full-time employed (Part-time employed) 0.935 0.121 0.089 0.956 0.174 0.181
Occupation (Plant & machine operatives)
Managers & Administrators 0.277 0.343 0.245 0.317 0.025 0.279
Professional 0.095 0.354 0.253 0.108 0.233 0.302
Associate professional & Technical 0.128 0.324 0.249 0.069 -0.009 0.305
Clerical & Secretarial 0.187 0.422* 0.247 0.158 -0.027 0.291
Craft related 0.238 0.600** 0.245 0.224 0.267 0.287
Personal & Protective services 0.016 0.729** 0.294 0.012 0.283 0.436
Sales 0.05 0.542** 0.260 0.090 0.381 0.301
With children (Without children) 0.411 0.035 0.071 0.410 -0.040 0.135
Household size (5 members or more)
1 -2 members 0.472 -0.266** 0.108 0.455 -0.315 0.195
136
3-4 members | 0.442
Residential area (South East)
Greater London ] 0.047
South West j 0.053
East j  0.072
West Midlands i 0.050
Greater Manchester j 0.025
North West j 0.045
Yorkshire & Humberside i  0.059
I
Tyne & Wear j 0.041
Wales i 0.148
Scotland ! 0.196







Number of observations 
Log likelihood 
LR Chi square 
P-value
p  (rho)__________________________________________________________ |_______________
(***) At the 1% significance level; (**) at the 5% significance level; (*) at the 10% significance level 
N ote: T h e b a se  d u m m y for each  d u m m y variab le is  sp e c ifie d  in bracket
























































































Short-term precautionary saving effect, which is defined as saving for short-term 
aggregate risk in this study, is not found to be significant in the estimation results at the 
whole sample level or even in the two subgroups. Two explanations are proposed: first, 
households may have accumulated enough wealth to buffer the short-term risk; second, 
this missing correlation between the propensity to save for the short term and the 
perceived aggregate risk supports the quasi-hyperbolic consumption model, as this 
implies that the precautionary saving effect may be missing. In addition, there is another 
finding that goes against the insight of precautionary saving motive, which is that 
households with joint income sources have an inclination to save for the short term. 
Nevertheless, it is observed at the whole sample level and in the homeowner group that 
an occupational effect is evident, showing that households in the sectors with unstable 
income streams have stronger short-term saving motives, and this suggests the 
possibility of precautionary saving behaviour. But this is not observed amongst pension 
participants.
Considering the whole sample level, 86.4% are homeowners and 27% are private 
pension participants. At the whole sample level, pension enrolment does not have a 
significant impact on saving motives, but homeowners are more likely to save mainly 
for the long term than non-homeowners. This finding about homeownership supports 
the quasi-hyperbolic consumption model in that the hyperbolic consumers, as they are 
presumably aware of their self-control problems, choose to self-impose constraint on 
accessing liquid assets, by accumulating wealth in illiquid forms (Laibson 1998). In 
addition, hyperbolic consumers have a preference for saving for the long term to saving 
for the short term. Housing wealth can distinguish itself from pension wealth as it can 
also serve as a type of precautionary savings to buffer uncertainty in the long term. 
Previous literature indicated that housing wealth also reflected precautionary wealth. 
Firstly, Laibson (1997) suggested that consumers with hyperbolic discount factors 
would hold illiquid wealth to buffer income risk in the long run. Secondly, Carroll and 
Samwick (1998) proposed that illiquid assets may not be undesirable buffers, if the 
consumers’ concern was a high cost but low probability event, such as job loss. Carroll, 
Dynan, and Krane (2003) found amongst U.S. households that home equity was a 
driving force behind the relationship between unemployment risk and total net worth
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and not net financial wealth. Having said so, the distinction of homeownership and 
private pension participants does not emerge as evident on the saving motives of 
homeowners and private pension participants.
Socioeconomic factor -  gender difference, educational attainment, and wealth level -  
have robust impacts on households’ saving motives at the whole sample level and in the 
two subgroups.
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5.4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS -  THE
SEEMINGLY UNRELATED REGRESSION (SUR) MODEL
As generally understood, the cross-sectional estimation can easily fail to distinguish the 
effects as a result of changes over time, which can cause bias in the estimation. A SUR 
model has the advantage over a simple cross-sectional estimation method, in that, when 
obtaining cross-sectional estimations, this model takes into account unspecified 
correlations during different periods in this study. Moreover, a SUR model can be 
employed on cross-sections with time-series data, by taking account of unobserved 
household heterogeneity without imposing any assumption on the distribution of these 
factors. An exogenous macroeconomic shock, such as a change in policy, can emerge as 
effective over three years, and this can be implicitly controlled by the correlations 
between equations. In addition, if a household makes a purchase of durable goods in a 
certain year, this has an effect on its current saving behaviour and is likely to emerge in 
the previous and successive years.
This approach allows for an investigation into whether a common framework captures a 
steady trend for the four different waves (years) of this study, which is a test on the time 
consistency of coefficients over the waves. The purpose for testing the hypothesis of 
time consistency of coefficients is to examine whether the effects of each independent 
variable, which are obtained in a SUR model, are consistent in all equations, i.e. the 
four waves in this study. If the hypothesis is not rejected, the time consistency of the 
coefficients of a given independent variable holds, and this further indicates that the 
robustness of its influence can be accepted.
5.4.1 The whole sample level
The results of the estimations over the four waves are reported in Table 5.6, and those of 
the hypothesis for time consistency, are shown in Table 5.7.
The shares of households who consider their financial situations as positive vary 
between 80.7% in wave 10 and 88.1% in wave 13, showing a temporally upward trend 
for the four waves. The results show that having a good current financial situation is
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associated with an increase in the likelihood of saving mainly for the long term, at the 
5% significance level, in waves 10 and 11, with coefficients of -0.190 and -0.204, 
respectively. This shows that households who consider themselves to be ‘living 
comfortably’ or ‘doing all right’ financially, tend to have a stronger long-term saving 
motive. Such a tendency is more evident in waves 10 and 11 than in waves 12 and 13; 
however, the hypothesis of time consistency is not rejected, at the 1 0 % significance 
level, showing that this tendency is consistent over the four waves.
Subjectively perceived aggregate short-term risk, which is featured by the dummy 
variable ‘financial expectations’, emerges as having no significant impact on affecting 
households’ short-term saving motive over the four waves, as the coefficients of 
positive and negative financial expectation are not evident, at the 1 0 % significance level. 
The precautionary saving effect is missing in that a negative financial expectation does 
not make households more inclined to save mainly for the short term. This is 
consistently observed throughout the four waves as is seen in Table 5.7, as the 
hypothesis of the coefficients being consistent over time is not rejected.
Recent financial experience, which is characterised by the difference between this 
year’s financial situation and last year’s situation, does not have any evident impact on 
changes in saving motives. No rejection of the hypothesis of time consistency confirms 
that this finding is stable over the four waves (see Table 5.7).
The relationship between a household engaging in homeownership and an increase in 
the likelihood of its saving mainly for the long term, is observed at the 5% significance 
level in wave 10 and at the 10% level in wave 12, with coefficients of -0.191 and -0.173 
respectively. These findings show that homeowners are more likely to save 
discretionarily mainly for the long term, than non-homeowners. This suggests that 
households’ holding of housing wealth mitigates their precautionary motive in making 
savings for short-term purposes. Such a pattern emerges as evident in waves 10 and 12, 
but not in waves 1 1  and 13; nevertheless, this is consistent over the four waves because 
the hypothesis of time consistency is not rejected.
It is only found in wave 10 that households who have paid into a private pension 
scheme are more likely to save mainly for the long term, at the 5% significance level,
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with a coefficient of -0.143. This relationship is not evident in the other three waves. 
However, the hypothesis of time consistency is not rejected, showing that the estimated 
influence of pension enrolment is stable over the four waves. The relationship between 
households’ inclination towards long-term saving and pension enrolment, suggests that 
those who have been regularly saving for retirement are more inclined to saving for the 
long term and are less precautionary with respect to short-term purposes, than their 
counterparts.
It is proposed that these findings provide evidence to support the quasi-hyperbolic 
consumption model. This is because hyperbolic households’ saving motive for a long­
term purpose is more profound than for the short term, as a result of their inconsistent 
time preferences. Moreover, illiquid wealth, like housing wealth, and external saving 
mechanisms, such as a private pension scheme, are favoured by these households 
because these saving instruments help them manage their saving for the long term, as 
the saved money is usually not accessible in the short term or costly to gain access to.
Being self-employed does not appear to have any evident impact on households’ saving 
motives, and this is a constant finding over the four waves, in that the hypothesis of 
time-consistency is not rejected. However, in the previous panel-data estimations, self- 
employed households were found to be more likely to save mainly for the long term, at 
the 1 0 % significance level, than employees.
The panel-data estimations in the previous section reported that the households in the 
‘craft related’, ‘personal & protective services’, or ‘sales’ occupations, are more likely 
to save mainly for the short term at the 5% significance level. However, some variations 
in the occupational effects can be seen over the four waves. To start with, the 
occupational effect is missing in wave 12. Secondly, compared with those in the ‘plants 
& machine operatives’ sector, households in the ‘craft related’ sector are more likely to 
save mainly for the short term, at the 5% significance level in waves 10 and 13, and at 
the 10% significance level in wave 11, with coefficients of 0.578, 0.801, and 0.438, 
respectively. Households in the ‘personal & protective services’ sector are more likely 
to save mainly for the short term, at the 5% significance level, in waves 10 and 11, with 
coefficients of 0.735 and 0.652, respectively. Households in the ‘sales’ sector are more 
likely to save mainly for the short term at the 5% significance level in wave 10 and at
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the 10% level in wave 13, with coefficients of 0.667 and 0.696, respectively. By 
contrast, it is only observed in wave 13 that such occupations as ‘managers & 
administration’, ‘professional’, and ‘associate professional & technical’, which have 
higher income variability as well as significantly higher income level than those in 
‘plants and machine operatives’ sector (shown in Table 5.1), are associated with an 
increase in the likelihood of saving mainly for the short term at the 1 0 % significance 
level, with coefficients of 0.643, 0.673, and 0.676. These findings are only weakly 
evident, and thus I propose they may be a result o f unobserved effects occurring only in 
wave 13. Households in the ‘clerical and secretarial’ sector are more likely to save 
mainly for the short term at the 10% significance level in wave 10 and at the 5% level in 
wave 13, with coefficients of 0.423 and 0.797, respectively. The hypothesis of time 
consistency is not rejected for any occupational sector, thus showing that the 
occupational effect on saving motives is stable over time (see Table 5.7).
Despite the variations mentioned above, it can be seen that, within a given wave, the 
scales o f the effects are larger and more evident in the ‘craft related’, ‘personal & 
protective services’, and ‘sales’ sectors than in the other occupational groups. This 
shows that households in these occupations are more precautionary than the rest.
Females are more likely to save mainly for the short term than males at the 1% 
significance level in all of the waves, with coefficients of 0.245, 0.378, 0.237, and 0.347, 
respectively. The gender effect is robust and its strength is consistent in all the four 
waves. This suggests that the short-term precautionary motive is more profound in 
females than in males.
Educational attainment of heads of households has significant influence on their saving 
motives. Being consistent with the previous panel-data estimates, heads of household 
with a postgraduate degree, are more likely to save mainly for the long term, at the 1 % 
and 5% significance levels over the four waves, with coefficients of -0.328, -0.361, - 
0.356, and -0.358, consecutively. Those with a first degree are more likely to do so at 
the 5% significance level, in wave 12, and at the 1% level, in waves 10 and 13, with 
coefficients of -0.230, -0.278, and -0.302, respectively. Those who have attended 
college are also more likely to save mainly for the long term, at the 1 % significance 
level in wave 12, at the 5% level in wave 13, and at the 10% level in wave 11, with
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coefficients of -0.217, -0.159, and -0.118, respectively. Households who have achieved 
just A-level education are more likely to save mainly for the long term, at the 10% 
significance level in wave 10, with a coefficient of -0.149. The scales of these 
coefficients and their significance levels show that the higher the educational attainment 
that a household has, the more profound is its long-term saving motive. The hypothesis 
of time consistency is not rejected, indicating that these effects are stable over the four 
waves.
The results show that households with higher estimated permanent income are more 
likely to save mainly for the long term at the 1 % significance level in waves 1 0  and 1 1 , 
and at the 10% level in waves 12 and 13, with coefficients of -5.76e-06, -5.35e-06, - 
3.77e-06, and -2.74e-06, consecutively. The scale of the influence decreases continually 
with time; however, the hypothesis of time consistency is not rejected, showing that 
these effects are constant over the four waves. This finding suggests that households 
with higher wealth levels have a weaker precautionary motive.
The previous panel-data estimation showed that households with an employed 
spouse/partner were more likely to save mainly for the short term at the 1 % significance 
level. The results here show that this correlation is evident at the 5% significance level 
only in wave 13, with a coefficient of 0.202; positive coefficients are obtained in the 
other three waves, but they are not statistically evident at the 10% level. The hypothesis 
of time-consistency is not rejected, showing that this relationship is stable over the four 
waves. It is considered that having joint income sources would mitigate households’ 
precautionary saving motive, however, the finding here goes against this notion.
The previous panel-data estimation showed that households with few members were 
more likely to save mainly for the long term at the 10% significance level. The results 
here show that those with 1 - 2  members are more likely to save mainly for the long term, 
at the 10% significance level in wave 10, and those with 3-4 members are more likely to 
save mainly for the long term, at 1 0 % significance level in wave 13, with coefficients of 
-0.265 and -0.188 respectively. Most of the insignificant coefficients in other waves 
have negative signs. This leads to the result that the hypothesis of time consistency is 
not rejected, showing the effects of household size to be consistent over the four waves.
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Where a household is located, to some extent, has an effect on its saving motives. 
Residents in the West Midlands region are more likely to save mainly for the short term 
at the 5% significance level in waves 10, 11, and 13, with coefficients of 0.288, 0.320, 
and 0.345 respectively. This is consistent with the previous panel-data estimations. 
What is not evident in the previous estimations is as follows: residents in the North 
West region are more likely to save mainly for the short term at the 5% significance 
level in wave 11, with a coefficient of 0.310, and residents in Tyne & Wear are more 
likely to save mainly for the short term, at the 1 0 % significance level, in wave 1 2 , with 
a coefficient of 0.272. In general, the hypothesis of the time consistency of any 
residential effect is not rejected, thus showing stability over time.
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Table 5.6: SUR model -  W hole sample
W a v e 10 W ave 11 W ave 12 W a v e  13
In d e p e n d e n t V a r ia b le s M ean C o ef. S td  D ev. M ean C oef. S td  D ev. M ean C o e f S td  D ev . M ean C o e f S td  D ev .
Permanent income 
Financial situation
33650.94 -5.74e-06*** 1.92e-06 34343.6 -5.35e-06*** 1.99e-06 35298.39 -3.77e-06* 1.98e-06 35672.97 -2.74e-06* 1.45e-06
Good 0.807 -0.190** 0.079 0.847 -0.204** 0.086 0.861 -0.110 0.089 0.881 -0.123 0.093
Bad
Financial expectation
0.020 0.095 0.210 0.018 -0.126 0.258 0.015 -0.368 0.237 0.014 0.308 0.282
Better-off 0.347 -0.047 0.06 0.327 -0.038 0.061 0.292 -0.002 0.062 0.304 0.082 0.064
Worse-off 
Financial realisation
0.077 0.076 0.111 0.076 0.042 0.104 0.072 -0.029 0.107 0.068 0.149 0.112
Better-off than last year 0.410 -0.034 0.062 0.436 0.069 0.059 0.370 0.006 0.060 0.368 -0.003 0.062
Worse-off than last year 0.152 -0.054 0.083 0.125 -0.082 0.091 0.158 -0.033 0.081 0.134 -0.054 0.091
Pension enrolment 0.281 -0.143** 0.063 0.270 -0.063 0.062 0.279 0.038 0.062 0.252 -0.086 0.065
Homeownership 0.848 -0.191** 0.079 0.859 -0.009 0.084 0.879 -0.173* 0.089 0.868 -0.118 0.084
Female 0.218 0.245*** 0.08 0.223 0.378*** 0.079 0.209 0.237*** 0.084 0.219 0.347*** 0.082
Age 42.108 -0.032 0.026 41.992 -0.022 0.024 42.659 -0.034 0.024 43.059 0.022 0.024
Age squared 
Education
1871.225 0.0002 0.0003 1862.523 0.0001 0.0003 1923.516 0.0003 0.0003 1959.809 -0.0003 0.0003
Higher than first degree 0.049 -0.328** 0.138 0.061 -0.361*** 0.129 0.064 -0.356*** 0.124 0.061 -0.358*** 0.131
First degree 0.164 -0.278*** 0.093 0.172 -0.119 0.091 0.169 -0.230** 0.091 0.180 -0.302*** 0.089
Some college 0.341 -0.097 0.071 0.336 -0.118* 0.071 0.350 -0.217*** 0.069 0.343 -0.159** 0.069
A Level 0.121 -0.149* 0.091 0.120 -0.006 0.091 0.117 -0.110 0.097 0.117 -0.021 0.092
Married/Cohabiting 0.747 -0.018 0.104 0.730 0.119 0.104 0.737 -0.033 0.106 0.728 -0.092 0.108
Self-employed 0.113 -0.087 0.109 0.113 0.035 0.106 0.131 -0.143 0.109 0.124 -0.072 0.118
Spouse/partner employed 0.603 0.100 0.083 0.609 0.077 0.081 0.602 0.087 0.083 0.590 0.202** 0.083
Full-time employed 
Occupation
0.928 -0.008 0.116 0.927 0.022 0.112 0.922 0.157 0.109 0.919 -0.007 0.103
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M anagers & Administrators 0.265 0.352 0.251 0.249
Professional 0.092 0.262 0.264 0.096
Associate professional & Technical 0.136 0.360 0.256 0.134
Clerical & Secretarial 0.160 0.423* 0.254 0.203
Craft related 0.266 0.578** 0.250 0.240
Personal & Protective services 0.020 0.735** 0.317 0.023
Sales 0.048 0.667** 0.266 0.046
W ith children 0.392 0.010 0.089 0.408
Household size
1 -2 members 0.497 -0.265* 0.141 0.493
3-4 members 0.427 -0.100 0.111 0.424
Region
Greater London 0.061 -0.000 0.126 0.051
South West 0.062 0.001 0.135 0.055
East 0.085 -0.083 0.122 0.072
West M idlands 0.060 0.288** 0.144 0.049
Greater M anchester 0.030 0.158 0.171 0.022
North West 0.044 0.072 0.159 0.042
Yorkshire & Humberside 0.065 -0.057 0.122 0.053
Tyne & W ear 0.047 0.179 0.141 0.043
Wales 0.163 0.050 0.098 0.123
Scotland 0.230 -0.007 0.091 0.184
Northern Ireland 0.009 0.254 0.360 0.182
(***) At the 1% significance level; (**) at the 5% significance level; (*) at the 10% significance level
0.168 0.270 | 0.263 -0.066 0.288 0.264 0.643* 0.363
0.273 0.278 0.090 0.059 0.297 0.092 0.673* 0.371
0.172 0.274 0.130 0.049 0.293 0.134 0.676* 0.366
0.205 0.270 0.185 0.027 0.289 0.181 0.797** 0.364
0.438* 0.269 0.243 0.243 0.287 0.234 0.801** 0.363
0.652** 0.324 0.021 0.150 0.331 0.027 0.581 0.398
0.388 0.285 0.058 0.025 0.302 0.059 0.696* 0.380
0.057 0.089 0.408 0.0003 0.086 0.399 0.088 0.091
-0.062 0.134 0.476 -0.053 0.135 0.492 -0.164 0.131
-0.096 0.105 0.443 0.031 0.106 0.420 -0.188* 0.100
-0.157 0.135 0.050 -0.095 0.149 0.046 -0.115 0.146
-0.137 0.143 0.054 0.057 0.147 0.049 -0.086 0.159
0.056 0.129 0.071 0.037 0.124 0.072 -0.059 0.128
0.320** 0.150 j 0.046 0.125 0.147 0.042 0.345** 0.150
-0.066 0.183 0.023 0.094 0.167 0.022 -0.157 0.186
0.310** 0.154 0.044 -0.008 0.158 0.043 0.013 0.164
-0.038 0.135 0.056 -0.108 0.146 0.060 0.093 0.126
0.174 0.145 0.039 0.272* 0.164 0.036 -0.035 0.164
0.074 0.107 0.140 -0.004 0.108 0.148 -0.027 0.105
-0.051 0.097 0.199 -0.003 0.102 0.191 -0.121 0.100
-0.047 0.101 0.160 -0.088 0.107 0.170 -0.062 0.106
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Table 5.7: Results of test on time-consistency -  At the whole sample level
W hole sam ple
Independent variable p-value Chi Square statistics






W orse-off 0.710 1.38
Financial realisation
Better-off than last year 0.668 1.56
W orse-off than last year 0.983 0.16




Age squared 0.420 2.82
Education
Higher than first degree 0.998 0.04
First degree 0.492 2.41
Some college 0.631 1.73
A Level 0.635 1.71
M arried/Cohabiting 0.538 2.17
Self-employed 0.695 1.45
Spouse/partner employed 0.689 1.47
Full-time employed 0.672 1.55
Occupation
Managers & Administrators 0.452 2.63
Professional 0.641 1.68
Associate professional & Technical 0.564 2.04
Clerical & Secretarial 0.378 3.09
Craft related 0.651 1.64
Personal & Protective services 0.594 1.90
Sales 0.375 3.11
With children 0.889 0.63
Household size
1 -2 members 0.669 1.56
3-4 members 0.522 2.25
Residential area
Greater London 0.852 0.79
South West 0.784 1.07
East 0.824 0.90
W est M idlands 0.718 1.35
Greater M anchester 0.576 1.98
North West 0.449 2.65
Yorkshire & Humberside 0.734 1.28
Tyne & W ear 0.595 1.89
Wales 0.897 0.60
Scotland 0.821 0.92
Northern Ireland 0.840 0.84
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5.4.2 The sub-sample level
The estimated coefficients for homeowners are reported in Table 5.8, and those for 
private pension participants are reported in Table 5.9. The holding of illiquid wealth and 
engagement in external saving mechanisms demonstrate that such households manage 
their self-control problems by means of certain instrumental constraints, in order to 
meet their optimal saving plans for the long-term perspective. It is thus worthwhile to 
explore the determinants of the saving motives of these two groups. The results of the 
hypothesis of time consistency, for both groups, are reported in Table 5.10.
To begin with, households’ perceptions of aggregate risk in the short term, i.e. in the 
next 12 months, do not have an evident impact on determining saving motives. By 
contrast, private pension participants, who expect to be financially better off and to have 
lower risk in the short term, are more likely to save mainly for the long term at the 1 0 % 
significance level in wave 11, with a coefficient of -0.200. This shows that the 
expectation of a lower aggregate risk in the near future, makes pension participants 
more inclined to save mainly for the long term and thus averse to saving mainly for the 
short term; this suggests the possibility that their precautionary motive is weak, in 
response to a low degree of aggregate future risk. Nevertheless, this finding is only 
weakly significant, and in addition, worse-off financial expectation, i.e. a higher risk in 
the short term, does not affect their short-term saving motive. For both groups, the 
hypotheses of time consistency of effects of these financial expectations are not rejected, 
showing that the influences of subjective perceptions with short-term risk are 
consistently insignificant over the four waves.
The status of having a good current financial situation appears to have an influence on 
both homeowners and private pension participants. Homeowners who are ‘living 
comfortably’ or ‘doing alright’ are more likely to save mainly for the long term at the 
5% significance level in wave 10 and at the 10% level in wave 11, with coefficients of - 
0.216 and -0.175 respectively. Pension participants in a good financial situation are 
more likely to save mainly for the long term, at the 5% significance level in wave 10, 
with a coefficient of -0.309. The hypothesis of time consistency is not rejected for both 
groups, showing that the effect of a good situation is stable over the four waves.
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The effect of recent financial experience emerges amongst private pension participants, 
but not for homeowners. As shown in the results, it is evident that pension participants, 
who have a better financial situation than last year, are more likely to save mainly for 
the short term, at the 5% significance level in wave 11, with a coefficient of 0.277; 
however, this correlation was missing in the previous panel-data estimations. The 
hypothesis of time consistency is not rejected for homeowners; on the other hand, it is 
rejected at the 1 0 % significance level for pension participants and this thus points to the 
observation that the effect of an improving financial experience varies over the four 
waves.
It is seen that some households own housing wealth and are also paying into a private 
pension. When considering the sample of homeowners, shares of private pension 
participants vary from 26.5% to 29.4% over the four waves. By contrast, for private 
pension participants, the percentages of homeowners range from 88.9% to 92.6%. The 
results show that homeowners, who have paid into a private pension scheme, are more 
likely to save mainly for the long term, than those who have not paid into any pension, 
at the 10% significance level in wave 10, with a coefficient of -0.120. By contrast, the 
effect of engaging in homeownership emerges as insignificant amongst pension 
participants. This relationship observed amongst homeowners is only weakly evident. 
Moreover, for the two groups, the hypothesis of time consistency is not rejected, 
showing that both the effect of owning a house and the effect of a pension saving 
commitment are constant over the four waves. These suggest that homeowners’ saving 
motives are not affected by pension enrolment, and pension participants’ saving motives 
are also not influenced by ownership of housing wealth.
For homeowners, the percentages of self-employed households range from 11.4% to 
13%, and they vary from 24.7% to 27.3% for private pension participants, over the four 
waves. For both groups, the results show the status of being self-employed does not 
have an influence on their saving motives. Moreover, this is considered as consistent 
over the four waves as the hypothesis of time-consistency is not rejected. The findings 
for homeowners are consistent with the previous panel-data estimations, whereas the 
previous estimations showed that self-employed pension participants are more likely to 
save mainly for the long term at the 1 0 % significance level, which is not evident here.
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Homeowners in full-time employment are more likely to save mainly for the short term, 
at the 10% significance level, only in wave 12, with a coefficient of 0.235. In addition, 
pension participants in full-time employment are more likely to save mainly for the 
short term, at the 10% significance level in wave 11, with a coefficient of 0.595. 
Nevertheless, these results do not show robustness because firstly, they are only weakly 
significant and secondly, the hypothesis of time consistency is not rejected in both 
groups, suggesting that the effect of full-time employment is constant over the four 
waves.
Occupational effects are insignificant for private pension participants, whereas these 
effects, in some sectors, are observed for homeowners. The results show that 
homeowners in occupations which feature unstable income streams and high volatility 
of employment than the ‘plant & machine operatives’ sector, such as the ‘craft related’, 
‘personal & protective services’, and ‘sales’ sectors, are more likely to save mainly for 
the short term. For the ‘sales’ sector, the coefficients are 0.588, at the 10% significance 
level in wave 10, and 1.078, at the 5% level in wave 13; for the ‘personal & protective 
services’ sector, the coefficients are 0.801 and 0.836, at the 5% level in waves 10 and 11, 
respectively, and 1.024, at the 10% level in wave 13; for the ‘craft related’ sector, the 
coefficients are 0.593, at the 10% level in wave 10 and 1.127, at the 5% level in wave 
13. These results support the possibility that households in these sectors, whilst 
possessing illiquid wealth, still have a stronger precautionary motive for the short-term 
future. In wave 13, there is a significant impact in every occupation on homeowners’ 
short term saving motive. Those in the ‘managers & administrators’, ‘professional’, 
‘associate professional & technical’, ‘associate professional & technical’, or ‘clerical & 
secretarial’ sectors, are more likely to save mainly for the short term at the 5% or 10% 
significance levels, with coefficients of 1.020, 1.054, 0.907, and 1.118, respectively. As 
suggested earlier, this can be attributed to unobserved effects in that wave, and they are 
particularly influential on homeowners but not pension participants. Despite these 
fluctuations in the occupational effects, they are consistent over the four waves as the 
hypothesis of time consistency is not rejected for any sector.
Gender difference has a strong impact on homeowners’ saving motives, as results show 
that female homeowners are more likely to save mainly for the short term, at the 1 % 
significance level in all four waves, with coefficients of 0.347, 0.376, 0.242, and 0.372,
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respectively. Amongst private pension participants, females are more likely to save 
mainly for the short term: this correlation is evident, at the 5% significance level in 
wave 10, with a coefficient of 0.419, and at the 1% significance level in wave 13, with a 
coefficient of 0.549. These findings show that even though they possess housing wealth 
or are saving regularly for retirement, females still show a stronger inclination towards 
saving for the short-term precautionary purposes as compared with their male 
equivalents, and moreover, this tendency is more frequently observed amongst 
homeowners. Moreover, the gender effect is constant over the four waves for both 
groups.
For both groups, the effects of levels of educational attainment are evident. Amongst 
homeowners, those with a postgraduate degree are more likely to save mainly for the 
long term, at the 5% significance level in waves 11 and 12, with coefficients of -0.339 
and -0.327, at the 1% level in wave 13, with a coefficient of -0.386, and at the 10% 
level in wave 10, with a coefficient of -0.263. Those with a first degree are more likely 
to save mainly for the long term, at the 1% significance level in waves 10 and 13, with 
coefficients of -0.267 and -0.313, and at the 5% level in wavel2, with a coefficient of - 
0.215. Those who have received a college level of education are more likely to save 
mainly for the long term, at the 5% significance level in waves 11 and 13, with 
coefficients of -0.170 and -0.154, and at 1% level in wave 12, with a coefficient of - 
0.207. Amongst private pension participants, those with a postgraduate degree are more 
likely to save mainly for the long term, at the 5% significance level in waves 12 and 13, 
with coefficients of -0.575 and -0.636. Those with a first degree are more likely to do so, 
at the 5% significance level in wave 10, with a coefficient of -0.408. Those who have 
had some college education are more likely to save mainly for the long term, at the 1 % 
significance level in wave 12, with a coefficient of -0.565. Comparing the two groups, 
educational effects are more frequently observed over the four waves, amongst 
homeowners, and the scales of the effects are larger for pension participants. In general, 
the hypothesis of time consistency is not rejected for both groups. The exception is 
found amongst pension participants, in that the hypothesis of time consistency is 
rejected at the 5% significance level. This is because the influence of having undertaken 
a college level of education is especially evident in wave 1 2 .
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The effects of wealth level, represented by permanent income level, on saving motives 
are significant amongst homeowners, but not for private pension participants. 
Homeowners with higher permanent income levels are more likely to save mainly for 
the long term, at the 1 % significance level in waves 1 0  and 1 1 , at the 1 0 % level in wave 
12, and at the 5% level in wave 13, with coefficients of -6.42e-06, -5.87e-06, -3.88e-06, 
and -3.50e-06, respectively. This suggests the possibility that homeowners with lower 
wealth levels are more likely to be precautionary with short-term uncertainty and 
expenses, but pension participants appear to be hardly influenced over the four waves. 
The hypothesis of time consistency is not rejected for both groups, showing such a 
pattern is constant over the four waves.
Homeowners with joint income sources are more likely to save mainly for the short 
term, at the 1% significance level in wave 13, with a coefficient of 0.242, and pension 
participants with joint income sources are more likely to save mainly for the short term, 
at the 5% significance level, with a coefficient of 0.411. Comparing the results, the scale 
of the effect is larger for pension participants than for homeowners. For both groups, 
although this effect is more profound in wave 13 than in the other waves, it is consistent 
over the four waves, as the hypothesis of time-consistency is not rejected.
A nonlinear age effect is evident amongst homeowners in wave 12 as a negative 
coefficient of ‘age’ is significant, at the 5% significance level and a positive coefficient 
of ‘ age2 ’ is so at the 10% level, with coefficients of -0.064 and 0.001, respectively. 
This suggests that young and old homeowners are more likely to save mainly for the 
short term than those in middle-age. By contrast, an age effect is not evident amongst 
private pension participants. In general, age effects are constant over the waves, for both 
groups, in that the hypothesis of time consistency is not rejected.
Household size has an impact on homeowners’ saving motives, but not on those of 
private pension participants. Homeowners with 1-2 family members are more likely to 
save mainly for the long term, at the 5% significance level, in wave 10, with a 
coefficient of -0.298, than those with 5 or more, and those with 3-4 members are more 
likely to save mainly for the long term, at the 1 % significance level, in wave 13, with a 
coefficient of -0.274. There is reason to believe that households with more family
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members may have a stronger precautionary motive, in that the occurrence of a shock 
would be more devastating on households with children or elderly dependents, than on 
those containing only a couple. The hypothesis of time consistency is not rejected for 
both groups, showing the effect of household size is constant over the four waves.
Homeowners in the West Midlands are more likely to save mainly for the short term, at 
the 10% significance level, in wave 10, and, at the 5% level, in waves 11 and 13, with 
coefficients of 0.258, 0.328, and 0.397, respectively. Of all the residential areas, this 
regional effect, i.e. living in the West Midlands, is the most frequently observed in the 
four waves. Those living in the Greater London area are more likely to save mainly for 
the long term, at the 10% level, with a coefficient of -0.254. On the other hand, these 
regional effects are not evident for private pension participants.
Homeowners in the North West region are more likely to save mainly for the short term 
at the 10% significance level in wave 11, with a coefficient of 0.279; private pension 
participants in this region are more likely to do so, at the 1 0 % significance level in 
waves 11 and 12, with coefficients of 0.532 and 0.529. Homeowners living in Tyne & 
Wear are more likely to save mainly for the short term, at the 10% significance level in 
wave 12, with a coefficient of 0.315. Pension participants who live in this region are 
more likely to save for the short term in waves 11 and 12, with coefficients of 0.487 and 
0.525. It can be seen that these two regional effects are more frequently observed and of 
greater magnitude for pension participants than for homeowners.
Some regional effects are only evident for pension participants. They are as follows: 
those living in the Greater Manchester are more likely to save mainly for the long term, 
at the 1% significance level in wave 13, with a coefficient of -1.091; those living in 
Scotland are more likely to save mainly for the short term, at the 10% significance level, 
with a coefficient of 0.319.
For homeowners, each regional effect is consistent over the four waves in that no 
hypothesis of time consistency is rejected. On other hand, for pension participants, one 
exception occurs in the case of residents in Greater Manchester; the hypothesis of time 
consistency is rejected at the 5% significance level, and this shows that such an effect is 
not consistent over time, and confirms that this regional effect in wave 13 is distinct.
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Table 5.8: SUR model - Homeowners
W a v e  10 W a v e  11 W a v e  12 W a v e  13
Independent Variables Mean Coef. Std Dev. Mean Coef. Std Dev. Mean Coef Std Dev. Mean Coef Std Dev.
Permanent income 35600.93 -6.42e-06*** 2.05e-06 36145.65 -5.87e-06*** 2.14e-06 36939.65 -3.88e-06* 2.05e-06 37355.59 -3.50e-06** 1.53e-06
Financial situation
Good 0.821 -0.216** 0.088 0.861 -0.175* 0.098 0.873 -0.092 0.099 0.897 -0.157 0.108
Bad 0.016 -0.162 0.250 0.017 -0.142 0.293 0.013 -0.239 0.275 0.012 0.168 0.326
Financial expectation
Better-off 0.348 -0.044 0.066 0.314 -0.019 0.066 0.284 -0.013 0.066 0.289 0.111 0.069
Worse-off 0.082 0.059 0.117 0.080 0.019 0.110 0.078 -0.033 0.110 0.065 0.169 0.121
Financial realisation
Better-off than last year 0.397 -0.036 0.066 0.423 0.084 0.063 0.364 -0.029 0.065 0.360 0.004 0.067
Worse-off than last year 0.151 -0.058 0.091 0.133 -0.025 0.097 0.163 -0.046 0.086 0.133 -0.019 0.098
Pension enrolment 0.294 -0.120* 0.068 0.283 -0.067 0.066 0.294 0.023 0.065 0.265 -0.037 0.068
Homeownership - -- - - -- - - -- -- - -- --
Female 0.188 0.347*** 0.094 0.190 0.376*** 0.091 0.184 0.242*** 0.094 0.196 0.372*** 0.091
Age 42.487 -0.036 0.029 42.376 -0.039 0.026 43.026 -0.064** 0.026 43.574 0.026 0.027
Age squared 1899.979 0.0003 0.0003 1890.456 0.0003 0.0003 1951.305 0.001* 0.0003 1999.512 -0.0004 0.0003
Education
Higher than first degree 0.053 -0.263* 0.149 0.065 -0.339** 0.135 0.066 -0.327** 0.131 0.060 -0.386*** 0.139
First degree 0.172 -0.267*** 0.102 0.181 -0.127 0.097 0.177 -0.215** 0.097 0.183 -0.313*** 0.095
Some college 0.353 -0.068 0.079 0.338 -0.170** 0.077 0.360 -0.207*** 0.075 0.349 -0.154** 0.076
A Level 0.127 -0.126 0.099 0.122 -0.043 0.098 0.119 -0.099 0.103 0.122 -0.019 0.099
Married/Cohabiting 0.782 0.020 0.116 0.771 0.099 0.115 0.767 0.017 0.115 0.761 -0.103 0.118
Self-employed 0.115 -0.079 0.118 0.114 0.082 0.112 0.130 -0.093 0.117 0.125 -0.127 0.126
Spouse/partner employed 0.635 0.112 0.088 0.646 0.097 0.086 0.623 0.075 0.087 0.619 0.242*** 0.088
Full-time employed 0.938 0.111 0.135 0.944 0.109 0.137 0.931 0.235* 0.125 0.927 -0.037 0.113
Occupation
Managers & Administrators 0.284 0.367 0.328 0.267 0.217 0.328 0.281 -0.190 0.364 0.278 1.020** 0.513
Professional 0.097 0.246 0.339 0.097 0.351 0.336 0.095 -0.053 0.372 0.091 1.054** 0.521
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Associate professional & Technical 0.127 0.304 0.333 0.128 0.200 0.333 0.126 -0.074 0.369 0.132 0.997* 0.515
Clerical & Secretarial 0.164 0.428 0.331 0.208 0.267 0.328 0.189 -0.058 0.365 0.187 1.118** 0.513
Craft related 0.258 0.593* 0.328 0.233 0.484 0.327 0.232 0.115 0.365 0.228 1.127** 0.512
Personal & Protective services 0.013 0.801** 0.392 0.015 0.836** 0.407 0.015 -0.064 0.419 0.019 1.024* 0.559
Sales 0.046 0.588* 0.343 0.045 0.437 0.345 0.054 -0.151 0.378 0.057 1.078** 0.534
With children 0.399 0.024 0.097 0.419 0.065 0.096 0.415 -0.041 0.094 0.410 0.116 0.098
Household size
1-2 members 0.479 -0.298** 0.150 0.476 -0.110 0.143 0.462 -0.130 0.144 0.473 -0.197 0.140
3-4 members 0.440 -0.130 0.116 0.438 -0.091 0.112 0.454 -0.002 0.111 0.436 -0.274*** 0.106
Region
Greater London 0.055 -0.145 0.144 0.045 -0.254* 0.153 0.047 -.058 0.159 0.041 -0.046 0.160
South West 0.058 0.036 0.143 0.051 -0.120 0.159 0.053 0.101 0.158 0.051 -0.018 0.168
East 0.082 -0.176 0.132 0.069 0.019 0.140 0.069 0.023 0.131 0.070 -0.123 0.140
West Midlands 0.062 0.258* 0.152 0.050 0.328** 0.158 0.047 0.154 0.153 0.043 0.397** 0.163
Greater Manchester 0.030 -0.053 0.184 0.023 -0.095 0.194 0.023 0.109 0.177 0.024 -0.185 0.193
North West 0.046 -0.042 0.169 0.043 0.279* 0.164 0.046 -0.020 0.165 0.046 0.021 0.173
Yorkshire & Humberside 0.066 -0.112 0.137 0.054 -0.009 0.147 0.057 -0.222 0.158 0.060 0.127 0.137
Tyne & Wear 0.046 0.040 0.155 0.043 0.191 0.160 0.040 0.315* 0.175 0.037 -0.080 0.175
Wales 0.174 -0.032 0.106 0.130 0.061 0.116 0.145 -0.004 0.115 0.145 -0.041 0.115
Scotland 0.229 -0.034 0.099 0.178 -0.088 0.107 0.189 -0.025 0.109 0.190 -0.126 0.111
Northern Ireland 0.010 0.331 0.361 0.193 -0.081 0.109 0.161 -0.140 0.114 0.177 -0.090 0.115
(***) At the 1% significance level; (**) at the 5% significance level; (*) at the 10% significance level
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Table 5.9: SUR model - Private pension participants
W a v e  10 W a v e  11 W a v e  12 W a v e  13
Independent Variables Mean Coef. Std Dev. Mean Coef. Std Dev. Mean Coef Std Dev. Mean Coef Std Dev.
Permanent income 35115.630 -4.55e-06 2.91 e-06 36461.810 -4.49e-06 3.24e-06 37049.490 -3.71 e-06 3.27e-06 39946.150 -3.13e-06 2.12e-06
Financial situation
Good 0.815 -0.309** 0.156 0.889 -0.016 0.197 0.869 -0.222 0.176 0.897 -0.239 0.224
Bad 0.011 -0.183 0.637 0.017 -0.484 0.539 0.013 -0.293 0.578 0.017 -0.162 0.520
Financial expectation
Better-off 0.335 0.013 0.115 0.325 -0.200* 0.121 0.299 -0.100 0.125 0.294 0.150 0.138
Worse-off 0.076 0.283 0.229 0.080 0.027 0.206 0.057 -0.172 0.224 0.061 0.136 0.235
Financial realisation
Better-off than last year 0.417 -0.082 0.117 0.445 0.277** 0.122 0.347 -0.072 0.121 0.338 0.166 0.129
Worse-off than last year 0.141 -0.065 0.179 0.137 0.040 0.175 0.172 0.060 0.164 0.157 0.080 0.180
Pension enrolment - - - - - _ - - - - -
Homeownership 0.889 0.041 0.176 0.902 -0.019 0.202 0.926 -0.251 0.211 0.916 0.254 0.224
Female 0.154 0.419** 0.175 0.141 0.235 0.162 0.118 0.032 0.193 0.128 0.549*** 0.210
Age 42.335 -0.028 0.049 42.672 -0.068 0.055 43.306 -0.049 0.048 44.229 -0.037 0.057
Age squared 1889.550 0.0002 0.001 1910.482 0.001 0.001 1978.675 0.0003 0.001 2055.797 0.0003 0.001
Education
Higher than first degree 0.041 -0.377 0.297 0.050 -0.362 0.309 0.042 -0.575** 0.257 0 063 -0.636** 0.275
First degree 0.176 -0.408** 0.179 0.180 -0.234 0.179 0.179 -0.205 0.171 0.182 -0.103 0.188
Some college 0.365 -0.128 0.134 0.353 -0.032 0.141 0.356 -0.565*** 0.133 0.358 -0.158 0.146
A Level 0.102 -0.033 0.181 0.121 0.133 0.178 0.118 -0.219 0.190 0.105 0.088 0.204
Married/Cohabiting 0.780 0.006 0.210 0.781 0.226 0.205 0.810 -0.074 0.212 0.778 -0.218 0.233
Self-employed 0.250 -0.175 0.158 0.247 0.056 0.160 0.262 -0.191 0.153 0.273 -0.230 0.176
Spouse/partner employed 0.648 0.029 0.168 0.642 0.136 0.153 0.635 0.127 0.149 0.623 0.411** 0.173
Full-time employed 0.954 0.269 0.270 0.967 0.595* 0.371 0.948 0.219 0.259 0.956 -0.284 0.271
Occupation
Managers & Administrators 0.298 0.095 0.318 0.299 -0.028 0.464 0.343 0.096 0.441 0.331 0.454 0.530
Professional 0.106 0.309 0.365 0.128 0.357 0.475 0.094 0.515 0.467 0.105 0.668 0.550
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Associate professional & Technical 0.069 -0.037 0.359 0.065
Clerical & Secretarial 0.154 -0.051 0.334 0.184
Craft related 0.244 0.315 0.327 0.213
Personal & Protective services 0.011 0.619 0.664 0.011
Sales 0.087 0.314 0.341 0.078
With children 0.387 -0.067 0.175 0.410
Household size
1 -2 members 0.461 -0.409 0.269 0.477
3-4 members 0.461 -0.141 0.211 0.423
Region
Greater London 0.063 0.151 0.240 0.045
South West 0.080 0.060 0.239 0.065
East 0.096 0.104 0.219 0.089
West Midlands 0.085 0.133 0.243 0.063
Greater Manchester 0.020 -0.219 0.377 0.015
North West 0.044 0.137 0.314 0.039
Yorkshire & Humberside 0.076 -0.187 0.231 0.058
Tyne & Wear 0.044 0.022 0.293 0.041
Wales 0.152 -0.035 0.192 0.124
Scotland 0.170 0.064 0.190 0.139
Northern Ireland 0.009 -0.092 0.663 0.186


























































































































































Table 5.10: Results of test on time-consistency -  At the subgroup level
Homeowners Private pension participants
Independent variable p-value
Chi Square 
statistics p-value Chi Square statistics
Permanent income 0.619 1.78 0.976 0.21
Financial situation
Good 0.825 0.90 0.705 1.40
Bad 0.801 1.00 0.975 0.22
Financial expectation
Better-off 0.376 3.10 0.253 4.08
Worse-off 0.655 1.62 0.543 2.15
Financial realisation
Better-off than last year 0.526 2.23 0.089* 6.51
Worse-off than last year 0.991 0.11 0.941 0.39
Pension enrolment 0.493 2.40 - -
Homeownership - - 0.429 2.76
Female 0.713 1.37 0.267 3.95
Age 0.116 5.91 0.955 0.33
Age squared 0.154 5.26 0.955 0.33
Education
Higher than first degree 0.946 0.37 0.873 0.70
First degree 0.563 2.05 0.693 1.45
Some college 0.629 1.74 0.028** 9.10
A Level 0.864 0.74 0.549 2.11
Married/Cohabiting 0.678 1.52 0.528 2.22
Self-employed 0.583 1.95 0.591 1.91
Spouse/partner employed 0.529 2.22 0.428 2.77
Full-time employed 0.450 2.64 0.234 4.27
Occupation
Managers & Administrators 0.278 3.85 0.917 0.51
Professional 0.385 3.04 0.950 0.35
Associate professional & Technical 0.406 2.91 0.654 1.62
Clerical & Secretarial 0.308 3.60 0.903 0.57
Craft related 0.442 2.69 0.968 0.26
Personal & Protective services 0.299 3.68 0.932 0.44
Sales 0.257 4.05 0.903 0.57
With children 0.698 1.43 0.372 3.13
Household size
1-2 members 0.803 0.99 0.798 1.01
3-4 members 0.349 3.29 0.819 0.93
Residential area
Greater London 0.768 1.14 0.517 2.28
South West 0.790 1.04 0.786 1.06
East 0.639 1.69 0.522 2.25
West Midlands 0.729 1.30 0.880 0.67
Greater Manchester 0.718 1.35 0.043** 8.13
North West 0.490 2.42 0.774 1.11
Yorkshire & Humberside 0.376 3.10 0.516 2.28
Tyne & Wear 0.390 3.01 0.509 2.32
Wales 0.923 0.48 0.876 0.69
Scotland 0.901 0.58 0.241 4.20
Northern Ireland 0.668 1.56 0.823 0.91
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5.4.3 Summary
At the whole sample level, the key findings are as follows. Households that possess 
illiquid assets are more likely to save mainly for the long term and thus less likely to 
save mainly for the short term. This provides evidence for the quasi-hyperbolic 
consumption model. Financial expectations, the proxy indicator for short-term 
aggregate risk, do not impact upon the short-term saving motive, and this shows that 
households do not have stronger short-term saving motives when they are faced with a 
risk of financial shock. Thus this does not support the buffer-stock model. Gender 
difference has a strong effect on short-term saving motives, indicating that females 
appear to have stronger short-term precautionary saving motives than males. This can 
be explained by that, in a household, it is mainly the female(s) who are in charge of 
financial management over a short-term time horizon, and this pattern is enhanced when 
they play the role as the heads of a household. A long-term saving motive is found to be 
more profound amongst households with high educational attainment. Households in 
occupations with volatile income streams are inclined towards saving mainly for the 
short term.
The comparison of the estimation results of the two samples has shown a difference in 
the determinants of the saving motives of homeowners and private pension participants. 
To sum up, a significant relationship between good current financial situation and long­
term saving motive is observed amongst both homeowners and private pension 
participants, and this confirms the enhancing influence that a good current financial 
status has on the long-term saving motive. It is evident in both samples that females still 
have an inclination to save for the short term, even though they own housing wealth or 
have committed themselves to schemes for long-term savings.
Amongst private pension participants, a positive relationship between long-term saving 
and better-off financial expectation is observed; this suggests that those with less short­
term aggregate uncertainty are more likely to save mainly for the long term and less 
likely to save for the short term. However, this is not a robust finding and cannot 
support the precautionary saving behaviour concept.
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Some factors are influential for homeowners but not for private pension participants, 
such as: occupational type, age, estimated permanent income, and household size. The 
effect of pension enrolment is weakly significant on the homeowners’ long-term saving 
motive; conversely, homeownership does not make any difference to pension 
participants’ saving motives across the four waves.
Whilst the previous panel-data estimations obtained a stable effect for a given variable 
on saving motives, the estimations of a SUR model show the changes of the effect over 
time for a given variable, allowing for time consistency to be examined. In this study, 
the hypothesis of time consistency is not rejected either at the whole sample level or in 
the subgroup of homeowners.
By contrast, the occurrence of time inconsistency is observed in the subgroup of private 
pension participants. For this group, these effects are not constant over the four waves 
for the following variables: an improving recent financial experience, college level 
educational attainment, and residents of Greater Manchester, at the 10%, 5%, and 5% 
significance levels, respectively. The previous estimated results of a random-effect 
Probit model shown in indicate a negative coefficient of the college level educational 
attainment at the 1% significance level, and in addition, the results in Table 5.9 
indicated that the coefficients of this variable over the four waves were simultaneously 
of a negative sign, though not necessarily statistically significant. This confirms that the 
influence of this educational level is not ambiguous. By contrast, concerning the 
rejection in the cases of an improving recent financial experience and of living in 
Greater Manchester, this researcher would propose that the significant results in a 
specific wave may relate simply to a chance. The explanations of this are as follows. 
Firstly, the results in Table 5.5 showed that the coefficients of these two factors were 
not significant at the 10% significance level, with one positive coefficient and one 
negative, respectively. Secondly, regarding the ‘improving financial experience’, as 
shown in Table 5.9, the coefficients were negative in sign in waves 10 and 12, and 
positive in waves 11 and 13. Regarding the effect of living in Greater Manchester, the 
coefficients were in negative in sign only in waves 10 and 13, and positive in waves 11 
and 12. This suggests inconsistency in the influences of these factors over time.
161
5.5 CONCLUSION
At the whole sample level, precautionary saving behaviour, from a short-term 
perspective91, is not evident in that financial expectations have no significant influence 
on a change in saving motives. Moreover, many of the findings do not support the 
possibility of such precautionary saving behaviour. Compared with employees, the self- 
employed do not show any inclination to save mainly for the short term, and this is 
opposite to the notion that being more financially vulnerable, they may save more for 
the short term. This can be explained in that the self-employed, as entrepreneurs, have a 
stronger motive for saving than employees, and are always prepared for liquidity needs 
in the short term; on the other hand, as individuals, they are more concerned with life 
after retirement than employees, because their social security welfare benefits are less 
guaranteed. This study found that households with joint income sources are more likely 
to save mainly for the short term; this suggests that these households are more 
concerned with things they need now, or secondly that they are more likely to engage 
themselves in precautionary saving. The second inference is opposite to the prediction 
in the buffer stock model, and the first inference emerges possibly because their 
spouses/partners work as a result of that these households are in need of more income. 
Age effects do not emerge as evident, in that young households are not found to have a 
stronger short-term saving motive, as they are easily confronted with liquidity 
constraints. One exception is that households in occupations with high income 
variability as well as unstable income flow, i.e. the craft related, the personal & 
protective services, and the sales sectors, show an inclination to save mainly for the 
short term, no matter whether they are employees or self-employed. For the subgroups - 
homeowners and private pension participants, precautionary saving behaviour, from a 
short-term perspective, is also not evident. The occupational effects are apparent only 
for homeowners.
A key finding, at the whole sample level, supports the quasi-hyperbolic consumption 
model: homeowners, who are characterised as holding illiquid wealth, are also inclined 
towards saving mainly for the long term and averse to saving mainly for the short term,
91 Whilst some literature suggested that households may accumulate (illiquid) wealth to buffer the risk in 
the long term future (Laibson, 1997; Carroll and Samwick, 1998; Carroll, Dynan, and Krane, 2003), this 
study is not able to directly examine such precautionary saving behaviour from a long-term perspective, 
yet will leave this issue for future investigation.
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when they make discretionary savings. By contrast, private pension participants, who 
are seen as committing themselves to external saving mechanisms to save for retirement, 
do not show evidently different saving preferences to non-pension participants. 
However, at the subgroup level, private pension enrolment does not show any further 
impact on those who also hold housing wealth, and homeownership is not influential on 
those who have paid into a private pension scheme.
At the whole sample level and subgroup level, females have a stronger short-term 
saving motive than males. Moreover, having undertaken higher education has an 
enhancing effect on households’ inclination to save mainly for the long term.
Two estimation approaches have been employed: one is a random-effect ordered Probit 
model on an unbalanced panel dataset, and the other is a SUR model on four cross- 
sectional datasets. Whilst simple cross-sectional estimation is not able to distinguish 
some unspecified effect over several time periods, a SUR model partially solves this 
problem by assuming the four cross-sectional waves are correlated in a single system. 
Moreover, the time consistency of the coefficients of a given independent variable over 
the four waves can be examined, as these coefficients exhibit fluctuations over time. 
The results show that, at the whole sample level, the estimated coefficients of each 
independent variable, in a SUR model, are consistent over the four time periods, and 
this is also the case for homeowners. However, inconsistency occurs amongst the 
pension participants on the effects of: having a better-off recent financial experience, 
having attained a college level of education, and living in the Greater Manchester area. 
The effect of having attained a college level of education was only evident in a specific 
wave (wave 12). However, the significant influences of the other two factors of the 
three mentioned above were possibly the results of chance.
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CHAPTER 6 : SAVING RATIOS, RISK, AND SELF- 
CONTROL PROBLEMS
6.1 INTRODUCTION
In chapter 5, the determinants of households’ saving motives were explored. Being a 
sequential study to chapter 5, this chapter investigates determinants of households’ 
saving ratios from a long-term and from a short-term perspective, respectively. The 
short-term saving ratio of each household is measured as imputed short-term savings to 
permanent income ratio, and long-term saving ratio as imputed long-term savings to 
permanent income ratio. The method of measuring a household’s long-term savings and 
short-term savings has been illustrated in chapter 3. Therefore, the research hypotheses 
addressed in chapter 5 will be examined in this chapter.
Short-term savings represent household’s realised saving acts from a short planning 
horizon and long-term savings for a long planning horizon. As Lusardi (1998) suggested, 
the length of a planning horizon of a financial decision is a result of a consumer’s time 
preference. The quasi-hyperbolic consumption model posits that a saving decision of a 
long planning horizon points towards a low intertemporal time preference, because a 
household act rationally with saving for the long term. By contrast, a short planning 
horizon indicates a high time preference as a household may act in the opposite fashion 
to how it should have acted, owing to its bias towards instant spending.
In this chapter, a new explanatory variable is included, in order to take into account the 
effect of habit in households’ saving ratios. In the BHPS, an individual was asked about 
his/her first reason for saving, and some of them answered ‘no specific reason’; in this 
case, it seems appropriate to see this as a well-established saving habit. In psychology, 
habit implies a tendency towards repetitive and routine behaviour. For instance, Katona 
(1975, 1980) posited that most human behaviour was routine behaviour. Such an effect 
persists because breaking a well-established habit usually involves pain as human nature 
appears to be resistant to changes, i.e. the endowment effect. The savings ‘for no 
specific reason’ exist as a consequence of controlling consumption expenditure below a
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certain level. The control may be primary goal and the saving serves as the outcome, or 
the saving may be the primary goal and the control of expenditure serves as the means 
(Wameryd, 1999). In terms of the behavioural life-cycle model (BLC) (Shefrin and 
Thaler, 1988), continued saving habits of using rules can be a practice of households’ 
internally precommitting themselves to save, in order to meet the long-term goal of 
utility maximisation.
A random-effect Tobit regression model is chosen as the estimation approach. The 
choice of a Tobit regression is dependent on the censoring feature of the saving ratio as 
some observations registered a value at ‘O’. Censoring occurred as the consequence of 
the method that was applied to impute household’s long-term savings and short-term 
savings. Estimation will be applied on the whole sample and two subgroups -  
homeowners and private pension participants.
Section 6.2 reviews the empirical framework of this work. Section 6.3 contains the 
analyses on the estimated coefficients and marginal effects at the whole sample level. 
Section 6.4 carries out similar analyses by contrasting subgroups: private pension 
participants vs. homeowners. The conclusions are addressed in section 6.5.
6.2 REVIEW OF METHODOLOGY
The estimation equation under a random-effect Tobit model is presented as, 
c *
* 7  = « » +  a ,17  + a 2F ‘, + X ' J  + g\Y + v, + e„, e„ ~ IID (0,a2e ) v, ~ //£>(0,<rv2) ,
it
where /denotes each household, and t denotes each waves of waves 10~13.
S  *—y  is a latent variable and denotes either the observed short-term saving ratio or the
^i t
observed long-term saving ratio of each household for a given wave. Note that 
households’ observed saving ratios are measured according to a weighting standard, and 
this has been addressed in chapter 3.
c» n  *
—— = 0  if - 2 - < 0yp yp
1 it 1 it
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Y£ represents the estimated permanent income of each household at a given time, and 
serves as a proxy for the household wealth level. F* denotes each household’s
subjective evaluation of its aggregate risk in the next 1 2  months, reflecting the 
expectation regarding the general economic situation, including inflation and 
unemployment, as well as the expectation of their financial status. X it denotes a vector
of control variables, such as the household’s current financial situation, financial 
realisation compared to one year ago, age, age squared, education dummies, region 
dummies, the household size, with/without children, marital status, self­
employed/employee, owning housing wealth, paying into a private pension, saving for 
any specific reason or not, and fulltime/part-time employment. git denotes the year
dummies, v, denotes the unobserved household effects and is assumed to be randomly 
distributed and independent of the independent variables and the rest of the error term. 
eit is the idiosyncratic error term. The estimated coefficients are taken as the value of 
the maximum of a log-likelihood function.
The reported coefficients of the Tobit model represents, if statistically significant, are 
only a latent scale and the direction of influences. The impacts of a given independent 
variable on saving ratio comprise two factors: one is on the possibility that households 
have a positive saving ratio and the other is on the change in saving ratio, provided that 
the households have already been making savings (McDonald and Moffitt, 1980). 
Accordingly, the relative magnitudes of two sub-effects can be measured as follows: 
one is the change in saving ratio conditional upon their being positive, weighted by the 
probability of being above the limit, and the other is the change in the probability of 
their being a positive saving ratio weighted by the expected mean saving ratio
09conditional on their being positive. This can be illustrated in the equation below ,
= Pr<4 v„ > 0]^ >  >0] + 4 y „  I > 0 ] a P r ° ^ > 0 1
8x„ 8x„ 8x„
92 This equation confirms that a change in x t has two effects: it affects the conditional mean of y t in the
positive part of the distribution, and it affects the probability that the observation will fall in that part of 
the distribution. The relative magnitudes of these two quantities are an important indicator with economic 
implication. (McDonald and Moffitt, 1980)
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When the two marginal sub-effects (elasticity) of each independent variable are reported, 
the relative magnitudes will be exhibited only upon the condition that the estimated 
marginal effects are significant at the 1 0 % significance level.
6.3 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS -  AT THE 
WHOLE SAMPLE LEVEL
Table 6.2 reports the estimated coefficients at the whole sample level. The bottom of the 
table shows the numbers of censored and uncensored observations. The rho ( p ) value 
indicates the percentage of the measurement error that is captured by the random-effect 
error term, which denotes the time-invariant unobserved household heterogeneity. It is 
0.4 in the case of the short-term saving ratio and 0.488 in the case of the long-term 
saving ratio; they are considerably high values, and confirm the efficacy of applying a 
random-effect estimation approach.
Two types of estimated marginal effects are shown in Table 6.3: effects on the change 
in possibility of households having positive savings and effects on changes in saving 
ratio provided that households have already been saving. At the bottom of Table 6.3, the 
estimated probability of households having savings and estimated mean of saving ratio, 
conditional upon positive observations, are reported respectively, for the cases of the 
short-term saving and the long-term saving ratios. Accordingly, Table 6.4 exhibits, for 
the total marginal effects, the relative magnitudes of the two effects, if they previously 
emerged as statistically significant at the 1 0 % significance level.
6.3.1 Short-term saving ratio
The estimated coefficients of a better-off financial expectation and of a worse-off 
financial expectation are -0.001 and 0.004. This shows that households who expect less 
short-term uncertainty could save less for the short term and those who expect higher 
uncertainty could tend to save more. However, owing to the two coefficients being 
statistically insignificant at the 1 0 % significance level, the association between 
household’s subjectively-perceived risk and its short-term saving ratio does not hold.
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By contrast, Guariglia (2001), who used datasets of wave 6 - 8  in the BHPS, found that 
households who expected their financial situation to be worse-off saved more. This 
disparity can be attributed to two features of the study. One is that, in Guariglia (2001), 
savings only considered mixed amounts for long-term purposes and those for short­
term/precautionary motives, ignoring heterogeneity arising from saving decisions for 
different planning horizons, i.e. time preference. The other point comes from the time 
period when the survey was carried out, considering years prior to those of this study, 
and bias may have arisen if British households’ behaviours have been changing 
considerably .
The estimated results show that current financial situations are not associated with 
short-term saving ratios, whereas a better-off financial situation, in comparison with the 
previous year, is. Households that perceive themselves to be financially better off than 
last year, tend to save more for the short term at the 1 % significance level; on the other 
hand, those perceiving themselves to be worse off financially than last year, do not 
show evident change in the variation in short-term saving ratio at the 1 0 % significant 
level. Table 6.3 shows that the estimated marginal effects of better-off financial 
realisation are strongly significant, not only on the increase in probability of households 
having positive short-term saving ratio, but also on the increase in households’ short­
term saving ratio, if they have already been making saving. Table 6.4 confirms the 
relative magnitudes of the two effects: the former takes up 77.83% and the latter 
22.17%. The magnitudes of the latter effect -  22.17% - is obtain by:
probability that an observation is uncensored, namely, the ratio of uncensored 
observations to total observations; 0.006 is the aggregate marginal effect, i.e. the 
estimated coefficient (slope). Therefore, the magnitude of the former effect is 77.83% 
(1-22.17% ).
* 1 0 0 % , where 0 . 0 0 2  is the estimated marginal effect on the
0.006
increase in households’ short-term saving
93 Long-term savings ratio is not associated with financial expectations either, which will be mentioned 
later.
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A well-established habit can have an impact on a household’s saving behaviour, and 
this is especially so in the domain of Behavioural Economics (Katona, 1980). A 
continued habit suggests an endowment effect, which features as resistance to changes 
in human nature. As discussed previously, the formation of saving habits takes place so 
as to control consumption expenditure below a certain level (Wameryd, 1999). 
Moreover, it plays the role as a rule of thumb of precommitments (Shefrin and Thaler, 
1988). Being aware of the difficulties in capturing such effect with a single proxy 
indicator, ‘saving for no specific reason94’ was chosen for this study from a list of first 
reasons for saving surveyed for each individual as the habit effect9 5  (Wameryd, 1999). 
Table 6.1 gives the cross-tabulated results of the percentages of mainly habit-driven 
observations, by saving motives. It is seen that the percentage of observations that save 
for no specific reason is the lowest (33.9%) amongst the groups who save mainly for the 
short term, whereas the percentage of those who save mainly for the long term (46.5%) 
is close to that of those who save for both equally (46.6%). These results indicate the 
possibility that households engaging in long-term savings are more likely to save due to 
a habit effect in the first place.
Table 6.1: Percentages of first reason for saving - no specific reason and with specific reason - by 
three saving motives_____________________________________________________________________








Mainly short term 742 33.9% 1445 66.1% 2187
Both equally 891 46.6% 1020 53.4% 1911
Mainly long term 1442 46.5% 1657 53.5% 3099
Total observations 3075 42.7% 4122 57.3% 7197
The estimated results here show that a significant association between the habit 
indicator and short-term saving ratio emerges. Households who make savings on the 
basis of a habit in the first place, tend to save less for the short term at the 1 % 
significance level, with a coefficient of -0.018. Estimated marginal effects of habit 
appear strongly evident both on the decrease in possibility of households having a short-
94 Savers were also asked about their first reason for saving, and the reasons covered ‘holidays’, ‘old age’, 
‘car’, ‘children’, ‘house purchases’, ‘home improvement’, ‘household bills’, ‘special events’, ‘no specific 
reason’, ‘share schemes’, ‘own education’, ‘grandchild’, and ‘other’. Saving for no specific reason may 
pick up idea of saving for peace of mind (Horika and Watanabe, 1997) or saving for “saving per se”, 
which can arguably emerge as a form of habit.
95 Guariglia (2001) considered savings for no specific reason to be precautionary savings.
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term saving ratio and on the decrease in short-term saving ratio if these households have 
already been making saving. Table 6.4 confirms that, of the total marginal effect, the 
former effect takes up 74.13% and the latter 25.87%. The results mentioned above 
suggest that households, who practice a routine to control consumption expenditure, 
save less and are less likely to save mainly for the short term96. This can be explained 
by the quasi-hyperbolic consumption model, in that these households are largely 
impatient with short-term saving and prefer instant gratification, if they do not have 
particular goals to meet. Moreover, mental accounting offers an explanation: in the 
short-term, savings for specific purposes are allocated into accounts with a lower 
propensity to consume, whereas savings as a result of routine, in particular as they serve 
as secondary outcome of controlling expenditure, are placed in an account with higher 
propensity to consume. And this leads to a lower short-term saving ratio.
Homeownership operates as a proxy for possession of illiquid wealth. The estimates 
show that homeowners tend to save less for the short term than non-homeowners, at the 
1% significance level, with a coefficient of -0.009. Estimates of the marginal effects 
shown in Table 6.3, confirm that homeowners not only are disinclined to save for the 
short term, with an estimate of -0.044, but also save less if they have already been 
saving, with an estimate of -0.004. Table 6.4 exhibits the relative magnitudes with 
70.44% for the former effect and 29.56% for the latter. On the other hand, the effect of 
paying into private pension schemes is not statistically significant on a household’s 
short-term saving ratio.
In general, homeowners are usually less liquidity-constrained than their counterparts in 
the sense that housing wealth can generate collateralised liquidity when needed; thus, 
housing wealth can serve as savings to defend against negative financial shocks. Carroll, 
Dynan, and Krane (2003)97 suggested that households with a hyperbolic discount 
function tend to accumulate illiquid assets, such as housing wealth, to buffer income 
risk in the long run. However, this does not explain why households’ engagement in 
housing wealth lowers their holdings of ‘short-term ' discretionary savings. Because
96 Results also show that savers who are driven mainly by habit effect have indifferent long-term savings 
ratio from those who are motivated by specific purposes of savings.
97 Carroll, Dynan and Krane (2003) not only provided a empirical finding that broke through presumed 
theoretical association between income risk and liquid financial, but also inclined to bring out the 
possibility that illiquid wealth can be a driving power of precautionary saving.
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liquidating housing wealth would have a monetary cost and some waiting time before 
the liquidity comes through, it would be expected that rational homeowners would also 
make sufficient savings for the short term to buffer against income variation in the near 
future. I would propose that the hyperbolic discount function offers an explanation for 
why homeowners do not behave rationally. Households with a hyperbolic discount 
function have a preference for illiquid wealth over liquid wealth, and a preference for 
saving for the long term over that for the short term. Owing to an awareness of self- 
control problems, they accumulate wealth in illiquid forms for the long-term future in 
order to prevent themselves from splurging out, in that they have a high marginal 
propensity to consume out of short-term savings, particularly as short-term savings are 
primarily in liquid forms. These households also favour illiquid wealth because it will 
generate investment income in the future.
Self-employed households are considered to be more financially vulnerable than 
employee households. The results show a strong correlation between short-term saving 
ratio and self-employment status, illustrating that the self-employed households tend to 
save more for the short term than employee household at the 1 % significance level, with 
a coefficient of 0.021. Thus, it appears that precautionary saving behaviour is evident 
amongst the self-employed. As shown in Table 6.3, the marginal effects are both 
strongly significant on the increase in probability of households’ having positive short­
term savings and on the increase in households’ short-term saving ratio if the 
households have already been making short-term savings, with estimates of 0.096 and
0.009, respectively. Table 6.4 confirms that the weight of the former effect (71.49%) is 
greater than that of the latter (28.51%).
Accepting that occupational differences reveal discrepancies, in the terms of degree of 
income volatility, welfare coverage, and employment vulnerability, measuring the 
correlation between occupations and the short-term saving ratio becomes essential. It is 
generally observed that, compared with those in the ‘plants & machine operatives’ 
sector, households of the ‘craft related’, ‘personal & protective service’, and ‘sales’ 
occupations with higher income variability tend to save more for the short term at the 
5% or 1% significance level, with coefficients of 0.030, 0.028, and 0.032, respectively. 
This can be explained by these occupations having a high income variance relative to 
‘plant & machine operatives’ (see Table 5.1) as well as unstable income flow.
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Households in ‘managers & administrators’, ‘professional’, ‘associate professional & 
technical’, and ‘clerical & secretarial’ categories, tend to save more for the short term 
than those in the ‘plant and machine operatives’ sector at the 5% or 10% significance 
level, with coefficients of 0.023, 0.021, 0.021, and 0.020 respectively. This suggests that: 
1 ) as every occupation group has higher income variance than the ‘plant & machine 
operative’ sector, households of all occupation group tend to save more for the short 
term, in order to buffer income variations in the short run; 2 ) meanwhile, such tendency 
is lessened amongst those groups with also higher average income than the ‘plant and 
machine operative’ sector, such as the ‘managers & administrators’, ‘professional’, and 
‘clerical & secretarial’ categories. As exhibited in Table 6.3, the marginal effects on the 
increase in possibility of positive short-term savings emerge more statistically 
significant than those on the increase in short-term saving ratio, if the households have 
already been making savings, in the occupations ‘associate professional & technical’, 
‘craft related’, and ‘sales’. Given that both effects are generally evident, Table 6.4 
confirms that the magnitudes of the former effects range between 68.33% and 71.49%, 
and those of latter group vary between 28.51% and 31.67%.
It is only weakly significant that households with full-time jobs tend to save more for 
the short term than those with part-time work, with a coefficient of 0.007. The marginal 
effect of full-time employment is only weakly significant on an increase in the saving 
ratio, with an estimate of 0.003, if these workers have already been making savings for 
the short term.
The findings in the first stage indicated that females are more likely to save mainly for 
the short term. The estimates here, however, show that the effect of gender difference 
on the short-term saving ratio is not statistically significant.
Being a key indicator of one’s socioeconomic identification, one’s educational 
attainment is considered to be an important factor that has an influence on one’s saving 
behaviour. For instance, highly-educated people can behave more prudently. The 
findings show that the households with a first degree or a postgraduate degree, tend to 
save less than their counterparts at the 5% or 1% significance levels, with coefficients of 
-0.010 and -0.022, respectively. In Table 6.3, results show that highly-educated 
households, not only are disinclined to save for the short term, but also save less if they
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have already been saving for the short term. As mentioned in chapter 5, this can be 
explained by highly educated people being more likely to have a job with a better 
financial prospect and welfare coverage. Moreover, the effects of having a postgraduate 
degree, with estimates of -0.106 and -0.009, are more compelling than those for a first 
degree, with estimates of -0.047 and -0.004. Table 6.4 shows that, in general, the effects 
on households’ having a positive short-term saving ratio come out of greater magnitude 
than those on adjustments to their short-term saving ratio.
Permanent income serves as a proxy for a household’s wealth level. According to 
Milton Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis, permanent income is determined by a 
consumer's assets: physical (shares, bonds, property) and human (education and 
experience). These identify his/her ability to earn income. The estimated results show 
that the households with higher wealth levels tend to save less for the short term at the 
1% significance level, with a coefficient of -4.31e-07, and this could be because they 
have enough wealth stock to manage financial uncertainty in the short run. The marginal 
effects of permanent income on the decrease in the probability of households’ having 
positive short-term savings and those on the decrease in households’ short-term saving 
ratio, if the households have already been saving, are strongly significant, with 
estimates of -2.07e-06 and -1.81e-07, respectively. Table 6.4 shows that, of the total 
marginal effects, the effect on decrease in possibility covers 72.07%, and the effect on 
the drop in short-term saving ratio is 27.93%.
Age effects, indicated by the variable ‘age’ and ‘ age2 ’, are statistically significant, with 
coefficients of -0.003 and 0.00003 respectively. The results exhibit a U shape, showing 
a nonlinear relationship of saving ratio when plotted against the working life cycle98. 
This suggests that the young cohorts save more for short term, because they are most 
likely to be liquidity constrained, and the cohorts close to retirement save more, as they 
expect a drop in their income. Given that the two effects are both significant, the 
marginal effect of age on the change in the probability of households’ having short-term 
saving is of greater magnitude than that on a change in households’ short-term saving 
ratio if they have already made savings.
98 The working life cycle here refers to the life span between age 25 and age 65.
173
The characteristics of a household that emerge as significant in affecting its tendency to 
save for the short term are: first, the households with young dependents (children) tend 
to save less at the 1 % significance level, with a coefficient of -0 .0 1 0 ; second, 
households with a spouse/partner in employment tend to save less, with a coefficient of 
-0.012 at the 1% significance level. The first finding implies that these households have 
limited disposable income to be put away after paying bills and expenses on children, 
whereas the second finding suggests that such households save less for the short term, 
because having a joint income source they are less likely to consider short-term income 
uncertainty as a huge impact. It is also found that households with fewer members tend 
to save less for the short term. Table 6.3 confirms that the marginal effects of the above 
variables on the decrease in probability of households’ having short-term savings and 
those on the decrease in short-term saving ratio, if the households have already made 
savings, are evident. Table 6.4 shows that the magnitudes of the former effects, i.e. 
73.39%, 72.29%, 73.39%, and 74.42% respectively, are higher than those of the latter 
effects.
Residential area captures geographic effects. The estimates show that residents in the 
West Midlands, Tyne & Wear, Greater Manchester, and Wales tend to save more for the 
short term than those in other areas at the 5% or 1% significance levels, with 
coefficients of 0.019, 0.024, 0.018, and 0.011 respectively. As shown in Table 6.4, the 
marginal effects on the change in probability of households’ having positive short-term 
savings are, in general, greater in magnitude than those on the change in short-term 
saving ratio, if the households have already made savings for the short term.
6.3.2 Long-term saving ratio
The coefficients for subjectively perceived short-term uncertainty are not evident at the 
1 0 % significance level, and this confirms that households’ long-term saving ratio is not 
influenced by financial uncertainty in the short term.
The results show that households that consider this year’s financial situation to be better 
than last year tend to save more for the long term at the 1 % significance level, with a 
coefficient of 0.008. In addition, those who think they are currently ‘living comfortably’ 
or ‘doing alright’, tend to save more for the long term at the 1 % significance level, with
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a coefficient of 0.022. In Table 6.3, the estimated marginal effects generated by the 
better-off financial realisation and good current financial status are all strongly 
significant on the increase in possibility of households having positive long-term 
savings, with estimates of 0.031 and 0.09 respectively, and on the increase in long-term 
saving ratio if households have already been saving, with coefficients of 0.004 and 0.01 
respectively. Table 6.4 reports the relative magnitude of the two effects: 62.35% and 
65.77% for the former effects and 37.65% and 34.23% for the latter.
Regarding a finding in Guariglia (2001) that households who perceived their current 
financial situation to be good tended to save more, the finding here extends this view 
and proposes that households with these circumstances tend to put more money away 
for long-term purposes rather than for the short-term purposes.
Possession of housing wealth does not make a difference in households’ long-term 
saving ratio. By contrast, results show that those who have paid into private pension 
schemes tend to save more for the long term at the 5% significance level, with a 
coefficient of 0.006; this indicates that their having a long-term planning horizon, is also 
reflected in their having higher discretionary savings for the long-term future, than their 
counterparts. This finding suggests that accumulating pension wealth has no substitute 
effect on the building up of discretionary wealth. Katona (1965) stated that social 
security and private pension wealth may increase the desire to save, because being 
closer to one’s goal represents a psychological force that enhances motivation for 
making savings, whereas motivation is weakened when it appears impossible or very 
difficult to reach a goal. Table 6.3 confirms that pension participants are not only 
inclined to save for the long term, but also make more long-term savings than non­
pension participants, if they have already been making saving to this end. As shown in 
Table 6.4, the effect on the increase in possibility of households’ having a long-term 
saving ratio is greater in magnitude than that on the increase in long-term saving ratio,
i.e. 62.35% and 37.65% respectively.
Self-employed households tend to save more for the long term than employee 
households at the 1% significance level, with a coefficient of 0.036. Table 6.3 confirms 
that, compared with employees, the self-employed are not only more likely to save for 
the long term but also have higher long-term saving ratio, with estimates of 0.134 and
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0.018. Table 6.4 further shows that the marginal effect on the increase in possibility of 
the self-employed households’ having long-term savings is larger in scale than that on 
the increase in long-term saving ratio, if they have already been making long-term 
savings, 62.35% and 37.65% respectively.
Negative association between occupation and long-term saving ratio is observed on all 
occupational types at the 5% or 1% significance levels, i.e. compared with those in the 
‘plants and machine operatives’ sector, households of all occupational categories tend to 
save less for the long term. The results show that, compared with those in the *’ those in 
‘craft related’, ‘personal and protective service’, and ‘sales’ occupations tend to save 
less for the long term at the 1% significance level, with coefficients of -0.041, -0.056, 
and -0.046 respectively. Those in the other occupations tend to do so mostly at the 5% 
significance level, with coefficients ranging between -0.026 and -0.032. The estimated 
marginal effects in Table 6.3 report that households in these occupations not only are 
disinclined to make long-term savings, but also have lower savings for long-term 
purposes if they have already been making savings. Table 6.4 shows that the effects on 
the decrease in possibility of households’ having long-term savings are greater in 
magnitude than those on the reduction in long-term saving ratio.
Female households tend to save less for the long term than male households at the 1% 
significance level, with a coefficient of -0.023. In comparison with the finding in 
chapter 5 that female households had a stronger short-term saving motive than male 
households, the result here could have two explanations. Firstly, whilst previously only 
the saving motives of heads of household were taken into account, saving ratio here 
allows for the saving preference of each individual within a household. Secondly, the 
current finding can reinforce the previous estimation on the likelihood in a proposition 
that females’ tendency to save for the short term (disinclination to save for the long term) 
is reflected by possessing lower long-term savings. In general, the findings verify that 
females have a shorter planning horizon when making savings decisions than males, and 
short-term precautionary saving behaviour is more likely to be observed amongst 
females. Table 6.3 suggests that, when compared with males, females are not only are 
averse to saving for the long term, but also make fewer savings for the long term, if 
their households have already been making saving, with estimates of -0.096 and -0.01
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respectively. Table 6.4 shows that the former effect is greater in magnitude than the 
latter.
Households with a first degree or a postgraduate degree tend to save more for the long 
term at the 1 % significance level, and those with a postgraduate degree save more than 
those with a first degree, with coefficients of 0.022 and 0.015 respectively. Highly 
educated households are not only more likely to save for the long term, but also save 
more if they have already been saving. This can be explained by highly educated people 
being more prudent than the lowly-educated. Table 6.4 indicates the effects on the rise 
in possibility of households’ having long-term saving ratio are of greater magnitude 
than those on an increase in households’ long-term saving ratio.
Several indicators for life-cycle factors do not have an impact on the long-term saving 
ratio: age, household size, and permanent income. On the other hand, households that 
have young dependents tend to save less for the long term at the 1 % significance level, 
with a coefficient of -0.017, and this suggests that young dependents take up a 
significant portion of expenditure, so these households have less money to put away. 
Households with joint income sources tend to save more for the long term at the 1% 
significance level, with a coefficient of 0.011. Table 6.4 exhibits that the estimated 
marginal effects of young dependents and joint income are greater on changes in 
possibility of households’ having long-term savings, than on changes in long-term 
saving ratio.
The estimates indicate that households living in the Greater London, East, Scotland, and 
North Ireland regions, tend to save more for the long term at the 5% or at the 10% 
significance level, with coefficients of 0.016, 0 .0 2 0 , 0 .0 1 0 , and 0.016 respectively, and 
households living in the West Midland, tend to save less at the 10% significance level, 
with a coefficient of 0.013. Table 6.3 confirms the existence of geographical effects not 
only on the change in the possibility of households having positive long-term savings, 
but also on the change in long-term saving ratio, if they have already been making 
savings to this end. Table 6.4 shows that the effects on the change in the possibility of 
positive long-term savings are greater than those on the change in the long-term saving 
ratio.
177
Table 6.2: Random effect Tobit estimates of saving ratio - At whole sample level
Short-term  saving ratio Long-term saving ratio
Independent Variables Mean Coef. Std Dev. Coef. Std Dev.
C onstant 0 .1 1 8 * * * 0 .027 0 .0 0 9 0 .0 3 0
Perm anent incom e 34874 .81 -4 .3 1 e -0 7 * * *  8 .4 3 e-0 8 7 .9 6 e-0 8 9 .0 4 e -0 8
Financial expectation
B etter-o ff 0 .323 -0 .001 0 .002 0.003 0 .0 0 2
W o rse -o ff 0 .0 7 4 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 4
Financial situation
G ood 0 .8 4 7 0 .0 0 4 0.003 0 .0 2 2 * * * 0 .0 0 3
Bad 0 .0 1 8 -0 .0 0 2 0 .008 -0 .011 0 .0 0 9
Financial realisation
B etter-o ff 0 .4 0 4 0 .0 0 6 * * * 0 .002 0 .0 0 8 * * * 0 .0 0 2
W o rse -o ff 0 .1 4 4 -0 .0 0 4 0.003 -0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 3
Pension  enrolm ent 0 .2 6 4 -0 .001 0 .003 0 .0 0 6 * * 0 .0 0 3
H om eow nersh ip 0 .8 6 2 -0 .0 0 9 * * * 0 .003 -0.001 0 .0 0 4
F em ale 0 .223 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 4 -0 .0 2 3 * * * 0 .0 0 4
Habit effects 0 .4 2 7 -0 .0 1 8 * * * 0 .002 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 2
A ge 4 2 .2 -0 .0 0 3 * * * 0.001 0 .0 0 0 0.001
A g e  squared 1880.493 0 .0 0 0 0 3 * * 0.00001 1 .12e-06 0 .0 0 0
Education
H igher than first degree 0 .06 -0 .0 2 2 * * * 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 2 2 * * * 0 .0 0 7
First degree 0 .1 7 4 -0 .0 1 0 * * 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 1 5 * * * 0 .0 0 5
Som e co lleg e 0.341 -0 .0 0 5 0 .003 0 .005 0 .0 0 4
A  L evel 0 .1 1 9 -0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 4 0 .002 0 .0 0 5
M  arri ed/C  ohabi ting 0 .733 -0 .0 0 3 0 .0 0 4 0 .008 0 .0 0 5
S elf-em p loyed 0 .1 0 8 0 .0 2 1 * * * 0 .005 0 .0 3 6 * * * 0 .0 0 5
Spouse/partner em ployed 0 .3 9 9 -0 .0 1 2 * * * 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 1 1 * * * 0 .0 0 4
Full-tim e em ployed 0 .925 0 .0 0 7 * 0 .0 0 4 -0 .0 0 7 0 .0 0 5
Occupation
M anagers & A dm inistrators 0 .2 5 7 0 .0 2 3 * * 0.011 -0 .0 2 9 * * 0 .0 1 2
P rofessional 0 .093 0 .0 2 1 * 0 .012 -0 .0 2 6 * * 0 .0 1 2
A ssoc ia te  profession al & T echnical 0 .1 3 7 0 .0 2 1 * 0.011 -0 .0 3 0 * * 0 .0 1 2
C lerical & Secretarial 0 .1 8 6 0 .0 2 0 * 0.011 -0 .0 3 2 * * * 0 .0 1 2
Craft related 0 .2 4 5 0 .0 3 0 * * * 0.011 -0 .0 4 1 * * * 0 .0 1 2
Personal &  P rotective serv ices 0 .0 2 3 0 .0 2 8 * * 0 .013 -0 .0 5 6 * * * 0 .0 1 4
Sales 0 .0 4 8 0 .0 3 2 * * * 0 .0 1 2 -0 .0 4 6 * * * 0 .0 1 3
W ith children 0 .4 0 6 -0 .0 1 0 * * * 0 .0 0 4 -0 .0 1 7 * * * 0 .0 0 4
Household size
1 -2 m em bers 0 .4 8 8 -0 .0 2 0 * * * 0 .0 0 6 0.001 0 .0 0 6
3 -4  m em bers 0 .43 -0 .0 1 3 * * * 0 .0 0 4 0 .005 0 .0 0 5
Residential area
Greater L ondon 0 .0 5 2 -0 .001 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 1 6 * * 0 .0 0 7
South W est 0 .0 5 4 0 .005 0 .0 0 6 0.011 0 .0 0 7
East 0 .0 7 8 -0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 2 0 * * * 0 .0 0 6
W est M idlands 0 .05 0 .0 1 9 * * * 0 .0 0 6 -0 .0 1 3 * 0 .0 0 8
Greater M anchester 0 .0 2 4 0 .0 1 8 * * 0 .0 0 9 0 .0 0 9 0 .0 1 0
North W est 0 .0 4 4 0 .0 0 8 0 .0 0 7 -0 .0 0 7 0 .0 0 8
Y orkshire & H um berside 0 .0 5 9 0 .0 0 7 0 .0 0 6 0 .003 0 .0 0 7
T yne & W ear 0.041 0 .0 2 4 * * * 0 .0 0 7 -0 .0 0 9 0 .0 0 8
W ales 0 .1 3 9 0 .0 1 1 * * 0 .005 0 .005 0 .0 0 6
Scotland 0 .195 0.001 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 1 0 * * 0 .0 0 5
Northern Ireland 0 .1 3 4 0 .0 0 6 0 .005 0 .0 1 6 * * * 0 .0 0 6
Year dummy
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1 99 9 -2 0 0 0 -0 .0 1 0 * * * 0 .0 0 3 0 .004* 0 .0 0 3
2 0 00-2001 -0 .0 0 8 * * * 0 .0 0 2 0 .003 0 .0 0 3
2 0 0 1 -2 0 0 2 -0 .0 0 8 * * * 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 8 * * * 0 .0 0 3
/ s ig m a v 0 .0 5 1 * * * 0.001 0 .0 6 4 * * * 0.001
/s igm a  e 0 .0 6 2 * * * 0.001 0 .0 6 5 * * * 0.001
L R  C hi2 (4 5 ) 3 3 0 .4 6 43 2 .8 3
Prob >  C hi2 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0
R ho ( P  ) value 0 .4 0 0 0 .0 1 7 0 .488 0 .0 1 5
O bservation Sum m ary
C ensored  observations 2 4 1 0 1777
U ncensored  observations 4 7 8 7 5420
(* * * ) At the 1% sign ifican ce  leve l; (* * ) at the 5%  sign ifican ce  level; (* ) at the 10% sign ifican ce  level
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Table 6.3: Marginal effect estimates -  At whole sample level
Short-term saving ratio Long-term saving ratio
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99 y  denotes the dependent variable.
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1 -2 members -0.020*** -0.094***
3-4 members -0.013*** -0.061***
Occupation
Managers & Administrators 0.023** 0.109**
Professional 0.021* 0.097*
Associate professional & Technical 0.021* 0.099**
Clerical & Secretarial 0.020* 0.096*
Craft related 0.030*** 0.139***
Personal & Protective services 0.028** 0.128**
Sales 0.032*** 0.143***
With children -0.010*** -0.049***
Residential area
Greater London -0.001 -0.003
South West 0.005 0.025
East -0.002 -0.009
West Midlands 0.019*** 0.09***
Greater Manchester 0.018** 0.082**
North West 0.008 0.037
Yorkshire & Humberside 0.007 0.032
Tyne & Wear 0.024*** 0.11***
Wales 0.011** 0.054**
Scotland 0.001 0.006





Estimated probability of saving ratio being positive 0.598
Estimated mean conditional upon saving ratio being positive
(***) At the 1% significance level; (**) at the 5% significance level; (*) at the 10% significance level
-0.008***
-0.005***
0 .0 1 **
0.009*
































































































Table 6.4: Relative magnitude estim ates o f marginal effect -  At whole sample level
Short-term  saving ratio
Independent Variables Prob(y>0) Change o f y  above zero
L ong-term  saving ratio
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24.94% 62 .35% 37 .65%
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6.3.3 Summary
In general, contrasting the estimation results of the two types of saving ratio brings the 
conclusion that determinants of households’ savings from a short planning horizon and 
those from a long planning horizon should be examined separately, because some 
differences do exist.
Short-term financial expectations do not affect either the short-term saving ratio or long­
term saving ratio, and this finding implies that precautionary saving effect from a short­
term perspective is not significant at the 1 0 % significance level in terms of the 
relationship between the short-term saving ratio and subjectively-perceived risk. 
Households with this year’s financial situation better than last year tend to save more 
for both the long term and the short term. Households whose savings are mainly driven 
by habit, tend to have a lower short-term saving ratio than those with a specific reason 
for saving, whereas habit effect is not evident on households’ long-term saving ratios. 
These findings support the behavioural models in that, firstly, hyperbolic consumers, 
when having no specific purposes for saving, are too impatient to control expenditure 
for the short term, but are able to manage this goal for the long term; secondly, 
households, who exercise mental accounting, may allocate savings for specific reasons 
into accounts with a lower propensity to consume.
Homeowners’ average short-term saving ratio is lower than that of their counterparts, 
and this suggests a robust connection between short-term discretionary saving and 
housing wealth. Two explanations can be offered: firstly, housing wealth provides 
implicit liquidity, so households feel it less necessary to put away money for the short 
term; secondly, this demonstrates hyperbolic discounting behaviour in which these 
households tend to possess short-term savings at lower levels and meanwhile engage in 
illiquid housing wealth. Moreover, homeownership does not affect households’ long­
term saving ratio, and this supports the preceding point, in that households are too 
impatient to have short-term savings, but are still rational so as to manage long-term 
discretionary savings. Pension enrolment only has an impact on increasing a 
household’s long-term saving ratio. This indicates that there is no evident substitute 
effect of pension wealth in the accumulation of financial wealth for long-term purposes.
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In addition, this confirms that pension participants exhibit a longer planning horizon for 
savings decisions than their counterparts.
Precautionary saving behaviour may be evident in self-employed households or 
households in certain occupations. Self-employed households tend to save more for 
both the long term and the short term than employee households. This verifies that the 
self-employed households have more discretionary savings, which is in line with the 
notion that the self-employed should save more money in liquid financial assets than 
employees, owing to the higher degree of financial vulnerability. Households in the 
‘sales’, ‘personal & protective services’, and ‘craft related’ occupations, tend to save 
more for the short term and less for the long term, than households in other occupations. 
These occupations are considered to generate instable income flow; thus, the findings 
suggest that the households with these jobs have a higher concern with their short-term 
future, than the long-term, and this can demonstrate a precautionary motive.
Socioeconomic factors demonstrate significant impacts on saving ratio. Female 
households tend to save less for the long term than male households, whilst gender 
plays no part in differences in households’ short-term saving ratio. Highly educated 
households tend to save less for the short term and save more for the long term. This 
suggests that they have a longer horizon savings plan than their counterparts. It is found 
that as its wealth level increases, the short-term saving ratio of a household decreases. It 
is shown that many life-cycle factors are more influential on households’ short-term 
saving behaviour than on their long-term saving behaviour. Age and household size 
affect only households’ short-term saving ratio. Factors like having young dependents 
and joint incomes, affect both long-term and short-term saving ratios.
In most cases, the corresponding estimated marginal effects on the changes in the 
possibility of households having a positive saving ratio and those on the changes in 
saving ratio, if households have already been making saving are evident. In addition, of 
the total marginal effects, the effects on the possibility of households’ having a positive 
saving ratio are greater than those on adjustments to households’ saving ratios, if  they 
have already been saving.
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6.4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS - AT THE SUB­
SAMPLE LEVEL
The estimated results of the two subgroups will be discussed: private pension 
participants and homeowners. Private pension enrolment captures the commitment to 
saving for retirement, and possession of homeownership portrays illiquidity and 
potential investment benefits in the long run. Both of them are considered as external 
saving commitments, but the difference is that housing wealth can generate 
collateralised liquidity whereas pension wealth does not.
6.4.1 Short-term saving ratio
As shown in Table 6.5, the estimated rho ( p ) value of the pension participants group is 
0.352, and 0.398 for the homeowners group, indicating that 35.2% of variations in 
pension participants’ short-term saving ratio is attributed to unobserved household 
characteristics, and 39.8% for homeowners.
In both the pension participants group and the homeowners group, those who expect 
less short-term uncertainty -  financially better off next year -  could save less for the 
short term, according to the coefficients, which are -0.006 and -0 . 0 0 1  respectively. 
Those who expect higher uncertainty -  financially worse off next year -  could save 
more, with coefficients 0.007 and 0.005 respectively. However, these coefficients are 
not different to zero at the 1 0 % significance level, thus the relationships between 
financial expectations and short-term saving ratio do not hold. This means that 
precautionary saving effect cannot be found.
On the other hand, households who perceive themselves to be financially better off this 
year than last year tend to save more for the short term at the 1 0 % significance level for 
both groups, with coefficients of 0.008 and 0.004, respectively. The estimated marginal 
effects of better-off financial realisation on a rise in the possibility of households having 
positive short-term savings and on an increase in short-term saving ratio, if the 
households have already been making savings for the short term, are significant at the 
10% significance level. As shown in Table 6.7, the effect in the former case is of greater 
magnitude than in the latter one.
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Only homeowners in a bad current financial situation tend to save less for the short term 
at the 10% significance level, with a coefficient of -0.016. The estimated marginal 
effects reported are only weakly significant, and the relative magnitude of the effect on 
a decrease in the possibility of households having short-term savings, shown in Table 
6.7, appears greater than that of the effect on a decrease in the short-term saving ratio.
Households that save primarily for no specific reason tend to save less for the short term 
at the 1 % significance level in both groups, with the coefficient of -0 . 0 2 1  for pension 
participants larger than that of -0.016 for homeowners. These show that both pension 
participants and homeowners, who mainly practice routine saving, save less for the 
short term, than those who save for specific purposes. These results are consistent with 
the findings at the whole sample level, and similarly, the implications of the behavioural 
models are provided as explanations. Table 6 . 6  exhibits that these households not only 
are disinclined to save for the short term but also save less if they have already been 
making savings. Table 6.7 confirms that, of the marginal habit effect, the effect in the 
former case is of greater magnitude than in the latter.
In both groups, the self-employed households tend to save more for the short term at the 
1 % significance level, with coefficients of 0.028 for pension participants and 0 . 0 2 1  for 
homeowners. This indicates that even though they have owned collateralised liquidity 
or they have been saving for retirement, the self-employed still save more for the short 
term than employees. This is a result which favours precautionary saving behaviour. As 
shown in Table 6 .6 , the marginal effects of self-employment on a rise in the possibility 
of having positive short-term savings and on an increase in the short-term saving ratio 
are all robust in both groups, and the effects on pension participants are more profound 
than those on homeowners. Table 6.7 further shows that the magnitudes of the effects in 
the former case are generally greater than in the latter.
Occupational effects appear more comprehensive on the homeowners’ short-term 
saving ratio than on that of pension participants. Pension participants in the ‘craft 
related’ sector tend to save more for the short term at the 5% significance level, and 
those in the ‘personal & protective services’ sector tend to save more at the 1 0 % 
significance level, with coefficients of 0.036 and 0.045 respectively. Homeowners in all
187
occupation groups tend to save more for the short term than those in the ‘plants & 
machine operatives’ sector. Moreover, those in ‘craft related’, ‘personal & protective 
services’, and ‘sales’, who have less stable income flow, tend to save more, with 
coefficients of 0.041, 0.042, and 0.042, respectively. Those in ‘managers & 
administrators’, ‘professional’, ‘associate professional & technical’, and clerical & 
secretarial’ occupations, also tend to save more for the short term, with coefficients of 
0.035, 0.032, 0.033, and 0.033, which are lower than the previous groups. Hence the 
findings for both groups confirm that households, who hold housing wealth or pension 
wealth, still save more for the short term if their occupations generate higher income 
volatility. Table 6 . 6  shows that, amongst pension participants, the estimated marginal 
effects of occupations are more evident on the rise in the possibility of households 
having positive short-term savings than on an increase in the short-term saving ratio. By 
contrast, amongst homeowners, the estimated effects of all occupations are strongly 
significant, not only on the rise in possibility of having positive short-term savings but 
also on an increase in the short-term saving ratio. Table 6.7 indicates that the situation 
that, across all occupations and in both groups, the magnitudes of the effects in the 
former case are in general greater than in the latter.
Homeowners in full-time employment tend to save more for the short term at the 10% 
significance level, with a coefficient of 0.008. These two marginal effects are both 
weakly significant, and the effect on an increase in the possibility of households having 
short-term savings appears greater in scale than that on an increase in the short-term 
saving ratio.
Homeownership does not have an impact on pension participants’ short-term saving 
ratio, and nor does pension-enrolment on homeowners’ short-term saving ratio.
The gender effect appears as insignificant on the short-term saving ratio for both groups. 
Higher education is significantly influential on the short-term saving ratio in both 
groups. Pension participants with a postgraduate degree tend to save less at the 1% 
significance level, with a coefficient of -0.046, and homeowners with a postgraduate 
degree or a first degree tend to save less at the 5% significance level, with coefficients 
of -0.020 and -0.009. As displayed in Table 6 .6 , the marginal effects of educational 
attainment on the drop in possibility of households having positive short-term savings
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and on a decrease in households’ short-term saving ratio are significantly robust for 
both groups. Table 6.7 confirms that, concerning these marginal effects, the sizes of 
effects in the former case come out larger than in the latter.
Those with a higher wealth level (permanent income) tend to save less for the short term 
at the 1% significance level, with a coefficient of -3.90e-07 for pension participants and 
-3.96e-07 for homeowners. Amongst both groups, these households are not only 
disinclined to save for the short term, but also save less if  they have already been 
making short-term savings. Table 6.7 shows that the relative magnitudes of the effects 
of wealth level on the decrease in possibility of having positive short-term savings are 
larger than on the decline in the short-term saving ratio.
Life-cycle factors - age, young dependents, household size, and joint income sources - 
are evidently correlated, either positively or negatively, with the short-term saving ratio 
for both groups. Households with fewer family members tend to save less for the short 
term, with coefficients of -0.035 and -0.016 for pension participants and -0.021 and - 
0.014 for homeowners. Those with joint income sources tend to save less at the 5% 
significance level, with a coefficient of -0.017 for pension participants and -0.013 for 
homeowners. Households with young dependents tend to save less at the 5% 
significance level, with coefficients of -0.020 and -0.010 respectively. A non-linear age 
effect across the working life cycle appears as evident in both groups, in particular 
pension participants: households tend to save more for the short term during young age 
and during ages close to retirement. As shown in Table 6 .6 , the estimated marginal 
effects of these life-cycle factors are evident, both on the possibility of households 
having short-term savings and on the changes in short-term savings, if households have 
already been making savings for this purpose. Table 6.7 further confirms that the scales 
in the former cases are greater than in the latter.
Both pension participants and homeowners living in the West Midlands, Greater 
Manchester, Tyne & Wear, and Wales regions, tend to save more for the short term, 
with coefficients of 0.027, 0.038, 0.044, and 0.022 for pension participants and 0.020, 
0.015, 0.025, and 0.010 for homeowners. In addition, pension participants living in 
Yorkshire & Humberside, Scotland, and Northern Ireland tend to save more for the 
short term, with coefficients of 0.023, 0.022, and 0.026. Amongst pension participants,
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the geographical marginal effects of the areas Greater Manchester, Tyne & Wear, 
Yorkshire & Humberside, and Northern Ireland on the increase in the possibility of 
households having positive short-term savings, are more evident than those on the 
increase in the short-term saving ratio. Amongst homeowners, this is also the case for 
those living in the Greater Manchester area. Table 6.7 shows that the magnitudes of 
effects on the changes in the possibility of having positive short-term savings are greater 
than those on the changes in the short-term saving ratio.
6.4.2 Long-term saving ratio
The estimated rho ( p )  value of the pension participants group is 0.452, and 0.516 for 
the homeowners group, showing that a very high proportion -  45.2% and 51.6% 
respectively - of variations in their long-term saving ratio are captured by unobserved 
household characteristics.
Results show that financial expectations do not have an impact on households’ long­
term saving ratio in both groups. By contrast, both pension participants and 
homeowners, with good current financial status, tend to save more for the long term at 
the 1% significance level, with coefficients of 0.026 and 0.021, respectively. Pension 
participants who perceive themselves to be financially worse off this year than last year, 
tend to save less for the long term at the 5% significance level, with a coefficient of - 
0.016; in comparison, homeowners who perceive themselves to be financially worse off, 
tend to save less for the long term at the 1 0 % significance level, with a coefficient of - 
0.006, and those who perceive themselves to be financially better off than last year, tend 
to save more for the long term at the 1% significance level, with a coefficient of 0.007. 
As displayed in Table 6 .6 , these financial marginal effects are both evident on the 
changes in the possibility of households having long-term savings and on adjustments to 
the long-term saving ratio. Table 6.7 exhibits the relative magnitudes of the two effects: 
in general, the effects on the possibility of households having positive long-term savings 
come out in greater size than the effects on the magnitude of the long-term saving ratio.
Pension participants who also own housing wealth tend to save less for the long term at 
the 10% significance level than those who do not, with a coefficient of -0.018. This 
indicates that housing wealth can have a substitute effect on pension participants’ long-
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term discretionary savings, but this correlation is only weakly significant. On the other 
hand, homeowners who are accumulating pension wealth do not tend to save differently 
to their counterparts, in terms of the long-term saving ratio. For pension participants, the 
marginal effect of homeownership appears more evident on the drop in the possibility of 
households having long-term savings than on the decrease in the long-term saving ratio, 
if they have already been making savings for the long term. Table 6.7 reports the 
relative scales of the two effects: 60.8% and 39.2%.
In both groups, self-employed households tend to save more for the long term at the 1% 
significance level than employees, with coefficients of 0.044 for pension participants 
and 0.039 for homeowners. This suggests that self-employed households, even if they 
have held housing wealth or pension wealth, still tend to have a higher discretionary 
long-term saving ratio. Along with the finding that they, the self-employed, also tend to 
save more for the short term, a conclusion emerges: the self-employed save more 
financial discretionary wealth than employees for both long-and short-term planning 
horizons. The estimated marginal effects of self-employment on a rise in the possibility 
of households having long-term savings and those on an increase in the long-term 
saving ratio are strongly evident in both groups. Table 6.7 indicates that the magnitudes 
of the effects in the former case -  60.80% and 58.58% - are greater than those in the 
latter -  39.20% and 41.42%.
Only homeowners in full-time employment tend to save less for the long term at the 5% 
significance level, with a coefficient of -0.011. The marginal effects of full-time 
employment are significant both on a change in the possibility of households having 
positive long-term savings and on a change in the long-term saving ratio. The effects in 
the former case are of a greater magnitude than those in the latter.
In both groups, the effects on the long-term saving ratios are only observed in some 
occupations, but they are more frequently observed for homeowners. Pension 
participants in the ‘personal & protective services’ sector tend to save less for the long 
term at the 10% significance, with a coefficient -0.052. Homeowners in the ‘craft 
related’ and ‘sales’ sectors tend to save less for the long term at the 1 0 % significance 
level, with coefficients of -0.027 and -0.028 respectively, and those in the ‘personal & 
protective services’ tend to save less at the 5% significance level, with a coefficient of -
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0.043. As shown in Table 6 .6 , the marginal effects for the ‘personal & protective 
services’ and ‘sales’ occupations are more significant on a decrease in the long-term 
saving ratio than on a drop in the possibility of households having long-term savings. 
Nevertheless, in general, the magnitudes of effects on the possibility of households 
having positive long-term savings are larger than those of the effects on the long-term 
saving ratio.
Both female pension participants and female homeowners tend to save less for the long 
term that their counterparts (males) at the 1 % significance level, with coefficients -0.028 
and -0.024 respectively. The estimated marginal effects shown in Table 6 . 6  and Table 
6.7 confirm that the effects on a drop in the possibility of households having positive 
long-term savings and those on a decrease in the long-term saving ratio of the two 
groups, come out similar.
The effects of higher education on the long-term saving ratio appear to be more evident 
for homeowners than for pension participants. Pension participants with a first degree or 
a postgraduate degree tend to save more for the long term only at the 1 0 % significance 
level, with coefficients of 0.016 and 0.026 respectively, whereas homeowners that hold 
a first degree or a postgraduate degree tend to save more for the long term at the 5% 
significance level, with coefficients of 0.013 and 0.018 respectively. In most cases, the 
marginal effects of higher education are simultaneously significant on an increase in the 
possibility of households having positive long-term savings and on an increase in the 
long-term saving ratio. The exceptions are the cases of: having a first degree for pension 
participants and that of having a postgraduate degree for homeowners. Table 6.7 shows 
that, in both groups, the effect of having a postgraduate degree is of greater magnitude 
on increasing long-term savings than on an increase in the possibility of households 
having long-term savings. By contrast, the effect of having a first degree works the 
other way around.
Indicators for life-cycle factors show a limited effect on homeowners but no effect on 
pension participants. Homeowners with young dependents tend to save less for the long 
term at the 1% significance level, with a coefficient of -0.015, than those without and 
those with joint income sources tend to save more for the long term at the 1 % 
significance level, with a coefficient of 0.012, than single income households. The
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marginal effects of having ‘young dependents’ and ‘joint income sources’ appear 
evident both on changes in the possibility of households having positive long-term 
savings and on the variations in the long-term saving ratio. Referring to the relative 
magnitudes in Table 6.7, the effect on the decrease in the possibility of households 
having long-term savings appears to be of greater magnitude in the case of having 
‘young dependents’, whereas the effect on an increase in the long-term saving ratio, if 
households have already been making savings for the long term, come out greater in 
size in the case of having ‘joint income sources’.
In both groups, those living in Northern Ireland tend to save more for the long term at 
the 5% significance level, with coefficients of 0.025 for pension participants and 0.016 
for homeowners. In addition, homeowners living in the East area tend to save more for 
the long term at the 1% significance level, with a coefficient of 0.023, and pension 
participants in the Greater Manchester tend to save more for the long term at the 10% 
significance level, with a coefficient of 0.036. Homeowners in the West Midlands tend 
to save less for the short term at the 10% level, with a coefficient of -0.014. The 
marginal effects of living in these residential areas on the changes in possibility of 
households having positive long-term savings and on the changes in long-term saving 
ratio are, by and large, equally significant, but an exception occurs amongst pension 
participants as area Greater Manchester, which only has the effect in the former case at 
the 10% significance level, with an estimate of 0.075. Referring to Table 6.7, for those 
who live in Northern Ireland, they are more likely to increase their long-term saving 
ratio than to have positive long-term savings. Amongst pension participants, a similar 
tendency occurs in Greater Manchester. By contrast, for the people in other residential 
areas, which have shown significant correlation with long-term savings, there is a 
greater impact on the change in the possibility of households having positive long-term 
savings.
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Table 6.5: Random -effect Tobit estim ates on saving ratio -  Pension participants and homeowners
Private Pension participants H om eow ners
Short-term saving ratio Long-term saving ratio Short-term saving ratio Long-term saving ratio
Independent Variables Mean Coef. Std Dev. Coef. Std Dev. Mean Coef. Std Dev. Coef. Std Dev.
Constant 0.150*** 0.058 -0.004 0.067 0.109*** 0.030 -0.008 0.033
Permanent income 37092.2 -3.90e-07*** 1.44e-07 -1.49e-08 1.57e-07 36629.75 -3.96e-07*** 8.49e-08 1.22e-07 9.17e-08
Financial expectation
Better-off 0.32 -0.006 0.005 0.008 0.005 0.312 -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002
Worse-off 0.071 0.007 0.008 -0.004 0.009 0.077 0.005 0.004 0.0001 0.004
Financial situation
Good 0.863 0.005 0.007 0.026*** 0.008 0.861 0.004 0.003 0.021*** 0.004
Bad 0.016 -0.023 0.018 -0.003 0.020 0.015 -0.016* 0.009 -0.003 0.009
Financial realisation
Better-off 0.4 0.008* 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.393 0.004* 0.002 0.007*** 0.002
Worse-off 0.157 -0.004 0.007 -0.016** 0.007 0.148 -0.004 0.003 -0.006* 0.003
Pension enrolment - - - ~ - 0.277 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.003
Homeownership 0.905 0.009 0.009 -0.018* 0.010 - - - - -
Female 0.142 0.012 0.008 -0.028*** 0.010 0.194 0.003 0.004 -0.024*** 0.004
Habit effects 0.437 -0.021*** 0.004 -0.004 0.005 0.434 -0.016*** 0.002 -0.0002 0.002
Age 42.995 -0.006** 0.002 0.002 0.003 42.614 -0.004*** 0.001 0.001 0.001
Age squared 1945.186 0.00005* 0.00003 -0.00001 0.00003 1911.407 0.00003*** 0.00001 -2.76e-06 0.00002
Education
Higher than first degree 0.051 -0.046*** 0.014 0.026* 0.015 0.063 -0.020*** 0.006 0.018** 0.007
First degree 0.185 -0.011 0.008 0.016* 0.010 0.181 -0.009** 0.004 0.013*** 0.005
Some college 0.357 -0.013** 0.006 0.001 0.007 0.347 -0.005 0.003 0.002 0.004
A Level 0.114 -0.007 0.009 -0.011 0.010 0.123 -0.003 0.004 0.0002 0.005
Married/Cohabiting 0.785 -0.002 0.010 0.003 0.011 0.769 -0.002 0.005 0.005 0.005
Self-employed 0.236 0.028*** 0.007 0.044*** 0.008 0.109 0.021*** 0.005 0.039*** 0.005
Spouse/partner employed 0.362 -0.017** 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.369 -0.013*** 0.004 0.012*** 0.004
Full-time employed 0.956 0.009 0.011 -0.017 0.012 0.937 0.008* 0.005 -0.011** 0.005
Occupation
Managers & Administrators 0.309 0.027 0.017 -0.006 0.018 0.274 0.035*** 0.014 -0.015 0.014
Professional 0.108 0.024 0.018 -0.019 0.020 0.095 0.032** 0.014 -0.009 0.015
1 9 4
Associate professional & Technical 0.071 0.022 0.019 -0.011 0.020 0.132 0.033** 0.014 -0.014 0.014
Clerical & Secretarial 0.163 0.013 0.018 -0.005 0.019 0.191 0.033** 0.014 -0.017 0.014
Craft related 0.227 0.036** 0.017 -0.026 0.019 0.238 0.041*** 0.014 -0.027* 0.014
Personal & Protective services 0.013 0.045* 0.026 -0.052* 0.030 0.016 0.042*** 0.016 -0.043** 0.017
Sales 0.086 0.016 0.018 -0.028 0.020 0.047 0.042*** 0.015 -0.028* 0.015
With children 0.41 -0.020** 0.008 -0.011 0.009 0.416 -0.010*** 0.004 -0.015*** 0.004
Household size
1-2 members 0.458 -0.035*** 0.012 0.010 0.014 0.47 -0.021*** 0.006 0.002 0.006
3-4 members 0.447 -0.016* 0.009 0.002 0.010 0.444 -0.014*** 0.004 0.005 0.005
Residential area
Greater London 0.043 0.021 0.014 -0.001 0.016 0.047 0.003 0.007 0.012 0.008
South West 0.065 0.017 0.012 0.008 0.014 0.053 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.008
East 0.099 0.009 0.011 0.017 0.012 0.076 -0.004 0.006 0.023*** 0.007
West Midlands 0.065 0.027** 0.012 -0.014 0.014 0.052 0.020*** 0.007 -0.014* 0.008
Greater Manchester 0.021 0.038** 0.019 0.036* 0.022 0.024 0.015* 0.009 0.014 0.010
North West 0.042 0.022 0.014 0.006 0.016 0.047 0.006 0.007 -0.006 0.008
Yorkshire & Humberside 0.063 0.023* 0.012 0.002 0.014 0.059 0.004 0.007 0.002 0.008
Tyne & Wear 0.038 0.044*** 0.015 -0.021 0.018 0.041 0.025*** 0.007 -0.006 0.009
Wales 0.132 0.022** 0.010 0.005 0.011 0.144 0.010** 0.005 0.006 0.006
Scotland 0.152 0.022** 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.191 0.001 0.005 0.008 0.006
Northern Ireland 0.128 0.026*** 0.010 0.025** 0.011 0.139 0.004 0.005 0.016*** 0.006
Year dummy
1999-2000 -0.016*** 0.006 0.001 0.006 -0.011*** 0.003 0.005* 0.003
2000-2001 -0.015*** 0.006 -0.002 0.006 -0.008*** 0.003 0.002 0.003
2001-2002 -0.012** 0.006 0.010* 0.006 -0.008*** 0.003 0.007*** 0.003
/sigmav 0.052 0.003 0.069 0.003 0.049*** 0.001 0.063 0.002
/sigma e 0.071 0.002 0.076 0.002 0.060*** 0.001 0.061 0.001
LR Chi2 (44) 130.79 145.38 276.04 374.92
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Rho ( p  ) value 0.352 0.038 0.452 0.030 0.398 0.018 0.516 0.016
Observation Summary
Censored observations 695 410 2118 1432
Uncensored observations 1204 1489 4087 4773
(***) at thel% significance level; (**) at the 5% significance level; (*) at the 10% significance level
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Table 6.6: M arginal effect estim ates -  Pension participants and homeowners
Short-term saving ratio Long-term saving ratio
Pension participants Homeowners Pension participants Homeowners
Independent Variables Prob(y>0) Change of y  above zero Prob(y>0)
Change ofy  above 
zero Prob(y>0)
Change o fy  above 
zero Prob(y>0)
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positive




(***) At the 1% significance level; (**) at the 5% significance level; (*) at the 10% significance level
0.016** -0.019 -0.003 -0.062 -0.007
0.015** -0.069 -0.009 -0.039 -0.004
0.015** -0.037 -0.005 -0.058 -0.006
0.015** -0.017 -0.002 -0.073 -0.008
0.019*** -0.094 -0.012 -0.113* -0.012*
0.021** -0.194* -0.021** -0.187** -0.018***
0 .02 * *  -0.101 - 0.012 - 0 . 122* - 0 .012* *
-0.004*** -0.038 -0.005 -0.062*** -0.007***
-0.009*** 0.035 0.005 0.009 0.001
-0.006*** 0.007 0.001 0.02 0.002
0.001 -0.002 -0.0003 0.048 0.006
0.004 0.026 0.004 0.03 0.004
-0.002 0.057 0.008 0.088*** 0.011***
0.009*** -0.05 -0.006 -0.06* -0.006*
0.007 0.114* 0.019 0.055 0.007
0.003 0.02 0.003 -0.027 -0.003
0.002 0.006 0.001 0.007 0.001
0.011*** -0.075 -0.009 -0.027 -0.003
0.004** 0.017 0.002 0.023 0.003
0.0003 0.033 0.005 0.034 0.004
0.002 0.083** 0.013** 0.062*** 0.008***
-0.004*** 0.003 0.0004 0.022 * 0.003*





Table 6.7: Relative magnitudes estim ates o f marginal effect -  Pension participants and homeowners
Short-term  saving ratio L ong-term  saving ratio
Pension participants Homeowners Pension participants Homeowners
Independent Variables Prob(y>0)
Change o fy  above 
zero Prob(y>0) Change o fy  above zero Prob(y>0) Change o fy  above zero Prob(y>0) Change o fy  above zero
Permanent income 74.31% 25.69% 72.39% 27.61% -- - - --
Financial expectation
Better-off - -- -- -- -- - -- -
W orse-off -- -- - - -- - -- -
Financial situation
Good -- - - -- 63.81% 36.19% 67.03% 32.97%
Bad -- - 75.30% 24.70% -- - -- -
Financial realisation
Better-off 76.22% 23.78% 67.07% 32.93% - - 56.04% 43.96%
W orse-off - -- - - 65.70% 34.30% 61.54% 38.46%
Pension enrolment -- - - - -- -- -- -
Homeownership - -- -- -- 60.80% 39.20% -- --
Female - - -- -- 63.60% 36.40% 64.74% 35.26%
Habit effect 72.83% 27.17% 71.18% 28.82% - - - -
Age 78.87% 21.13% 67.07% 32.93% - - - -
Age squared 74.64% 25.36% 56.09% 43.91% -- - -- -
Education
Higher than first degree 77.95% 22.05% 73.65% 26.35% 60.80% 39.20% 61.54% 38.46%
First degree - -- 70.73% 29.27% 100% 0% 64.50% 35.50%
Some college 75.61% 24.39% -- -- - - --
A Level - -- - -- -- -- -- -
M arried/Cohabiting ~ - - -- -- -- -- --
Self-employed 72.83% 27.17% 71.77% 28.23% 60.80% 39.20% 58.58% 41.42%




Managers & Administrators 
Professional
Associate professional & Technical ~
Clerical & Secretarial
Craft related 73.58%













Yorkshire & Humberside 72.43'%















































30.52% -  -  65.81% 34.19%
32.93% 68.33% 31.67% 67.80% 32.20%
31.36% -  -  67.03% 32.97%








59.23% 40.77% 61.54% 38.46%
23.95% -  -  53.85% 46.15%
24.70% -
24.70% 100% 0% 67.03% 32.97%
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6.4.3 S u m m ary
Amongst both pension participants and homeowners, the impacts of current financial 
situations and financial realisations emerge to be more significant on the long-term 
saving ratio than on the short-term saving ratio. As shown in Table 6.8 below, it is 
clearly observed amongst the two groups that those in a good current financial situation 
save more for the long term, those in a better financial situation than last year save more 
for the short term, and those in a financial situation worse than last year save less for the 
long term.
Table 6.8: Summary of the effects of financial situations
Short-term saving ratio Long-term saving ratio








Better-off (+)* (+)• (+)***
Worse-off (-)** (-)•
Note: *** at the 1% significance level, ** at the 5%, and * at the 10%.
For both groups, habit effects are only evident on the short-term saving ratio but not on 
the long-term saving ratio. This reinforces that households save less if the savings for 
the short term are not motivated by being for particular purposes. Households who save 
mainly for no specific reason may practice a rule of thumb to control consumption 
expenditure. However, they tend to save less in that they are too impatient with saving 
for the short term or such savings are likely to be in an account with a higher propensity 
to save.
In both groups, the self-employed have a higher long-term saving ratio and a higher 
short-term saving ratio than do employees. This confirms that even though they possess 
housing wealth, pension wealth, or both, the self-employed generally have higher 
discretionary savings than employees. This indicates that amongst both homeowners 
and pension participants, the self-employed have a stronger precautionary saving motive 
than employees. In general, occupational influences are more evident on homeowners 
than on pension participants, and in particular on homeowners’ short-term saving ratio. 
A common finding amongst the two groups is that those in occupations with a
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changeable income flow, such as the ‘craft related’, ‘sales’, and ‘personal & protective 
services’ sectors , tend to save more for the short term and less for the long term, than 
those in the ‘plant and machine operative’ sector. The effect of full-time employment is 
only observed amongst homeowners: full-time employed homeowners tend to save 
more for the short term and less for the long term, than those homeowners who work 
part time.
Socioeconomic factors emerge as influential. Gender is strongly associated only with 
the long-term saving ratio for both groups: female pension participants and female 
homeowners have a lower long-term saving ratio than their counterparts. Highly 
educated homeowners tend to save more for the long term and less for the short term, 
whereas amongst pension participants, the impacts of having had higher education are 
more evident on the short-term saving ratio than on the long-term saving ratio. In both 
groups, households with high wealth levels tend to save less for the short term.
Table 6.9 summarises the findings that life-cycle factors appear more comprehensively 
influential on the short-term saving ratio than on the long-term saving ratio, and their 
effects on the short-term saving ratio amongst pension participants, come out, by and 
large, coherent with those of homeowners. In addition, homeowners with joint income 
sources appear to save less for the short term and more for the long term. Homeowners 
with young dependents, in general, put less money away for both the long-term future 
and short-term purposes.
T a b le  6 .9 :  S u m m a r y  o f  e f fe c ts  o f  l i fe -c y c le  fa c to r s
Short-term  saving ratio Long-term  saving ratio
Pension participants Homeowners Pension participants Homeowners
A ge (-)** (.)***
A ge-square (+)* (+)***
W ith you n g dependents (-)•* (-)*** (-)•••
Sm aller hou sehold  size _^\**100 (-)***
W ith jo in t incom e sources (-)•* (-)**• (+)***
Note: *** at the 1% significance level, ** at the 5%. and * at the 10%.
In all cases, the corresponding estimated marginal effects on the changes in the 
possibility of households having a saving ratio and those on the changes in the saving
100 The significance level is 5% due to the fact that one household size dummy is significant at the 1% 
significance level and the other is significant at the 10% significance level.
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ratio, if households have already been making saving are simultaneously evident. In 
addition, the effects in the former case generally are of greater magnitude than in the 
latter case.
6.5 CONCLUSION
In an attempt to examine the effectiveness of the buffer-stock model and the quasi- 
hyperbolic consumption model in explaining households’ saving behaviour, the control 
variables were comprised of heads of household’s perceptions of short-term uncertainty 
or risk, their ownership of illiquid wealth (housing wealth), their enrolment with a 
private pension scheme (external commitment mechanism for saving for retirement), 
their employment status (employed/self-employed), their occupations, their 
socioeconomic status, and demographic characteristics. A random-effect Tobit model 
was employed on unbalanced panel data, covering waves 10 ~ 13 of the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS), to investigate changes in the short-term saving ratio 
and the long-term saving ratio with respect to specified control variables, at the 
household level. In general, the estimates have shown that differences exist between 
determinants of long-term saving ratio and those of short-term saving ratio. This 
indicates that households’ savings decisions of a short-term planning horizon are 
different to those of a long-term planning horizon and this supported the concept of 
inconsistency between short-term and long-term decisions.
Some evidence is supportive of the quasi-hyperbolic consumption model. Homeowners 
tended to save less for the short term than non-homeowners at the whole sample level. 
Two explanations are proposed: firstly, housing wealth provides implicit liquidity, so 
that households feel it is less necessary to put away money for the short term; secondly, 
this demonstrates quasi-hyperbolic discounting behaviour in which households tend to 
possess short-term savings at lower levels and meanwhile engage in illiquid housing 
wealth. By contrast, homeownership does not affect households’ long-term saving ratio, 
and this highlights the preceding second explanation, in that households are only too 
impatient to have short-term savings, but are still rational so as to manage long-term 
discretionary savings. Private pension participants tend to save more for the long term at 
the whole sample level. This shows that pension participants possess a more profound 
inclination to save for the long term than their counterparts, and this can be explained in
202
that pension participants’ motive for saving for retirement is enhanced further by their 
accumulation of pension wealth (Katona, 1965). Moreover, there is no evident 
substitution effect of pension wealth on the accumulation of financial wealth for long­
term purposes. This study considered habit effects on households’ intertemporal saving 
behaviour, as following a routine is more consistent with human nature, suggesting an 
endowment effect. It was found that households, who save as a result of habit, i.e. for no 
specific reason, tend to save less for the short term, but save indifferently for the long 
term to those with a specific purpose for saving. This indicates the possibility that 
households possess a high discount rate with short-term discretionary saving, or that 
they practice mental accounting, so that savings for no specific reason are likely to be in 
an account with a high propensity to consume.
The relationship between the short-term saving ratio and short-term risk is not 
significant at the whole sample level or in each subgroup, which does not support 
precautionary saving effect form a short-term perspective. Nevertheless, evidence of 
precautionary saving behaviour can be found: self-employment households tend to save 
more for both the long term and the short term, than employees. This is in line with the 
notion that the self-employed need more liquidity than employees, even though they 
hold illiquid wealth or pension wealth. Households in the ‘sales’, ‘personal & protective 
services’, and ‘craft related’ occupations tend to save more for the short term and save 
less for the long term, than households in the ‘plant and machine operative’ sector. This 
can demonstrate precautionary behaviour, because these households save more owing to 
their having fluctuating income streams. This is also observed in the subgroups of 
pension participants (only weakly) and homeowners. Finally, households with joint 
income sources, tend to save less for the short term and more for the long term. This is 
also evident in the subgroups of homeowners and pension participants.
Females tended to save less for the long term than males at the whole sample level and 
in the subgroups of pension participants and homeowners. Highly educated households 
tend to save less for the short term and more for the long term at the whole sample level 
and in the subgroups of homeowners and pension participants.
Overall, the estimates of the relative magnitudes of the marginal effect on the possibility 
of households having a positive saving ratio and of that on changes to a saving ratio, if
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households were already saving, confirm that the effects in the former cases are of 
greater magnitude than those in the latter.
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CHAPTER 7 : SAVINGS-AGE PROFILE
7.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter investigates households’ savings-age profile over the working life cycle -  
between ages 25 and 65. In an attempt to understand better the age effects on 
households’ saving behaviour, their total discretionary savings-age structures are 
investigated, followed by an examination of long-term and short-term savings structures. 
This study thus has the advantage of breaking down discretionary savings into long­
term time and short-term time preferences.
Two sets of theoretical implications will be examined: one is derived from the standard 
life-cycle model/buffer-stock model, and the other is derived from the behavioural 
models, i.e. the quasi-hyperbolic consumption life-cycle model and the behavioural life­
cycle model. The standard/conventional life-cycle model proposes that the main 
motivation for saving is to accumulate resources for later expenditure and in particular 
to support consumption at the habitual standard during retirement. Consumption 
smoothing leads to a hump-shaped age path of wealth holding (Modigliani, 1986): 
households’ savings are low in young age, increase gradually, reaching a peak during 
the 50s, and decrease after retirement. This has led to much attention on the testing of 
this hypothesis, by estimating savings-age profile over the life cycle through empirical 
observation. The buffer-stock model, based on the life-cycle/permanent income 
hypothesis, making the assumption that individuals accumulate assets mainly to buffer 
income uncertainty/risk, suggested that precautionary savings, in terms of financial 
wealth, exhibited an inverse-V shape over the life cycle. This is consistent with the 
basic idea of a humped savings-age profile: the allocation of resources over time.
The behavioural models, which incorporate the influences of inconsistent time 
preferences, as discussed in chapter 2 , imply that economic agents would have more 
savings for long-term purposes than for short-term purposes. Provided that external 
saving schemes are available, savings for long-term purposes may pick up the life-cycle 
effects, whereas savings for short-term purposes, including precautionary savings, 
remain small and constant throughout the life cycle as a result of households’ refraining
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themselves from saving too much for the short term. Hence, households’ long-term and 
short-term savings patterns throughout the life cycle ought to be investigated separately. 
This will exhibit the resources that households’ allocate over the relevant horizon at a 
point in time, which is influenced by their inter-temporal time preferences, over the 
working life cycle (Attanasio and Banks, 2001).
A non-parametric conditional quantile estimation method is applied to four consecutive 
cross-sectional datasets for the wave 10 to 13 of the BHPS. The estimates are obtained 
not only at the whole sample level, but also for five subgroups - males, females, 
homeowners, private pension participants, and employees. One limitation of this work 
was that it was not able to track households’ saving behaviour over time, which could 
only be done through panel-data analysis. Having said so, time-effects could be detected 
by comparing four consecutive estimates; however, treatments in order to separate 
cohort (year of birth) effects from time effects were not applied in this work, as this 
would require a long panel data. In addition, the savings patterns of households aged 
over 65 were not investigated because they were not included in the sample101; as a 
consequence, only savings profiles over the working life cycle, between ages 25 and 65, 
were investigated.
Section 7.2 summaries the econometric model. Section 7.3 analyses savings-age 
profiles at the whole sample level. Section 7.4 examines the profiles of the 
aforementioned subgroups. The values of savings amount (£/year) are at the price level 
of September 2000. Section 7.5 concludes this chapter.
7.2 REVIEW OF METHODOLOGY
The empirical framework is illustrated in a univariate function,
Savingsf = f(a g e t), where Savingf denotes a household’s total savings,
SavingsfT = f(a g e t) , where SavingfT denotes its long-term savings, and
Savings f T = f(a g e t), where SavingfT denotes its imputed short-term savings.
101 This is mainly to keep the consistency of samples over the three empirical works of this study.
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i denotes households. Total savings are specified as the subjectively reported amount 
of money that individuals put away within the last year in which each wave of British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) was carried out. Bills, regular expenses, and regular 
endowments, such as mortgages, are presumed to have been paid before individuals 
put away the money. Long-term savings and short-term savings are measured in 
advance, and this was addressed in chapter 3. A non-parametric kernel-smoothed 
conditional quantile estimation method, developed by Magee, Burbidge, and Robb 
(1991), is employed to accomplish the estimation.
The basic algorithm is presented below. In the following, a  represents the quantile of 
the distribution of Y given X  = x as qa (x), which solves
evaluated at Y = y . An estimate qa (x) can be obtained from the observed pairs ( X t , Y{)
(i = 1,...,«) by solving (1) after replacing F  with some estimate F  . One choice of F , 
which smoothes over X , is
Where AT is a kernel function and I  is the indicator function: I[A\ = 1 if A is true, 
I[A\ = 0 otherwise. In order to choose the bandwidth parameter h , a leave-one-out 
cross-validation (CV) approach is used in which h is chosen to minimise the loss 
function :
Where ra(z) = |a - I [ z  < 0]|. |z| is the leave-one-out loss function employed and q {f  
denotes the estimate of qa (X t) using bandwidth h , where observation i has been 
dropped from the sample.
The cross-validation approach is a non-parametric estimation of statistical error, 
mainly the bias and standard error of an estimator. It is a way of obtaining nearly 
unbiased estimators of prediction error. The method deletes the observations X t from 
the data set one at a time, and recalculates the prediction rule on the basis of the leave-
( 1 )
Where is the conditional cumulative distribution function (cdf) of Y given x
L(h) = Y j r J Y , - q ^ ( X i)),
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one-out sample. It shows how well the recalculated rule predicts the deleted 
observation, and takes the averages of these predictions calculated by deleting one 
observation at a time. (Efron and Gong, 1983)
Under the empirical framework of this study, Yi denotes either the measured short-term 
savings or the measured long-term savings of each household, and X, denotes the age 
of the head of each household, a  = 0.25,0.5,0.75. Kernel smoothing involved a kernel 
function, f { x - a ), which gives the weight to be attached to observations at age x  in 
the estimation of age a . Two aspects of the kernel should be chosen by investigators: 
the bandwidth and the shape. Please see section 4.4 regarding more details.
7.3 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS -  AT THE 
WHOLE SAMPLE LEVEL
7.3.1 Total savings-age profile
Figure 7-1 exhibits four households’ total savings profiles, by plotting saving amounts 
against age cohorts, at the median level, each representing one wave. In wave 10, total 
savings go upwards between ages 25 and 32, descends over the 30s, increase from age 
39 onwards, reach a peak level in the mid 40s, and remain steady until age 65. In wave 
1 1 , the profile in general is similar to that observed in wave 1 0 , except that total savings 
start to descend from a peak level in the late 50s and decrease continually during the 60s. 
In wave 12, total savings rise throughout the 20s and 30s, reach a peak at around age 40, 
and stay at this peak level for rest of the working life cycle. In wave 13, total savings 
grow from age 25 onwards, reach a peak level around age 30, remain steady at the peak 
level until age 60, and descend from then onwards.
In all four waves, total savings remain stable at peak levels throughout middle-age -  
between the mid 40s and late 50s; prior to this, total savings are located at a low level in 
the mid 20s, increase gradually during the 20s, 30s, and early 40s. I propose that this 
upward trend could mainly reflect income growth over the life cycle, as well as other 
life-cycle effects, such as increase in family size. After the late 50s, the total savings
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profiles in the different waves exhibit ambiguities: staying at the peak level until age 65 
in waves 10 and 12 and descending steadily in waves 11 and 13. Only the profile of 
wave 11 displays a humped shape, as it shows that households’ savings are at their 
lowest level during young age, rise and reach a peak level in middle-age, and 
continually descend during ages close to retirement. However as described previously, 
the estimated profiles of the four waves do not, in general, appear humped. In 
comparison, Demery and Duck (2006) used a parametric approach to examine the 
saving ratio-age profile on the UK Family Expenditure Survey (FES) dataset over the 
years 1969-1998, and found that the estimated profile exhibited a hump between age 25 
and 65.
The findings here confirm that savings are at a peak level in the late 40s and throughout 
the 50s, and this is in line with some of the previous literature on savings-age profile 
(Alessie, Lusardi, and Aldershof, 1997; Attanasio, 1998). This is consistent with the 
standard/conventional life-cycle hypothesis.










W 10 W 12 — W13
Figure 7-1: The total savings-age profiles of the whole sample
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7.3.2 Long-term savings and short-term savings-age profiles
Four cross-sectional estimates of long-term saving-age profiles are displayed in Figure 
7-2. In wave 10, long-term savings are at the lowest level at age 25, move upwards 
during the 20s, 30s, and 40s with occasional fluctuations, reach a peak around the late 
40s, and stay at this peak level during the 50s and 60s. The profiles of waves 11, 12, 
and 13 are similar to that of wave 10, but long-term savings in waves 11 and 13 
achieve their peaks in the mid 40s and those in wave 12 at age 41. A general trend is 
observed: savings of the young cohorts are the lowest, and they move upwards during 
the late 20s, 30s, and early 40s. After age 45, long-term savings remain stable at peak 
levels until age 65.
Long-term savings observed above show a similar pattern. This indicates that long­
term savings tend to grow with increases in income, as the permanent income 
hypothesis suggests that the average permanent income of the young cohorts starts at 
its lowest point just as they enter the labour market, and income gradually increases 
and reaches a peak in the middle-age phase. In addition, one particular life-cycle factor, 
family size, can have an influence on the long-term savings amount; for instance, 
heads of household in middle-age are likely to have young children, older dependents, 
or both, who can be financially demanding in the long run.
Long-term savings become stable after the mid 40s. Regarding this, several points are 
addressed here. First, long-term savings do not decrease close to retirement age. There 
are several possible reasons for this: 1 ) bequeathing to the next generation is one of 
them; 2 ) it reflects the decline in total expenditure as the number of dependents is 
decreasing; 3) it can refer to that households save regarding their expectancy of 
mortality risk, and as suggested in Jappelli (2005) that, such savings for mortality risk 
may become unintentional bequests. Second, the steady trend suggests that households 
tend to make a particular amount of savings for future requirements, even though 
income possibly still increases during this period. This can indicate that households at 
this life stage save by committing themselves to saving schemes, which regularly takes 
a certain amount of money from their monthly income; alternatively, there is the 
possibility that households follow an internal rule, which binds them to regularly 
saving a certain amount of money. The roles of internal rules or external saving
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commitments illustrate different approaches for households to tackle self-control 
problems, as suggested in the behavioural models.
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Figure 7-2: The long-term savings-age profiles of the whole sample
Four cross-sectional estimates on short-term savings-age profiles are displayed in 
Figure 7-3. In wave 10, short-term savings are at high levels over the late 20s and over 
the 40s, and stay relatively low throughout the 30s, 50s and early 60s. In wave 11, 
short-term savings remain stable between ages 25 and 57, drop slightly between ages 
57 and 61, and rise after age 61. In wave 12, short-term savings start at a peak level at 
age 25, drop slightly during late 20s, remain stable through the 30s, 40s, and 50s, and 
descend markedly in the 60s. In wave 13, short-term savings go up a little during the 
20s, become stable at a high level, and decline after age 55.
In general, short-term savings levels remain steady between age 25 and the mid 50s, 
and after that, savings noticeably fall. This steady trend before the mid 50s shows that 
households accumulate only a limited amount of money and life-cycle effects 
discussed earlier have little influence on them. This supports the possibility that 
households are reluctant to save for the short term, as they tend to constrain themselves 
from splurging by saving only a limited amount money for short-term future, such as
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for buffering high-frequency income fluctuations (Laibson, 1998; Carroll, Dynan, and 
Krane, 2003). The preceding explanation is related to households’ high time 
preference (high discount rate) with regard to saving for the short term. Samwick 
(1998) simulated the wealth-to-income ratio of households who were assumed to have 
a constant high discount rate over the life cycle, and obtained a profile showing that 
the wealth-to-income ratio102 remained constant between ages 25 and 55. The finding 
in this work thus reinforces Samwick’s (1998), by suggesting that households’ 
estimated short-term savings profiles reflect a high time preference, and this is 
consistent with the quasi-hyperbolic consumption model.
Apart from wave 11, it is generally observed amongst the other three waves that a drop 
in short-term savings takes place between ages 50 and 60, in particular in waves 12 
and 13. The drop can be attributed to two reasons. First, the degree of exposure to 
income risk, particularly unemployment risk, is at its lowest when households are 
close to retirement age, and thus households accumulate less precautionary savings for 
the short term. Moreover, these households are generally of smaller size; therefore, 
they make fewer savings for regular expenses in the future. It is in waves 12 and 13 
that short-term savings fall profoundly in the ages prior to retirement.
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Figure 7-3: The short-term savings-age profiles of the whole sample
102 The wealth takes into account o f savings both for precautionary motives and for retirement.
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7.3.3 Summary
Contrasting the long-term savings profile for each wave with short-term profile 
confirms that households, in general, save more for the long term than for the short 
term, in that the estimated medians of long-term savings are above those of short-term 
savings, throughout the working life cycle. This supports one implication of the quasi- 
hyperbolic life-eycle consumption model: households prefer saving more for the long­
term future than saving for the short term. In sum, the estimated long-term profiles are 
consistent with the implication of a standard/conventional life cycle model and short­
term savings-age profiles suggest that households have higher time preference with 
saving for the short term. These two findings are in support of the behavioural models 
which suggest that households have inconsistent time preferences with saving for a 
long-term horizon and for that of short term.
Comparing Figure 7-2, and Figure 7-3, it is seen that the upward trend of total savings 
is highly determined by long-term savings, whereas the downward tendency close to 
retirement age, if present, is due to decreasing short-term savings, but long-term 
savings remain constant during that period. This can be explained as that these 
households keep making long-term savings as a result of longer life expectancy or an 
intention of bequeathing to the next generation. On the other hand, they save less for 
the short term because they expect less unemployment risk when they approach 
retirement.
In general, differentials are observed amongst the profiles of the four waves. This may 
be due to the unbalanced panel dataset used in this study. As can be seen in Table 7.1, 
only 13.5% of the households appeared in every wave and more than 40% of them are 
present only in one wave. This means the effects of household heterogeneity cannot be 
completely ruled out. Furthermore, a time effect can be another explanation for the 
differentials.
Table 7.1: The number and percentage of households presenting in four, three, two, and one wave, 
respectively -  At the whole sample level____________________________________________________
In four waves In three In two waves In one wave Total
waves
Number % Number % Number % Number % Number %
Whole
sample 480 13.5 654 18.4 888 24.9 1539 43.2 3561 100
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7.4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS-AT  
SUBSAMPLE LEVEL
The savings-age profiles of the subgroups -  males, females, homeowners, private 
pension participants, and employees -  will be investigated below. It has been found in 
the preceding two chapters that gender difference leads to variations in saving 
preferences, and as a consequence, the savings-age profiles of females and males are 
separately estimated. Homeownership is considered as a proxy indicator for the 
possession of housing (illiquid) wealth, and estimating the savings-age structures of 
homeowners aims to investigate how households, whilst possessing illiquid assets, 
discretionarily accumulate financial wealth for the short term and the long term. 
Households who have joined a private pension scheme are considered to have been 
committing themselves to external devices, so as to postpone current consumption and 
to save for retirement. Given that the self-employed exhibit different saving patterns 
from employees, the savings-age profiles of employees are estimated by leaving out 
the effects of the self-employed103.
7.4.1 Males
7.4.1.1 Total savings-age profile
Figure 7-4 shows the four total savings profiles for males, each representing one wave. 
In wave 10, total savings have an upward trend throughout the working life cycle: they 
are at their lowest level at age 25, move up and then fall during the 30s, and increase 
again through the 40s, 50s, and 60s. In the other three waves, the profiles appear 
virtually flat throughout the life cycle, and it is only in wave 1 1  that a small hump 
comes into view during the 50s.
It is observed amongst the four waves that males’ total savings are at relatively high 
levels during their 50s, and this is analogous to what has been observed amongst the 
whole sample. Life-cycle effects in terms of income growth and increase in family size
103 Difficulties occurred in estimating the self-employeds’ savings-age profiles as their sample size was 
too small.
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appear to be rather weak on males’ total savings-age structure, as only the profile in 
wave 10 exhibits an upward trend during the 30s and 40s; in addition, total savings do 
not appear to decrease close to retirement age.
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Figure 7-4: The total savings-age profiles of males
7.4.1.2 Long-term  and short-term  savings-age profiles
Figure 7-5 shows four cross-sectional long-term savings profiles of males. In wave 10, 
long-term savings constantly increase throughout the working life cycle: exhibiting the 
lowest level at age 25, a tremendous growth between ages 35 and 58, and remaining 
stable here. In wave 11, the profile shows an upward trend between ages 25 and 32, 
stays stable between ages 32 and 48, is illustrated by a hump during the late 40s and 50s, 
and becomes stable again in the 60s. In wave 12, the profile shows an increase between 
ages 25 and 27, remains flat afterwards until age 50, and grows again between ages 50 
and 65. In wave 13, the profile is similar to that in wave 11, but there is a smaller hump 
between ages 53 and 60.
Briefly, there are two periods in which males are more active in saving for the long term, 
than at other times during the working life cycle, in terms of upward trends shown in the 
estimated long-term savings profiles. One spell is in late 20s until the early 30s: during 
this period, males could be saving mainly for the long term, in order to buy a property in
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the future or saving for plans in their approaching 30s, for example, starting a family. 
The other spell is in the 50s: in this period, household income usually reaches its highest 
level during working life; in addition, family expenditure is decreasing, because the 
numbers of dependents are usually low in households aged over 50. With more money 
left after regular expenditure, households make more savings for long-term purposes.
In sum, long-term savings-age profile of males exhibited some evidence in support of 
the conventional life-cycle hypothesis. First, the profiles of waves 11 and 13 display 
themselves to be humped during age 50s. Second, the savings reach the peak levels in 
mid-50s in waves 10, 11, and 13. Thirdly, upward trends can be seen during young age 
and middle age in the four waves.
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Figure 7-5: The long-term savings-age profiles of males
Figure 7-6 shows short-term savings profiles. In waves 10 and 11, short-term savings 
are at their highest level at age 25, decrease slightly by age 27, become steady between 
age 27 and the mid 50s, and fall again thereafter, reaching their lowest level at age 65. 
In wave 12, short-term savings are situated at a high level at age 25, decrease between 
ages 25 and 30, subsequently become steady until age 62, with several humps during 
this period, and drop afterwards until reaching the lowest level at age 65. In wave 13,
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short-term savings increase slightly between ages 25 and 29, fluctuate to a limited 
extent between ages 29 and 58, and then descend sharply, reaching their lowest level at 
age 65.
Apart from the estimates in wave 13, the estimates confirm that the short-term savings 
of the young cohorts in their late 2 0 s are at their highest, when considering the whole 
working life cycle. This reflects the notion that young people tend to have more 
precautionary (short-term) savings. It is observed across the four waves that short-term 
savings remain stable during the 30s, 40s, and 50. A constant level of short-term savings 
throughout these age groups supports the possibility that males possess a high time 
preference with saving for the short term, which keeps the levels of savings constantly 
low. This is evidence in support of the behavioural models. It can also be seen that life­
cycle effects, which would make the savings profiles humped, do not appear evident on 
short-term savings profiles.
Eventually, a fall occurs around the late 50s, and short-term savings are descending 
during the 60s, reaching their lowest level by the end of the working life. This strongly 
indicates that males save less for the short term, whilst they are approaching retirement, 
and this can be as a result of decreasing income risk in that age phase. This is consistent 
with the prediction of the standard life-cycle model.
Disparities between the short-term savings of wave 13 and those of the other three 
waves are observed; this is considered to be caused by a specific time-effect, e.g. 
macroeconomic shock, which occurred during the interviewing period.
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Figure 7-6: The short-term savings-age profiles of males
7.4.1.3 Sum m ary
Contrasting Figure 7-5 with Figure 7-6 shows that the long-term savings profiles of 
males are located well above the short-term savings profiles throughout the working life 
cycle. This shows that males prefer saving for the long term to for the short term. In 
addition, discrepancies between two types of savings-age profiles suggest the existence 
of inconsistent time preferences with males’ savings decisions for the long term and for 
the short term. In sum, there is evidence in support of the behavioural models: the long­
term savings-age profiles are more consistent with the standard/conventional life-cycle 
model, whereas short-term profiles suggest that households have the tendency to keep 
the levels of savings constantly low, indicating the possibility that males have high time 
preference towards saving for the short term.
Males’ total savings-age profiles are flattened by both long-term savings and short-term 
savings. The upward trends that occur across young ages amongst the long-term savings 
profiles do not appear amongst the aggregate savings profiles, as these effects are 
disguised by the flat trends observed in the short-term savings profiles. In comparison to 
those in the long-term savings profiles, the humps appear moderate in the aggregate 
savings profiles, as they are mitigated by the flat trends observed in the short-term
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profiles. Finally, the decreasing trends observed amongst short-term profiles do not 
appear in the aggregate profiles. This indicates that, during ages close to retirement, 
males save less for the short term but not necessarily save less for the long term.
As shown in Table 7.2, only 15.3% o f the total household appear in four waves, and 
over half o f them appear in one or two waves. In addition to time effects, this may also 
contribute to the disparities observed in the profiles o f different waves.
Table 7.2: The number and percentage of households presenting in four, three, two, and one wave, 
respectively -  Males
In four waves In three In two waves In one wave Total
waves
Number % Number % Number % Number % Number %
Males 408 15.3 514 19.3 677 25.4 1063 39.9 2662 100
7.4.2 Fem ales
7.4.2.1 Total savings-age profile
Figure 7-7 exhibits four female total savings profiles against age cohorts, each 
representing one wave. In wave 10, total savings remain constant over the whole 
working life cycle. In wave 11, the curve for total savings appears stable between ages 
25 and 41, exhibits a hump between ages 41 and 51, and becomes stable again during 
the 50s and 60s. In wave 12, the profile appears similar to that o f wave 11, and the 
hump occurs between ages 44 and 57. In wave 13, the curve o f total savings stays 
constant between ages 25 and 43, shows a hump between ages 44 and 53, which is 
flatter than those in waves 11 and 12, becomes flat between ages 53 and 59, and finally 
descends between ages 59 and 65.
In general, females’ total savings remain flat throughout the 20s and 30s, appear as a 
humped curve between the 40s and mid 50s, and then become steady until the end o f the 
working life cycle. Amongst the four cross-sectional estimates, it is only observed in 
wave 13 that total savings are at the lowest level in ages close to retirement. Females’ 
total savings achieve peak levels in the late 40s, which is an earlier age than that 
observed amongst males.
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Figure 7-7: The total savings-age profiles of females
7.4.2.2 Long-term  and  short-term  savings-age profiles
Figure 7-8 shows four cross-sectional long-term savings profiles. In wave 10, the curve 
o f long-term savings is located at a relatively high level at age 25, shows a downward 
trend between ages 25 and 30, becomes stable at a low level during the 30s, increases 
considerably throughout the 40s, becomes stable again at the peak level between ages 
48 and 55, and descends significantly thereafter, reaching the lowest level at the end of 
the working life cycle. In wave 11, the curve o f total savings remains at its lowest level 
during the 20s, ascends significantly in the 30s until achieving its peak, becomes stable 
thereafter throughout the 40s and 50s, and slightly decreases during the 60s. In wave 12, 
the curve o f total savings appears stable, at its lowest level, between ages 25 and 34, 
goes up between ages 34 and 42, until reaching its peak, and becomes constant 
throughout the rest o f the working life cycle. In wave 13, the long-term savings profile 
stays constant at a low level between ages 25 and 32, goes up between ages 32 and 46, 
until reaching its peak, becomes stable at the peak level between ages 46 and 57, 
decreases considerably during the late 50s, and stabilises again in the 60s.
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The profiles o f waves 10, 11, and 13 are all humped between the 30s and 50s, showing 
increasing long-term savings in the 30s and early 40s and decreasing long-term savings 
during the late 50s, which is the period close to retirement.
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Figure 7-8: The long-term savings-age profiles of females
Figure 7-9 exhibits the short-term savings profiles for females. In wave 10, the curve o f 
short-term savings remains constant between ages 25 and 37, grows slightly between 
ages 37 and 41, becomes stable at a relative high level between ages 41 and 49, 
decreases to its lowest level during the 50s, and increases significantly in the 60s. In 
wave 11, the profile remains constant at a high level throughout the 20s and 30s, 
descends slightly between ages 39 and 41, becomes stable between ages 41 and 48, 
exhibits another drop between ages 48 and 52, until reaching its lowest level, remains 
steady at this level during the 50s, and climbs up significantly for the rest o f the 
working life cycle. In wave 12, the curve o f short-term savings remains stable 
throughout the 20s, 30s, and 40s, shows a small drop between ages 50 and 52, and 
becomes stable again in the 50s and 60s with a drop and a bounce back occurring in the 
early 60s. In wave 13, the profile remains constant at its peak level throughout the 20s, 
30s, and 40s, descends gradually during the 50s until achieving its lowest level, and 
becomes stable during the 60s.
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Some common patterns can be observed. Short-term savings appear stable at peak levels, 
if  not, a relatively high level, during the 20s, 30s, and even the 40s. Savings decrease 
constantly throughout the 50s and generally are found to be at the lowest levels. In ages 
close to retirement, short-term savings rise in waves 10, 11, and 12, and this suggests 
the possibility that females’ precautionary saving motives are enhancing.
These profiles do not exhibit pronounced evidence in support o f the behavioural models. 
To begin with, savings are not kept at a constantly low level over the working life. 
Secondly, as analysed in the previous paragraph, the patterns o f these profiles may 
suggest the existence o f precautionary saving behaviour. Meanwhile, these profiles did 
not display themselves to be humped, which does not support the standard life-cycle 
model.
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Figure 7-9: The short-term savings-age profiles of females
7.4.2.3 S u m m a ry
Contrasting Figure 7-8 with Figure 7-9 shows that females save more for the short term, 
than for the long term, before middle age: the short-term savings curve is above that of 
the long term from the 30s to the 60s, in wave 10, during the 20s and 30s in wave 11, 
through the 20s, 30s, and 40s in wave 12, and in the period up until age 45 in wave 13. 
This suggests that females do not always prefer saving for the long term across the
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working life cycle, thus this goes somewhat against the quasi-hyperbolic consumption 
model. The humps observed in females’ total savings profiles are mainly attributed to 
long-term savings patterns that can be described by the standard/conventional life-cycle 
model.
Females tend to save less for the long term and more for the short term in the last few 
years o f their working lives, whereas equivalent males tend to save as much as their 
middle-age cohorts and moreover save more for the long term and less for the short 
term. Possible explanations for this are as follows. First, it suggests that males have a 
stronger bequest motive than females, thus males are keener to leave wealth for the next 
generation by saving more for the long term. Second, it has been suggested that, in 
general, old households may have more precautionary savings in that they are more risk 
averse than young households (Borsch-Supan, 1992). This provides an explanation for 
females’ savings profiles, but not for those o f males.
As seen in the figures, disparities are observed amongst the profiles o f different waves. 
This can be explained by: 1) the sample size o f females are relatively small; 2) as can be 
seen in Table 7.3, more than 50% o f the female households appear only in one wave but 
only 8% o f them present in four waves, so individual heterogeneities cannot be 
controlled properly; and 3) time effects exist.
Table 7.3: The number and percentage of households presenting in four, three, two, and one wave, 
respectively -  Females
In four waves In three In two waves In one wave Total
____________________waves_________________________________________________
Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % 
Females 72 8 140 15.6 211 23.5 476 52.9 899 100
7.4.3 H om eow ners
7.4.3.1 Total savings-age pro file
Figure 7-10 exhibits four homeowners’ total savings profiles, by plotting savings 
amount against age cohorts, each representing one wave. In wave 10, the curve o f  total 
savings is located at a relatively low level at age 25, goes up slightly between ages 25 
and 32, falls between ages 32 and 35 to its lowest level, becomes stable from ages 35 to
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42, exhibits a upward trend between ages 42 and 46, stabilises at a relatively high level 
during the late 40s, 50s, and early 60s, and shows an increase between ages 63 and 65. 
In wave 11, the profile is a smooth upward slope during the 20s and 30s until reaching 
its peak at age 44 and becomes stable, at the peak level, for the rest o f the working life. 
In wave 12, the curve o f  total savings is located at its lowest level at age 25, shows a 
smooth ascending trend between ages 25 and 32, reaching its peak, and becomes stable 
throughout the rest o f the working life cycle. In wave 13, the profile shows a small jump 
between ages 25 and 27, becomes constant at its peak level throughout the 30s, 40s, and 
50s, and descends in the 60s.
Homeowners’ total savings structures appear relatively flat for the whole working life 
cycle, and fluctuate within a small margin. In general, the life-cycle effects are not 
pronounced.
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Figure 7-10: The total savings-age profiles of homeowners
7.4.3.2 Long-term  and  short-term  savings-age profiles
Figure 7-11 shows four cross-sectional long-term savings profiles over the life cycle. In 
wave 10, the curve o f long-term savings is located at its lowest level at age 25, shows an 
upward trend from the 20s to the mid 40s, achieving a relative high level at age 45, 
becomes stable between ages 45 and 52, exhibits a small hump during the 50s, and
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remains stable in the 60s. In wave 11, the profile ascends between ages 25 and 39, 
reaching a peak, and remains stable thereafter throughout the rest o f the working life 
cycle. In wave 12, the curve o f long-term savings ascends significantly between ages 25 
and 31, exhibits a downward then upward trend in the 30s, remains stable during the 40s 
at a relatively high level, shows a small hump in the 50s, and becomes stable during the 
60s. In wave 13, the profile is located at its lowest level at age 25, exhibits an upward 
trend between ages 25 and 41, achieving its peak, and becomes stable throughout the 
40s, 50s, and 60s.
Long-term savings increase with up-and-down fluctuations before the middle-age phase, 
and remain stable thereafter. The estimates for wave 10 and wave 12 both show a small 
hump during the 50s. The ascending trends during the 20s, 30s, and early 40s, together 
with the achievement o f peak levels in the mid 50s can, to a large extent, be attributed to 
life-cycle effects, i.e. income growth and an increase in family size. However, 
homeowners do not reduce their long-term savings whilst approaching retirement.
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Figure 7-11: The long-term savings-age profiles of homeowners
Figure 7-12 shows four cross-sectional short-term savings profiles over the life cycle. In 
wave 10, the curve o f short-term savings appears stable at its peak level, between the 
20s and early 50s, exhibits a downward trend between ages 54 and 57, and becomes
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stable thereafter at its lowest level. In wave 11, the curve of short-term savings is 
located at its peak level at age 25, shows a drop between ages 25 and 27, becomes stable 
between the 30s and the mid 50s, shows a drop from ages 57 and 59, and generally 
stabilises for rest of the working life cycle. In wave 12, the profile has its peak level at 
age 25, slightly descends between ages 25 and 28, becomes stable throughout the 30s, 
40s, 50s, and early 60s, and shows a steep drop between ages 62 and 65. In wave 13, the 
profile is significantly inconsistent with the profiles of the other waves, between ages 25 
and 56: it exhibits a constant trend with two humps -  ups and downs - between ages 25 
and 36 and between ages 43 and 49, and descends after age 56, until the end of the 
working life cycle.
Amongst the four cross-sectional estimates, short-term savings are, in general, at peak 
levels in the late 20s (beginning of the working life-cycle), and remain constant during 
the 30s, 40s, and even the early 50s. Subsequently, savings start to decrease and reach 
their lowest level in the late 50s or 60s (end of the working life cycle). The divergences 
observed in wave 13 show higher estimated savings levels including two humps, which 
are considered as a consequence of the time effects. The observed stabilities between 
the 30s and the 50s are in support of the behavioural models: savings remain constantly 
low and are not influenced by life-cycle effects.
It is observed in waves 11, 12, and 13 that homeowners decrease savings for short term 
purposes during ages close to retirement, and this can be explained by the standard 
conventional life-cycle hypothesis.
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Figure 7-12: The short-term savings-age profiles of homeowners
7.43.3  Sum m ary
Contrasting Figure 7-11 with Figure 7-12 shows that homeowners, in general, save 
more for the long term than for the short term as long-term savings profiles are well 
above short-term profiles throughout the working life cycle. In sum, apart from the 
finding that homeowners do not reduce long-term savings when approaching retirement, 
their long-term savings profiles exhibit strong evidence in support o f life-cycle model. 
In addition, their short-term savings profiles during young and middle age suggest their 
possessing high time preference towards saving for the short term. These are evidence 
in support o f the quasi-hyperbolic consumption model.
In comparison with the total savings profile o f the whole sample, homeowners’ profiles 
are smoother. The life-cycle effects observed amongst homeowners’ long-term savings 
profiles appear to be concealed in the total-savings profiles. The descending trends 
displayed in the homeowners’ short-term savings profiles do not emerge amongst the 
total saving profiles.
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In addition to time effects, the unbalanced dataset (see Table 7.4) can explain the 
differentials shown in the profiles of different waves.
Table 7.4: The number and percentage of households presenting in four, three, two, and one wave, 
respectively -  Homeowners
In four waves In three In two waves In one wave Total
____________________waves__________________________________________________
Number % Number % Number % Number % Number %
Homeowners 439 14.7 578 19.4 755 25.4 1205 40.5 2977 100
7.4.4 P rivate  pension partic ipan ts
7.4.4.1 Total savings-age profile
Figure 7-13 shows total savings-age structures o f households who have paid into a 
private pension scheme to save for retirement. In wave 10, the curve o f total savings 
exhibits several ups and downs during the working life cycle: between ages 25 and 40, 
total savings go up, remain constant, and then smoothly decrease; between ages 40 and 
60 total savings increase, become stable until the mid 50s, and show a drop in the late 
50s; beyond age 60 total savings show an upward trend and reach their peak level. In 
wave 11, total savings go up during the 20s, become constant throughout the 30s and 
40s, exhibit a hump during the 50s, and show a significant downward trend between 
ages 58 and 65. In wave 12, the curve o f total savings appears generally stable 
throughout the working life cycle, with a small up-and-down trend in the early 50s and 
an upward trend between ages 63 and 65. In wave 13, total savings remain at a constant 
level between the 20s and early 50s, show a minor hump between ages 54 and 61, and 
become stable in the 60s, finishing with a small drop.
Total savings remain at a stable level during the 30s and 40s, and show a small humped 
trend during the 50s. In most cases, pension participants’ total savings achieve a peak in 
the 50s. The trend in the 60s appears to be unclear, when considering the four waves. In 
sum, life-cycle effects can be seen but they are not pronounced.
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Figure 7-13: The total savings-age profiles of private pension participants
7.4.4.2 Long-term  and  short-term  savings-age profiles
Figure 7-14 shows the long-term savings-age structures o f private pension participants. 
In wave 10, the curve o f long-term savings is located at its lowest level at age 25, 
exhibits a small hump in the 30s, ascends significantly between ages 41 and 47, 
reaching its peak level, descends slightly in the late 40s, and stabilises at a relatively 
high level, for the rest o f the working life cycle. In wave 11, the profile rises in the 20s, 
becomes constant during the 30s and early 40s, shows a significant hump between the 
mid 40s and 50s, and remains stable during the 60s. In wave 12, the long-term savings 
curve emerges as constant in the period from the 20s to the 50s, with a moderate hump 
in the early 50s, and ascends gradually during the late 50s and 60s, reaching its peak 
level. In wave 13, the profile rises between ages 25 and 31 to a relatively high level and 
subsequently becomes stable for the rest o f the working life cycle, with a moderate 
hump occurring between ages 55 and 61.
Amongst the four long-term savings profiles, humps, as suggested by the conventional 
life-cycle model, are, in general, observed in between ages 40 and 60: waves 10 and 11 
exhibit significant upward trends in this period and reach their peak level, whereas the 
rises in waves 12 and 13 are relatively mild. The surges in this period point to life-cycle 
effects, such as income growth and having more dependents. The long-term savings o f
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the younger cohorts are at their lowest levels, compared with any other time during the 
working life cycle. However, long-term savings do not fall in the period close to 
retirement, and this suggests that private pension participants at this stage do not reduce 
savings for long-term purposes.
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Figure 7-14: The long-term savings-age profiles of private pension participants
Figure 7-15 shows the short-term savings-age structures. In wave 10, the curve o f short­
term savings appears flat for the whole o f the working life cycle, remaining at a relative 
low level during the 40s and 50s and showing a drop in the 60s. In wave 11, the profile 
appears as a downward trend throughout the working life cycle: its peak level is at age 
29, decreasing in the 30s and 40s, becoming stable in the 50s, and dropping to its lowest 
level during the 60s. In wave 12, the curve o f short-term savings is located at its peak 
level at age 25, shows significant fluctuations during the 20s and 30s, reaches its lowest 
level at age 42, slightly rises up thereafter, stabilises through the late 40s and the 50s, 
and shows mild fluctuations above the previous constant level in the 60s. In wave 13, 
the profile is situated at its peak at ages 25 and 26, shows a sharp drop in the late 20s, 
becomes constant during the 30s, descends gradually between ages 38 and 48, reaching 
its lowest level, and remain constantly at this level for the rest o f the working life.
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Pension participants’ short-term savings show fluctuations during their 30s and 40s, and 
it is generally observed that the young cohorts save more for the short term than the 
middle-age groups and those close to retirement. In general, the young cohorts’ short­
term savings are the highest over the working life cycle, and those who are close to their 
retirement have the lowest short-term savings. This could be explained in that the young 
have the strongest precautionary saving motive, and such motive becomes less evident 
as they age.
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Figure 7-15: The short-term savings-age profiles of private pension participants
7.4.4.3 Sum m ary
Contrasting Figure 7-14 with Figure 7-15 it can be seen that private pension participants 
save more for the long term than for the short term throughout the working life cycle, 
except during young age, and this shows that pension participants prefer saving for the 
long term to saving for the short term. In sum, the long-term savings-age profiles are in 
support o f the conventional life-cycle hypothesis. The downward trends and the 
fluctuations observed in short-term savings profiles make the effect o f high time 
preference less pronounced. The downward trends can suggest that the preference for 
short-term savings amongst pension participants decreases with age. This supports the 
possibility that it is less necessary for them to make precautionary savings when getting 
closer to the retirement because they have acquired pension wealth to finance their
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consumption after that date. Compared with homeowners, pension participants’ short­
term profiles provide weaker evidence in support o f the quasi-hyperbolic consumption 
model.
Total savings profiles are highly determined by the long-term savings profiles, and the 
former profiles appear smoother than the latter.
As seen in the figures, disparities are observed amongst the profiles o f different waves. 
This can be explained by: 1) the sample size o f pension participants are relatively small; 
2) as can be seen in Table 7.5 , 54% of the female households appear only in one wave 
but only 7.9% o f them present in four waves, so individual heterogeneities cannot be 
controlled properly; and 3) time effects exist.
Table 7.5: The number and percentage of households presenting in four, three, two, and one wave,
respectively -  Private pension participants_________________________________________________
In four waves In three In two waves In one wave Total
____________________waves_________________________________________________
Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % 
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7.4.5 Em ployees
7.4.5.1 Total savings-age pro file
Figure 7-16 shows the total savings-age structures for employees throughout the 
working life cycle. In wave 10, the curve o f total savings remains stable between ages 
25 and 34, descends slightly to its lowest level around the late 30s, exhibits an upward 
trend afterwards until age 48, becomes stable at a high level during the 50s and 60s, 
with a small hump at the end o f the working life cycle. In wave 11, the profile appears 
as a smooth hump throughout the working life cycle: it ascends during the 20s, 30s, and 
40s, reaching a peak level, becomes stable at this level throughout the 50s, and then 
descends for the rest o f the working life cycle. In wave 12, the curve o f total savings 
climbs upwards during the 20s and 30s, reaching its peak level, and remains stable, at 
this level, for rest o f the working life. In wave 13, the curve o f total savings is at its 
lowest level at age 25, exhibits an up-and-down pattern before the mid 30s, slightly
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climbs up thereafter until reaching a peak level, stays constant at this level during the 
40s and 50s, and then descends gradually in the 60s.
It is observed amongst the four waves that an upward trend appears in the period 
between the late 20s and middle age, and this supports the idea that employees’ total 
savings grow with income during this period. Total savings stabilise during the 50s, in 
general at a peak level, and, as said previously, this was also discovered by some o f the 
empirical literature. Only in waves 11 and 13, are total savings observed to descend 
during ages close to retirement.
Total savings - E nployees
3000
2000




WIO W ll W12 W 13
Figure 7-16: The total savings-age profiles of employees
7.4.5.2 Long-term  and  short-term  savings-age profiles
Figure 7-17 shows long-term savings-age structures o f employees throughout the 
working life cycle. In wave 10, the curve o f long-term savings appears relatively stable 
for the 20s and 30s age groups with a small up-and-down movement between ages 30 
and 34, ascends significantly during the 40s until reaching a peak level, and becomes 
constant at this level throughout the 50s and 60s. In wave 11, the profile is at its lowest 
level at age 25, climbs with large fluctuations during the 30s and 40s until reaching its 
peak at age 48, and becomes stable at this level throughout the 50s and 60s. In wave 12, 
the profile exhibits an upward trend for the 20s and 30s age groups with large scale
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fluctuations, reaches its maximum at age 41, and stabilises at this level for the 
remainder o f the working life cycle. In wave 13, the curve o f long-term savings is 
located at its lowest level during the 20s, exhibits an upward trend in the 30s and 40s 
until reaching its peak at age 47, and becomes steady at this level through the 50s and 
60s.
Amongst the four profiles, long-term savings are at their lowest levels in the young age 
period. During the middle-aged phase, they increase to a great extent, reaching a peak 
in the 40s or early 50s, and then remain steady for the rest o f the working life cycle. 
The upward trends observed amongst the middle-aged cohorts are strongly linked to 
life-cycle effects, such as income growth and increase in family size. In addition, the 
long-term savings o f the pre-retirement cohorts do not appear to decrease.










Figure 7-17: The long-term savings-age profiles of employees
Figure 7-18 shows short-term savings-age structures for employees over the working 
life cycle. In wave 10, the curve of short-term savings appears as constant, at its peak 
level, throughout the 20s, 30s, 40s, and up until the mid 50s, falls between ages 57 and 
60, reaching its lowest level, and becomes stable in the 60s. In wave 11, the profile 
remains steady at its peak level between age 25 and the mid 50s, and descends 
considerably for rest o f  the working life cycle, finishing at its lowest level. In wave 12,
234
the curve of short-term savings appears steady at a relatively high level before age 60 
and shows a sharp drop in the 60s to its lowest level. In wave 13, the profile shows a 
small surge between ages 25 and 27, stays constantly between ages 27 and 43, climbs 
to its maximum level. This is followed by a significant drop between ages 43 and 48, 
becoming steady during the 50s, and descending to a great extent in the 60s, 
cumulating at its lowest level.
Amongst the four waves, short-term savings appear constant at their peak levels during 
the young age phase and through to middle-age; they begin to decrease around the mid 
50; a downward trend appears in the 60s and the short-term savings of the cohorts 
close to retirement are the lowest. Three inferences can be made. First, short-term 
savings are the highest amongst the young and middle-aged cohorts, however, they are 
not influenced by life-cycle effects, such as, income growth and increase in family size. 
Second, short-term savings remain at a constant level, indicating that it is likely that 
employees apply a rule in order to save a regular amount of money for short-term 
purposes, and employees save only a limited amount money for the short-term future 
during this period. Third, employees decrease their short-term savings when 
approaching retirement, and this can be as a result of decreasing income uncertainty 
that employees have. The first two inferences provide evidence in support of the quasi- 
hyperbolic consumption model, and the third one is consistent with the prediction of 
the buffer-stock model.
235









W 13W 10 Wll W 12
Figure 7-18: The short-term savings-age profiles of employees
7.4.5.3 Sum m ary
Contrasting Figure 7-17 with Figure 7-18 shows that employees save more for the long 
term than for the short term throughout the working life cycle, as their long-term 
savings profiles are generally above those for the short term. This suggests that 
employees prefer saving for the long term to saving for the short term. Employees’ 
total savings profiles show an upward trend in long-term savings during young and 
middle age and a decline in short-term savings in the 60s, and these are evidence in 
support o f the conventional life-cycle model. Their short-term profiles suggest the 
influence o f high time preference on employees’ short-term savings profiles.
Comparing the long-term savings-age profiles o f employees’ with those of the whole 
sample allows for the detection o f discrepancies, which can be attributed to the self- 
employeds’ savings patterns104. In general, the total and long-term savings profiles of 
employees’ are, in general, similar to those o f the whole sample, and this suggests that 
the self-employeds’ long-term savings profiles are similar to those o f employees. By 
contrast, short-term savings profiles for employees from young to middle age, appear 
smoother than those o f the whole sample, also, the short-term savings o f the whole
104 As mentioned previously, the self-employeds’ saving patterns could not be estimated because of the 
small sample size of this group.
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sample do not consistently appear to descend during the period close to retirement. 
This suggests that the self-employeds’ short-term savings profiles should appear to be 
more volatile amongst young and middle-aged cohorts, and it is likely that they do not 
decrease their savings for the short term, as they approach retirement. Two inferences 
thus can be made: first, some predictions o f the conventional life-cycle model can be 
found in the self-employeds’ long-term savings profiles, such as an upward trend 
during young and middle age; second, the evidence o f the influence o f high time 
preference on short-term savings can be found less pronounced amongst the self- 
employed.
In addition to time effects, the unbalanced dataset (see Table 7.6) can explain the 
differentials shown in the profiles o f different waves.
Table 7.6: The number and percentage of households presenting in four, three, two, and one wave, 
respectively -  Employees
In four waves In three In two waves In one wave Total
____________________waves_________________________________________________
Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % 
Employees 423 13.2 584 18.3 786 24.6 1403 43.9 3196 100
7.5 CONCLUSION
This chapter investigated households’ intertemporal savings amount with regards to the 
short-term future and the long-term future, respectively, during the working life cycle; 
in addition, influences on total savings were also examined. In the whole sample, long­
term savings-age profiles and short-term savings-age profiles emerged as different with 
the long-term savings profiles being well above those of a short-term perspective 
throughout working life. Life-cycle effects, i.e. income growth and increase in family 
size during middle-age, are evident in the long-term savings profiles, but are missing in 
the profiles for short-term savings which, as can be seen, remain stable over most o f the 
working life, except close to retirement. Moreover, the life-cycle effects shown in the 
long-term savings profiles are evident in the total savings profiles and by contrast, the 
decreasing trends in the short-term savings profiles close to retirement age, influence 
the total savings profiles.
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Long-term savings profiles showed upward trends from young age through to middle- 
age and reached a peak around the late 40s or 50s; this was consistent with the standard 
life-cycle model. However, long-term savings did not show a downward tendency in 
ages close to retirement, and two reasons for this were proposed: to bequeath to younger 
generations and/or to accumulate wealth for mortality risk.
By contrast, short-term savings profiles emerged as constant, at peak levels, between 
age 25 and the mid 50s. This points to the possibility that, from a short-term perspective, 
households, regardless of income growth in this period, consistently save only small 
amount of money, as they have a high discount rate with the short-term future. Also, 
this prevents them from splurging in the short-term future. Moreover, households who 
practice mental accounting also refrain from putting all the money into accounts for 
short-term purposes, as they have a higher propensity to consume out of these. Short­
term savings profiles showed falls from the mid-50s onwards, and this suggests that 
households’ income risk, especially unemployment risk, is decreasing and that regular 
expenditure declines as family size decreases. The profiles in this period are within the 
prediction of the standard/conventional life-cycle model.
The estimates of the profiles for the subgroups give enlightenment to the influence that 
gender, homeownership, private pension enrolment, and employment status have on the 
disparities in households’ saving behaviour. It was observed amongst males, 
homeowners, pension participants, and employees that households constantly preferred 
saving for the long term over the short term throughout the working life cycle.
The key characteristics of the long-term savings profiles for the whole sample were also 
observed amongst males, homeowners, and employees105. By contrast, females’ long­
term savings profiles are more consistent with the standard life-cycle hypothesis. The 
long-term savings profiles of private pension participants pointed to the influences of 
the life-cycle effects in the 40s or 50s, but the patterns during ages close to retirement 
were unclear. The features of the short-term savings profiles for the whole sample were 
also detected amongst males, homeowners, and employees. By contrast, a similar
105 It has been inferred previously that the self-employeds’ long-term savings profiles would be similar to 
those o f employees.
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inference cannot be drawn from the findings amongst females 106 and pension 
participants.
To sum up, this study has provided evidence for it being essential to investigate 
separately household’s savings-age profiles regarding two time preferences. 
Considering the findings in this study, it is concluded that the standard life-cycle model 
can better explain households’ long-term saving profiles and the downwards trends 
observed during ages close to retirement. In comparison, the behavioural models, which 
posit the influence of inconsistent time preferences, provide a justification for the short­
term savings profiles, which can be seen to remain at a constant level.
106 This may also be the case for the self-employed.
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CHAPTER 8 : SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
8.1 INTRODUCTION
Deriving from a life-cycle/permanent income hypothesis, the buffer-stock model 
(Carroll, 1992, 1997) has become a benchmark for explaining consumers’ precautionary 
saving motive and thus has provided valuable insights beyond the traditional life-cycle 
hypothesis. This model posits that consumers save in this period to buffer against 
income uncertainty or risk in the next period. Precautionary saving motive emerges 
when consumers’ prudence dominates their impatience. Later, the quasi-hyperbolic life­
cycle consumption model (Laibson, 1997, 1998) incorporated a new factor into the 
buffer-stock model framework, by assuming that consumers have dynamically 
inconsistent time preference, which is characterised by a quasi-hyperbolic discount 
function. This model suggests that consumers would gain more utility from consuming 
a unit of money in the long-term future than in the short-term future. Therefore, 
sophisticated consumers prefer saving for the long term than for the short term. 
Inconsistent time preference is considered to occur as a result of consumers’ having 
self-control problems; in order to manage self-control problems, consumers take up 
precommitment mechanisms to prevent them from splurging in the short term and to 
save for the long term.
A theoretical anomaly arises as a consequence: the precautionary saving effect, which 
relates current saving activity to income uncertainty in the next period, may be missing 
with a hyperbolic consumer, because they are disinclined to save for the next period. 
This illustrates that hyperbolic consumers’ saving decisions regarding saving motives 
are strongly affected by their inconsistent time preference, whereas under a life-cycle 
hypothesis, consumers’ intertemporal saving decisions emerge mainly as a result of 
their future needs, which are seen as saving motives, and their time preference is 
assumed to be consistent over time.
To gain more insights into households’ saving behaviour, the empirical studies in this 
thesis focused largely on examining the implications of the quasi-hyperbolic 
consumption model, which also included the aforementioned theoretical anomaly, by
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investigating the determinants of households’ saving motives and those of long-term 
and short-term decisions.
8.2 SUMMARY
This study examined saving behaviour at the household level by taking into account the 
influences of psychological factors in an empirical study of economic activities, in order 
to gain more understanding of the determinants of intertemporal saving decisions.
Chapter 1 gave a background introduction. To begin with, the formation of the concept 
of consistent time preference in a conventional life-cycle was presented. What followed 
aimed to highlight to what extent the introduction of some psychological factors has 
nourished the insights into consumers’ saving behaviour. For instance, the introduction 
of inconsistent time preference suggests that consumers’ saving decisions for the short 
term are the reverse of those which they would make for the long term future. Moreover, 
the process of how crucial psychological forces take place in a conventional 
consumption life-cycle model was illustrated. Finally, the main research intuition was 
set out: to look into consumers’ behaviour regarding long-term and short-term 
perspectives. This was followed by summaries of the important contributions and the 
outlines of this thesis.
Reviews of theoretical issues and related empirical literature were presented in chapter 2. 
Of the modem theories of consumption/saving behaviour, the buffer-stock model and 
the quasi-hyperbolic consumption model share a common proposition: consumers make 
intertemporal consumption/saving decisions, subject to temporal budget constraints, to 
maximise expected utility over their life time. However, the latter distinguishes itself by 
assuming that consumers’ time preferences are dynamically inconsistent. The 
theoretical implications of these two models were summarised and the existing 
anomalies highlighted. The buffer-stock model suggested the existence of precautionary 
saving behaviour, which related saving/savings to future income risk. The most 
important empirical issue was how to choose a proxy indicator for income risk and 
approaches to measuring it, and other linked factors considered the measurement of 
savings and econometric estimation methodologies. By and large, empirical studies in
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the United Kingdom have confirmed the importance of precautionary saving behaviour. 
It was also found that the precautionary saving effect does not relate to liquid wealth but 
to illiquid wealth, which was considered as counterintuitive to the buffer-stock model 
but can be explained by the quasi-hyperbolic consumption model (Carroll, Dynan, and 
Krane, 2003). However, empirical studies of the quasi-hyperbolic consumption model 
are limited. Most of them have been based on structure simulations by using U.S. 
survey datasets. These calibrations have highlighted that an economy with hyperbolic 
consumers better fits the observed data than one with exponential consumers. In the 
United Kingdom, related empirical studies do not exist. These discussions above 
positioned the main empirical objectives of this study: first, to explore the determinants 
of households’ temporal savings behaviour over a long-term and a short-term planning 
horizon, respectively; second, to re-examine the precautionary saving effect.
Chapter 3 gave a brief introduction to the data source, sample selection, and elementary 
data analysis. The datasets used waves 10-13 of the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS). To begin with, descriptions of the survey questions which were considered to 
be related to this study and were available from the data source were exhibited. This 
was to specify: 1) the three aspects of temporal saving behaviour -  saving motives, 
saving ratios, and saving amounts, and 2) the factors which were considered to have an 
impact on saving behaviour. The characteristics of the BHPS provided an advantageous 
platform for a household-level panel-data analysis for this study. Accordingly, samples 
for the three empirical analyses in this study were selected, respectively, for panel-data 
estimation. The selection of the sample was subject to the valid observations of the 
aforementioned variables. Eventually, the sample included households whose heads 
were: aged between 25 and 65, employed, and were making savings. Finally, 
elementary descriptive analyses of the dependent variables and their relationship to the 
key explanatory variables were presented. In brief, the results showed that a significant 
portion of households mainly engaged in long-term savings, which was demonstrated 
by: the frequent response of ‘mainly saving for the long term’, having a higher long­
term savings ratio, and the path of long-term savings amount against the age structure, 
being seen to exceed that of short-term savings. On the other hand, it emerged that the 
levels of short-term saving behaviour were consistently low. This provided a 
preliminary finding of households’ favouring saving for the long term than for the short 
term.
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Chapter 4, in accordance with the characteristics of the dependent variables employed 
in this study, introduced two existing econometric methodologies, which were applied 
for panel data. One was the random-effect Probit model and the other the random- 
effect Tobit model. A Probit model was chosen in response to the discrete feature of 
saving motives, and a Tobit model for the feature of censoring of the saving ratios. 
Justifications for choosing a random-effect model instead of one of fixed-effect were 
also provided. Moreover, a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model was 
employed to investigate the determinants of saving motives. This model has the 
advantage of obtaining cross-sectional estimates by allowing for the correlations 
between cross-sections. It can be applied in cross-sections with time-series data in that 
it is assumed that the correlations in the errors capture the households’ unobserved 
heterogeneity and time effects. Yet, contrasting with previous random-effect or a 
fixed-effect model, a SUR model does not need to impose any assumption on the 
distribution of the unobserved household heterogeneity. Finally, a non-parametric 
conditional kernel smooth quantile estimation method was chosen, to estimate the 
relationship between savings amount and age structure. A non-parametric estimation 
method plays a role in showing the relationship between the variables, with no need 
for any specific assumption about the distribution of the error term. This quantile 
analysis method allows one to look at the median estimates which are less vulnerable 
to distortion due to extreme observations, whereas mean estimates would easily 
encounter such a problem in a skewed dataset, which is the case in the dataset of this 
work. However, the disadvantage of using a cross-sectional estimation method was 
that the treatment of discriminating cohort effects from age effects could not be carried 
out, and this was because it would require a long panel to do so.
The empirical frameworks in chapters 5, 6, and 7 were formed in order to gauge the 
evidence in favour of the quasi-hyperbolic life-cycle consumption model, as well as to 
re-examine the precautionary saving effect. Chapter 5 explored the determinants of the 
saving motives of heads of household. The saving motives ranged between mainly 
saving for the long term and mainly saving for the short term, i.e. two preferences 
towards saving for the future. The crucial determinants of the tendencies towards these 
two saving preferences of interest were: the subjectively perceived risk of the 
households and their engagement in saving commitment mechanisms. Chapter 6 was
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concerned with the determinants of the saving ratios for the long-term and short-term 
horizons. In addition to the impacts from the aforementioned important determinants of 
saving motives, the influence of a behavioural factor - habit effect -  was discussed. The 
results emphasised that a habitual pattern significantly emerged in households’ savings 
ratios. In contrast to a humped-shape savings-age profile implied by the standard life­
cycle model, the feature of inconsistent time preference may cause divergence between 
the long-term savings-age profile and the short-term savings-age profile, over the life 
cycle. This forms the foundation of the empirical study presented in chapter 7.
In chapter 5, the determinants of saving motives for the long-term and short-term future 
of heads of household, were examined. The short-term precautionary saving effect, 
which was defined as saving for short-term aggregate risk in this study, was not found 
to be significant at the whole sample level nor in the two subgroups -  homeowners and 
private pension participants. Two explanations were proposed: first, households may 
have accumulated enough wealth to buffer short-term risk; second, this supported the 
quasi-hyperbolic consumption model, as this implied that the precautionary saving 
effect may be missing. In addition, there was another finding that went against the idea 
of there being a precautionary saving motive, which was that the heads of household 
with joint income sources were inclined to save for the short term, as discussed earlier. 
Nevertheless, it was observed at the whole sample level and in the homeowner group 
that an occupational effect was evident, showing that households in the sectors with 
unstable income streams and high income variance had stronger short-term saving 
motives, and this suggested the possibility of precautionary saving behaviour for these 
groups. However, this was not observed amongst pension participants. At the whole 
sample level, pension enrolment did not have a significant impact on saving motives, 
but homeowners were more likely to save mainly for the long term than non­
homeowners. The pattern that households, when holding illiquid wealth, exhibited a 
preference for saving mainly for the long term was consistent with the implications of 
the quasi-hyperbolic consumption model (Laibson 1998). Housing wealth distinguishes 
itself from pension wealth in that it can also serve as a type of precautionary savings to 
buffer uncertainty in the long term. Therefore, the aforementioned finding supports the 
possibility that housing wealth can be precautionary wealth (Laibson, 1997; Carroll and 
Samwick, 1998; Carroll, Dynan, and Krane, 2003). Having said this, in the case of 
homeowners, whether they chose to engage in a private pension scheme or not, had no
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effect on their saving motives. This proved to be the same for pension participants in 
respect of homeownership. Socioeconomic factors had robust impacts on households’ 
saving motives at the whole sample level and in the two subgroups. The results showed 
that higher education attainment enhanced households’ long-term saving motive, and 
strongly implied that having undertaken higher education played an important role in 
making people more inclined towards saving for the long term. This was explained by 
highly-educated households usually being more prudent and more likely to have jobs 
with higher payment as well as welfare coverage, than low-educated households. Thus, 
they were less concerned with saving for the short term and more likely to save for the 
long term. Female heads of households were more likely to save mainly for the short 
term at the 1% significance level than males, and this implied that females had a more 
profound short-term saving motive than males. This related to the situation that, in a 
household, it is usually the female members that are mainly in charge of financial 
management of a short-term basis. Estimated permanent income was considered as a 
proxy for a household’s wealth level. Households with higher permanent income, or 
wealth, were more likely to save mainly for the long term, suggesting that households 
with less wealth concerned themselves more with short-term precautionary savings, 
than those better off.
The findings in chapter 6 showed the determinants of long-term and short-term savings 
ratios of the households. Short-term financial expectations did not affect either the 
short-term or long-term saving ratio, and this finding implied that the precautionary 
saving effect, from a short-term perspective, was not significant. Households with this 
year’s financial situation better than the previous year, tended to save more for both the 
long term and the short term. For the subgroups, those in a good current financial 
situation saved more for the long term, those in a better financial situation than last year 
saved more for the short term, and those in a financial situation worse than last year 
save less for the long term. Households whose savings were mainly driven by habit, 
tended to have a lower short-term saving ratio, than those with a specific reason for 
saving, whereas the habit effect was not evident on households’ long-term saving ratios, 
in the whole sample or the subgroups. These findings supported the behavioural models 
in that: firstly, the precautionary saving effect was missing; secondly, households were 
likely to exercise an internal rule, such as mental accounting, to allocate savings for 
specific reasons into accounts with a lower propensity to consume. Homeowners’
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average short-term saving ratio was lower than that of their counterparts, and this 
suggested a robust connection between short-term discretionary saving and housing 
wealth. Two explanations were offered: firstly, housing wealth provided implicit 
liquidity, so households felt it less necessary to put away money for the short term to 
buffer short-term uncertainty; secondly, this demonstrated hyperbolic discounting 
behaviour. Pension enrolment only had an impact on increasing a household’s long­
term savings ratio. This indicated that there was no evident substitute effect of pension 
wealth in the accumulation of financial wealth for long-term purposes. Precautionary 
saving behaviour appeared evident in self-employed households and households in 
certain occupations. Self-employed households tended to save more for both the long 
term and the short term than employee households, at the whole sample level and for 
the subgroups. This verified that the self-employed households had more discretionary 
savings. Households in the ‘sales’, ‘personal & protective services’, and ‘craft related’ 
occupations, tended to save more for the short term and less for the long term, than 
households in the ‘plant and machine operative’ sector, at the whole sample and the 
subgroup levels. These occupations were considered to generate unstable income flow 
and higher income variability; thus, the findings suggested that the households with 
these jobs had a higher concern with their short-term future, than the long-term future. 
Socioeconomic factors demonstrated significant impacts on the saving ratios. Female 
households tended to save less for the long term than male households at the whole 
sample and for the two subgroups. This strongly related to the fact that females were 
usually in charge of expenditure management in a household over a short-term horizon. 
Highly educated households tended to save less for the short term and save more for the 
long term at the whole sample level and results were the same for the homeowners. This 
was explained by highly educated households being more prudent with saving for the 
long term than their counterparts; also, they were likely to be in jobs with good salary 
and welfare coverage, which mitigated their need of saving for the short term. It was 
found that as its wealth level increased, the short-term savings ratio of a household 
decreased, at the whole sample and the subgroup level. It was shown that many life­
cycle factors were more influential on households’ short-term saving behaviour than on 
their long-term saving behaviour. Age and household size only affected households’ 
short-term saving ratio. Factors like having young dependents and joint incomes, 
affected both the long-term and short-term savings ratios.
246
Chapter 7 investigated households’ intertemporal savings amount, with regard to the 
short-term and the long-term future, respectively, in terms of age structure. This aimed 
to examine the effect of inconsistent time preference on households’ savings-age 
profile over the life cycle. In the whole sample, the upward trend of total savings was 
highly determined by long-term savings, whereas the downward tendency close to 
retirement age, if present, was due to decreasing short-term savings. Total savings fell 
close to retirement age, and this was also the case with short-term savings, whereas 
long-term savings remained constant. Males’ total savings-age profiles were flattened 
by both long-term and short-term savings. The reasons for this are as follows: the 
upward trends that occurred during young age regarding the long-term savings profiles 
did not appear amongst the aggregate savings profiles, as these effects were disguised 
by the flat trends observed in the short-term savings profiles. When the short-term and 
long-term profiles are aggregated, the long-term humps are flattened by the 
incorporation of the former. Finally, the decreasing trends observed amongst short­
term savings profiles during ages close to retirement did not appear in the aggregate 
savings profiles.
The estimated results showed that females saved more for the short term, than for the 
long term, before middle age, suggesting that they did not always prefer saving for the 
long term throughout the working life cycle. The humps observed in the females’ total 
savings profiles were mainly attributed to long-term savings patterns that could be 
described by the conventional life-cycle model. Females tend to save less for the long 
term and more for the short term in the last few years of their working lives. The 
results showed that homeowners, in general, saved more for the long term than for the 
short term as long-term savings profiles are well above the short-term profiles, 
throughout the working life cycle. In comparison with the total savings profile of the 
whole sample, homeowners’ profiles were smoother. The life-cycle effects observed 
amongst homeowners’ long-term savings profiles appeared to be concealed in the 
total-savings profiles. The descending trends displayed in the homeowners’ short-term 
savings profiles did not emerge in the total saving profiles. For pension participants, 
the total savings profiles were highly determined by the long-term savings profiles, 
and the former profiles appeared smoother than the latter. In general, downward short­
term savings profiles suggested that the preference for short-term savings amongst 
pension participants decreased with age.
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Comparing the savings-age profiles of employees’ with those of the whole sample 
allowed for the detection of discrepancies, which could be attributed to the self- 
employeds’ savings patterns. Employees’ total savings profiles showed an upward 
trend in long-term savings during young and middle age and a decline in short-term 
savings in the 60s. In general, the total and long-term savings profiles of employees’ 
were similar to those of the whole sample; by contrast, the short-term savings profiles 
for employees from young to middle age, appeared smoother than those of the whole 
sample and descended during the period close to retirement. However, the short-term 
savings of the whole sample did not consistently appear to descend when approaching 
retirement. This suggested that the self-employeds’ short-term savings profile should 
appear volatile amongst young and middle-aged cohorts, and it was likely that they did 
not decrease their savings, for the short term, as they approached retirement.
8.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Investigating the influence of inconsistent time preference, characterised by a 
hyperbolic discount function, on households’ saving behaviour formed the central 
intuition of this study. In sum, the findings from the empirical studies of this work 
emerged as consistent with the theoretical predictions regarding the saving behaviour of 
hyperbolic consumers. In the United Kingdom, this study was the first to explore such a 
relevant issue by employing econometric analysis on field panel data from the BHPS.
Questions available from the BHPS, waves 10-13, provided useful information about 
individuals’ subjectively reported main preference of time horizons, regarding a 
intertemporal saving decision, which could be measured on a monetary scale, i.e. 
amount of savings. Such information allowed for the formation of two main ways of 
specifying households’ saving behaviour. To begin with, households’ saving motives 
came into view, which varied between saving mainly for the long-term future, saving 
mainly for short-term purposes, and saving for both the long and the short term, equally. 
Saving motives, here, represented individual’s subjective planning time horizons for a 
saving decision and gave an indication for how long households were willing to delay 
consumption and hence pinned down their preferences. Being able to locate time
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preference regarding an intertemporal saving decision, was one contribution of this 
study. Secondly, compared with ‘the motive’ which was a psychologically oriented 
concept, an economic concept -  saving amount - was later taken into account, which 
could be measured monetarily.
The concept of savings in this study referred to households’ discretionary savings in 
financial accounts. The savings were limited to households’ saving acts which took 
place only in that period, and were considered to be appropriate under the definitions of 
savings in this study. The effects of intertemporal time preferences occurred before 
every saving act was made in each period. Moreover, time preference was considered to 
be dynamically inconsistent, e.g. from this moment, a time two years hence could be 
seen as a long-term horizon, whereas one year in the future it was considered to be 
short-term. Identifying a household’s time preference for a saving act was restricted to 
the period when the saving acts occurred, rather than from total assets accumulated. If 
accumulated assets were used, a complex set of intertemporal decisions from the past 
would have to be included, for which there was no available information
Contrasting the theoretical implications of the buffer-stock model and the quasi- 
hyperbolic consumption model, the effects of inconsistent time preference related to 
three hypotheses: 1 ) the precautionary saving effect was missing; 2 ) saving for the long 
term was preferred to saving for the short term; 3) long-term saving preference was 
positively associated with consumers’ tendency towards holding illiquid wealth, e.g. 
housing wealth and/or self-imposed commitment to saving, such as joining in a private 
pension scheme. These hypotheses set out the empirical studies in chapters 5, 6 , and 7.
In sum, this study found that when the precautionary saving effect was conceptualised 
as the relationship between short-term saving behaviour and future uncertainty, it was 
missing. This was supported by the results that households’ financial expectations did 
not have an influence on their short-term saving behaviour.
Holding housing wealth or joining in a private pension scheme were influential on 
saving behaviour. The empirical results in this study showed that homeowners were 
inclined towards saving mainly for the long term and averse to saving mainly for the 
short term, when they were making discretionary savings. This reinforced the possibility
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that households in possession of illiquid wealth tended to show a weaker preference in 
saving for the short term. In addition, homeowners tended to save less for the short term 
than non-homeowners, but saved indifferently for the long term to non-homeowners. 
This strongly supported the quasi-hyperbolic consumption model in that such 
households tended to possess short-term savings at lower levels and meanwhile engaged 
in illiquid housing wealth. Whilst the effect of pension enrolment was insignificant on 
saving motives, the results showed that pension participants tended to save more for the 
long term. This suggested that pension participants managed to make more 
discretionary saving for the long tern than their counterparts who did not precommit 
themselves to saving for retirement. This confirmed the effect of engaging in an external 
commitment mechanism on long-term savings, and did not support the crowd-out effect 
of pension wealth on discretionary saving, whilst the standard life-cycle hypothesis 
would suggest such a crowd-out effect.
Regarding the savings-age profiles, the results favoured the behavioural models. Long­
term savings profiles showed upward trends from young age through to middle-age and 
reached a peak around the late 40s or 50s; this was consistent with the standard life­
cycle hypothesis. However, long-term savings did not show a downward tendency in 
ages close to retirement, and two reasons for this were proposed: to bequeath to younger 
generations and/or to accumulate wealth for mortality risk. By contrast, short-term 
savings profiles emerged as constant, at peak levels, between age 25 and the mid 50s. 
This pointed to the possibility that, from a short-term perspective, households, 
regardless of income growth in this period, consistently save only a small amount of 
money. This could be explained because: 1) they had a high discount rate with the 
short-term future; or 2 ) households practiced mental accounting and hence refrained 
from putting too much money into accounts for short-term purposes, for which they had 
a higher propensity to consume. Short-term savings profiles showed falls from the mid- 
50s onwards, and this suggested that households’ income risk, especially unemployment 
risk was decreasing and that regular expenditure declined as family size decreased. In 
sum, it was concluded that the standard life-cycle model could better explain 
households’ long-term saving profiles than short-term saving profiles. However, the 
behavioural models, which posit the influence of inconsistent time preferences, 
provided a justification for the short-term savings profiles.
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Socioeconomic factors -  the attainment of higher education and gender -  played robust 
roles in determining households’ saving behaviour. Compared with males, females’ 
long-term savings profiles were more consistent with the standard life-cycle hypothesis, 
displaying as a hump shape. Males’ short-term savings profiles were more in line with 
the prediction of the behavioural models, whereas females’ profiles exhibited 
fluctuations. The results that females were more likely to save mainly for the short term 
and that they tended to save less for the long term than males, suggested that the short­
term precautionary motive may be more profound in females than in males, and they 
were less impatient than the latter. Those who have attained higher education were 
inclined to save mainly for the long term and tended to save less for the short term than 
they did for long-term purposes.
A well-established habit had an impact on a household’s saving behaviour, and this was 
especially a focus in the domain of Behavioural Economics (Katona, 1980). A 
continuous habit could be the resistance to changes in human nature, suggesting an 
endowment effect. Such a habit effect on saving behaviour may take place so as to keep 
consumption expenditure below a certain level (Wameryd, 1999); alternatively, it could 
play the role as an internal rule of thumb for precommitments (Shefrin and Thaler, 
1988). The results in this study showed that households who saved mainly as the result 
of a habit tended to save less for the short term, but saved indifferently for the long term, 
when compared with their counterparts. This suggested that, if a habit effect played the 
role as an internal force in helping households, either to control expenditure or to save, 
it worked well for saving more for the long term but worked poorly in the case of short 
term saving. This could be explained by households’ being biased towards instant 
gratification rather than saving for the short term.
To conclude, households’ intertemporal saving behaviour, regarding the long-term 
future, displayed itself to be inconsistent with that for the short term. This could be seen 
from the investigation of the influences of various factors on households’ saving 
behaviour, which included: future uncertainty or risk, possession of illiquid wealth, 
exercising an internal rule or engaging in an external mechanism to make savings, and 
other socioeconomic and demographic factors. In brief, the findings provided valuable 
empirical evidence in support of the quasi-hyperbolic life-cycle consumption model and 
the behavioural life-cycle model.
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8.4 IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE EXTENTION
This study found that households did not save more with respect to risk in the short­
term future, and holding housing wealth further discouraged them from accumulating 
short-term savings. Assuming that the housing market remains stable, a question 
emerges: how do households finance their short-term income fluctuations? The concept 
of ‘Debt Puzzle’ was firstly proposed by Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (2000), 
regarding the phenomenon of households holding high credit card debts and high 
illiquid wealth at the same time, which suggested that they tended to borrow via credit 
cards to finance their short-term consumption. In the United Kingdom, much attention 
of policy analysts has been paid to the fact that the amount of unsecured debt has been 
surging in recent years. However, to the knowledge of this researcher, the impact that 
inconsistent time preference could have on the accumulation of unsecured debt, has not 
been investigated in this country. Therefore, it is worthwhile to examine whether or not 
British households rely largely on unsecured debt to finance their instant gratification. 
For such credit borrowers or for those homeowners who are still on a mortgage, their 
having lower liquid savings for short-term purposes may make them more vulnerable to 
changes in the monetary policy, which would be of note to policy analysts.
This thesis found that joining in a private pension schemes was related to households’ 
higher discretionary savings for the long term. This was consistent with what Katona 
(1965) stated: wealth did not necessarily reduce saving motives, and social security and 
private pension wealth may even increase the desire to save because being closer to 
one’s goal represented a psychological force that enhanced motivation, whereas 
motivation was weakened when it appeared impossible or very difficult to reach such a 
goal. A further extension of this could research the level of effectiveness, in a 
quantitative sense, of engaging in a private pension scheme or any other saving 
mechanism in enhancing households’ discretionary saving for the long term. This would 
lead to further useful insights for policymakers.
The influences of gender and the educational attainment displayed themselves as robust 
on households’ saving preferences and amount of savings made. Compared with males, 
females had a stronger short-term saving preference, but they had lower savings for the
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long term. Lowly educated households had a weaker preference for long-term savings 
and saved less for the long term. Therefore, a mandatory scheme of saving for 
retirement may be more necessary for females than males and for the lowly educated 
than the highly educated. An inference can be drawn: understanding the time 
preferences of the saving behaviour of different socioeconomic cohorts, provides useful 
information for evaluating the efficacy of a policy tool which is employed to enhance 
savings, e.g. a mandatory saving scheme.
It can be tracked back to 1834 when John Rae discussed the sociological and 
psychological determinants of intertemporal choices to explain the differences of 
national wealth across nations. Analogously, the concept of inconsistent time 
preferences could play a part in explaining the variations in different nations’ patterns of 
asset and unsecured debt accumulation, in a comparative study between countries. To 
successfully carry out such further research would require comprehensive field data 
which would need to collect consumers’ saving preferences in terms of time horizon as 
well as information on their asset portfolios and unsecured debt holdings.
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APPENDICES
SECTION A: DUMMY INDICATORS
Table A.l : Education dummy indicator
Code New education indicator Old (old code) education indicator
1 Higher than college Higher degree (1)
2 College First degree (2)
3 Some college Teaching QF (3); Other higher QF (4); Nursing QF (5)
4 A levels GCE A levels (6)
5 Less than A levels Others (7 and above)
Table A.2: Occupation dummy indicator
Code New occupation indicator Old occupation indicator
1 Managers & administrators (1) Employers, large; Managers, large; Employers, small; 
Managers, small; Farmers-employers
2 Professional (2) Professional, self-employed; Professional, employee
3 Associate professional & 
technical (3)
Junior non-manual; Unskilled manual worker
4 Clerical & secretarial (4) Intermediate non-manual, work; Intermediate non-manual, 
foreman
5 Craft related (5) Skilled manual workers; Semi-skilled manual; Foreman, 
manual
6 Personal & protective services 
(6)
Personal service worker; Members of armed for
7 Sales (7) Own account workers
8 Plants & machine operatives (8) Agricultural workers; Farmers—own account
Table A.3: Residential area dummy indicator
Code New area indicator Old (old code) area indicator
1 Greater London (1) Inner London (1); Outer London (2)
2 South East (2) Rest of South East (3)
3 South West (3) South West (4)
4 East (4) East Anglia (5); East midlands (6)
5 West Midlands (5) West midlands conurbation (7); Rest of west Midland (8)
6 Greater Manchester (6) Great Manchester (9)
7 North West (7) Merseyside (10); Rest of North West (11)
8 Yorkshire & Humberside (8) South Yorkshire (12); West Yorkshire (13); Rest of York & 
Humberside (14)
9 Tyne & Wear (9) Tyne & Wear (15); Rest of North (16)
10 Wales (10) Wales (17)
11 Scotland (11) Scotland (18)
12 Northern Ireland (12) Northern Ireland (19)
2 5 4
SECTION B: PROGRAMMING CODE OF THE KERNEL- 
SMOOTHED CONDITIONAL QUANTILE ESTIMATION 
METHOD
@ To get variables, age and savings©
output file = quantitle.out reset;
load yy[ 1705,2]= D:\Gauss\Savingratio\agesaving.dat;
"Do you want to search for CV bandwidth?";
"Type 0 for NO"; 
s witch l=con( 1 , 1 );
if sw itch l= 0 ; "what bandwidth do you want"; bw=con(l,l); 
"you have chosen BW=";; bw; endif;
nst=40;
"Number of bins:";; nst;
qts=.25|.5|.75;
"Quantiles are:";; qts';











format/ml /rd 1 0 ,2 ;
"Min Dependent:";;yoo[l,.];
"Max Dependent:";; yoo[n,.];
"Age of Max Dependent holder:";; xo[n,.];
"Median Dependent:";; yoo[trunc(n/2),.]; 
save yoo;
clear yoo;













if sumc(xo .eq j)— 0; "No one age:";;j;
if j==maxage; break; endif;
ifj .ltmaxage; j=j+l; i=i+l; continue; endif;
endif;






format /ml /rd 14,2 ;
"Level of Ind var count"; 
seqa(minage, 1 ,ages)~agecount;
agecl=(agecount .eq 0 )+agecount; 
z=z./agecl';
agec2 =(agecl .eq l)+agecl;
div=l/(agec2 -l);
zsdif=(z .It l).*(z.*(div'));
zbdif=(z .It 0 ).*(z.*(div')-(div'));
zs=z+zsdif;
zb=z+zbdif;
save z, agecount, mgy, xo, zsdif, zbdif, zs, zb;
@ end create cdfs by age @
load xo, z, agecount, yoo, mgy; 
m=seqa(minage, 1 ,ages); 
bwsave=zeros(ages,3);
@ calculate qhats @
qhatm=zeros(rows(agecount),rows(qts));
i=0 ;
do until i=rows(qts); 
qt=qts[i+l,.];
lbt=sumc(z .It qt);
tl=(lbt .eq 0 )+(lbt .eq rows(z));
ib=(tl .eq 0 ).*lbt + (tl .ne 0 )*trunc(rows(z)/2 );
klb=diag(submat(z,lb,0 ));










format 1 0 ,6 ; 
proc loss(al);
@ This proc calcs values for loss function @
@ al is bandwidth @
local j, kr, klb, kub, kscdf, kscdfs, kscdfss, kscdfsb, lb, loss, m, 
n l, n2, n3, ncol, qlb, qub, qk, qks, qkb, qtv, sw3, wd, w tl, wt2, 
wt3, wts, none, vect, wtemp, tmat, wtsd, 
zlb, zub, zk, lossl,yl,y 2 , rz, ii, ni, route 1 , route2 ;
@ create triangular kernel weights @ 
wts=zeros(ages,ages); @ cols are weights for each age @ 
m=seqa(minage, 1 ,ages);
j=minage;
do until j= m axage+ l; 
w tl= l - (4/(al A2))*((m-j)A2); 
wt2 =wtl.*(wtl .gtO); 
wts[. j-(minage-1 )] =wt2 ;
j=j+i;
endo;






@ end create triangular kernel weights @ 
rz=rows(z);
@ calc kernel smoothed quantiles @ 
kscdfs=z*wts;
lbt=sumc(kscdfs .It (qt+1 0 A(-1 0 )));
tl=(lbt .eq 0 )+(lbt .eq rz);






kr=(tl .eq 0 ).5|tkr + ,l*(tl .eq 1 ); 




lbt=sumc(kscdfss .It (qt+1 0 A(-1 0 )));
tl=(lbt .eq 0 )+(lbt .eq rz);
lb=(tl .eq 0 ).*lbt + (tl .ne 0 )*trunc(rz/2 );
klb=diag(submat(ksedfss,lb,0 ));





kr=(tl .eqO).*kr+ .l*(tl .eq 1 ); 
qks=((qt-klb). *qub+(kub-qt). *qlb)./kr; 
clear zsdif,zs;
load zbdif,zb;
kscdfsb=((kscdfs+zbdif. * wtsd’). * sw3 '-zb. * wd1) ./(s w3 -wd)';
lbt=sumc(kscdfsb .It (qt+1 0 A(-1 0 )));
tl=(lbt .eq 0 )+(lbt .eq rz);







kr=(tl .eq 0 ).*kr + .l*(tl .eq 1 ); 
qkb=((qt-klb). * qub+(kub -qt). * qlb) ./kr; 
clear zbdif,zb;
@ end calc kernel smoothed quantiles @





zub=diag(submat(z,lb+l ,0 )); 
kr=kub-klb;
zk=(zub. *(qk-klb)+zlb. *(kub-qk))./kr; 
qtv=qt*ones(rows(zk),l); 
n 1  =(minc(qtv, |zk')). * agecount; 
n3=( 1 -maxc(qtv' |zk*)).* agecount; 
n2 =agecount-n 1  -n3;
loss 1 =( 1 -qt) * (n 1 . * (qkb-qhat))+qt* (n3. * (qhat-qks))
+(qk .gt qhat). *n2 . *(qt*qhat+( 1  -qt)*qkb-(qhat+qk)/2 ) 





if switch 1 = 0 ; goto route4; endif;
"If you do not wish to search for optimal bandwidth, type 0" 
testl=con(l,l);
"Starting bandwidth";; stbase = con(l,l);
"Size of step";; step=con(l,l);




do until i .gt nstep; 
j=stbase+(i- 1  )* step;
jk= 0 ;
do until jk==rows(qts);
qt=qts[jk+l, 1 ]; qhat=qhatm[.,jk+l];









^  ************** ggY UP PLOTS *******************************
"If you want to create a matrix of quantile values - type 1;
if not, type anything else to proceed ";;
no=con(l,l);
if no==0; goto route5; endif; 
clear z;
clear jb l , jb2, jb3, jb4; 
proc plotmat(al);
@ This proc sets up matrix to be plotted @
@ al is bandwidth @
local j, kr, klb, kub, kscdf, kscdfs, kscdfss, kscdfsb, lb, loss, m,
n l, n2, n3, ncol, qlb, qub, qpl, qk, qks, qkb, qtv, sw3, wd, w tl, wt2,
wt3, wts, none, vect, wtemp, tmat, wtsd,
zlb, zub, zk, lossl,yl,y 2 , rz, ii, ni, route 1 , route2 ,
qkl,qk2,qk3;
@ create triangular kernel weights @
load z;
wts=zeros(ages,ages); @ cols are weights for each age @ 
m=seqa(minage, 1 ,ages);
j=minage;
do until j= m axage+ l; 
w tl= l - (4/(alA2))*((m-j)A2); 
wt2 =wtl.*(wtl .gtO); 
wts [. j-(minage-1 )] =wt2 ;
j=j+i;
endo;





@ end create kernel weights @ 
rz=rows(z);
@ calc kernel smoothed quantiles @
kscdfs=z*wts;
jb4=z;
lbt=sumc(kscdfs .It (qt+1 0 A(-1 0 )));
tl=(lbt .eq 0 )+(lbt .eq rz);




qub=mgy [(lb+1 ),. ];
kr=kub-klb;
kr=(tl .eq 0 ).*kr + .l*(tl .eq 1 ); 






jb 2 =qk2 ;






if switchl .ne 0 ;
"Set bandwidth bw=con(l,l);
"You have chosen BW = bw; 
endif;
i=l;
do until i .gt rows(qts); 
qt=qts[i,.];





"Do you want to add values for another bandwidth to the output? 
Type 0 for no; anything else to continue";; 
no= 0  @con(l,l)@;
if no==0; goto route7; else; ftrip=2; goto route6 ; endif; 
route7:
ksqtout=seqa(minage, 1 ,ages)~ksqtout;
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